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45!St.!Augustine,!Confessions,!trans.!Henry!Chadwick!(Oxford:!Oxford!University!Press,!2009)!X.18.!
  
192 
broader!cultural!discourse!of!its!epoch!and!its!more!immediate!philosophical!context.!It!
is!in!its!historicity,!and!more!specifically!with!its!insistence!on!the!immanence!of!
negation!to!the!specific!context!of!philosophical!development,!that!Hegel’s!Logic!will!
seek!a!ground!for!the!basic!elements!of!thought!and!being!that!will!avoid!the!charge!of!
arbitrariness.!
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$
$
CHAPTER$3$$
HEGEL:$NEGATION$AND$THE$LOGIC$OF$THE$CONCEPT$
Section(One.(Introduction(
$ If$the$method$of$division$is$the$method$by$which$definitions$are$established,$and$
definitions$conform$to,$and$indeed$state,$the$essence$of$a$thing,$then$it$is$through$
division$that$the$homology$between$logic$and$metaphysics$is$most$clearly$
demonstrated,$all$the$more$so$since$though$division$primarily$serves$the$interests$of$the$
systematic$knowledge$of$general$truths,$it$is$also$in$principle$applicable$to$the$full$range$
of$predicables,$including$accidents,$and$so$makes$visible$a$link$between$ontology$and$
ordinary$talk$about$contingent$truths$and$particulars$as$well.$So$much$is$clear$in$both$
Plato$and$Boethius,$and$thus$for$the$conception$of$logic$that$prevails$throughout$
scholastic$philosophy,$yet$it$is$precisely$the$ontological$import$of$negation,$as$we$have$
seen,$that$drives$Boethius$to$abjure$what$is$clearly$entailed$by$the$method$he$
champions$as$the$centerpiece$of$the$logica,vetus,$namely,$the$operation$of$negation$
involved$in$parsing$the$divisions$of$a$given$genusOspecies$lineage.$This$is$why$his$
proscription$of$negation$is$framed$in$terms$of$a$rejection$of$contradiction.$
Boethius’$argument$that$the$application$of$negation$issues$in$the$destruction$of$
being$turns$out$to$have$depended$upon$a$conception$of$negation$that,$while$Platonic$in$
terms$of$the$ontological$import$it$assigns$negation,$sidesteps$Plato’s$more$specific$
$$
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identification$of$negation$with$ontological$difference.$More$significantly,$the$conception$
of$negation$relevant$to$the$generation$of$contraries$in$division$is$at$odds$both$with$the$
extinctive$conception$Boethius$neglects$to$recognize$and$the$separative,conception$he$is$
apparently$bound$to.$Rather,$what$drives$Boethius’$proscription$is$the$looming$threat$of$
ontological$disunity$in$the$fabric$of$those$things$about$which$philosophy$and$theology$
are$most$urgently$concerned:$being,$truth$and$essence.$Together,$the$system$of$
predicables,$the$conception$of$the$proposition$and$thought$that$system$is$supposed$to$
ground,$and$the$method$of$division$that$reveals$the$permissible$lines$of$attribution$
imply$a$principle$at$odds$with$the$largely$Aristotelian$account$of$determination$that$
prevails$from$Boethius$onwards,$the$principle,$namely,$that$all,determination,is,negation$
(omnis,determinatio,est,negatio).$
As$suggested$in$the$introduction,$this$principle,of,negative,determination$(PND),
can$be$seen$as$following$from$two$principles$that$precede$it$historically:$(1)$all$division$is$
negation,$and$(2)$all$determination$is$division.$Thus$far$I$have,$in$effect,$argued$that$(1)$
is$more$or$less$Plato’s$principle$and$that$(2)$is$roughly$Boethius’.$On$the$familiar$
Hegelian$model$of$phenomenological$dialectic,$Hegel$himself$comes$to$the$principle$by$
way$of$a$kind$of$deductive$inheritance,$which$is$to$say$not$that$he$deduces$it$from$the$
principles$of$his$philosophical$forebears,$but$that$he$arrives$at$it$through$the$inferential$
force$of$the$tradition$itself,$just$as,$for$example,$the$formalism$of$Stoic$logic$can$be$seen,$
from$Hegel’s$perspective,$to$imply$the$development$of$selfOconsciousness$by$realizing,$in$
$$
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effect,$(a$law$of)$the$autonomy$of$calculative$thought,1$although$this$implication$was$
unavailable$to$the$Stoics$themselves,$for$whom$the$relation$between$thought$and$
consciousness$remained$to$be$thought.$To$this$extent,$Stoic$logic,$or$Stoicism$more$
generally,$is$to$be$thought$of$as$a$formal$expression$whose$determinate$meaning$awaits$
its$realization$in$subsequent$philosophical$or$cultural$discourse.$
Likewise,$Plato’s$discovery$of$the$role$of$negation$in$the$differentiation$of$forms$
and$concepts$amounts$to$a$formal$expression$of$the$negativity$of$discursive$thought,$
which,$though$also$implicit$in$the$foundations$of$scholastic$logic$and$metaphysics,$as$we$
have$seen,$is$first$explicitly$realized$and$articulated$in$Hegel,$and$encapsulated$in$the$
logicoOmetaphysical$law$he$ascribes$to$Spinoza,$i.e.,$PND.2$In$the$Science,of,Logic,$Hegel$
tells$us$that$the$principle$is$the$“basis$of$the$absolute$unity$of$substance”$but$that$
Spinoza’s$mistake$was$to$have$conceived$negation$as$mere$“determinateness,
(Bestimmtheit),or$quality”$and$not$“as$absolute,$that$is,$self9negating$negation.”3$This,$
according$to$Hegel,$is$to$understand$the$determinative$role$of$negation$as$limited$to$
particularization$(Besonderung),$that$is,$as$external$to$substance,$which$qua$substance$
admits$of$no$particularization.$But$if$negation$remains$an$operation$external$to$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
1$Phenomenology,of,Spirit$§197O§200.$Unless$otherwise$indicated,$all$translations$of$the$Phenomenology,
of,Spirit$are$from$G.$W.$F.$Hegel,$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$trans.$A.$V.$Miller$(Oxford,$1977).$Translations$
of$the$two$Logics$are$from$the$Cambridge$Hegel$Translations$editions,$The,Science,of,Logic,$trans.$George$
Di$Giovanni$(Cambridge,$2010)$and$Encyclopedia,of,the,Philosophical,Sciences,in,Basic,Outline,,Part,I:,
Science,of,Logic,$trans.$Klaus$Brinkmann$and$Daniel$O.$Dahlstrom$(Cambridge,$2010).$$$
$
2$As$mentioned$in$the$introduction,$Hegel$cites$a$version$of$this$principle$from$Spinoza,$but$its$intended$
use$in$Spinoza$is$far$more$restricted.$
$3$Science,of,Logic,$11.376.$
$$
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substance,$then$substance$itself$stands$against$whatever$is$particularized$in$relation$to$
it,$and$to$this$extent$remains$undetermined.4$To$be$sure,$it$remains$thereby$the$very$
exemplar$of$pure$being$(inasmuch$as$it$is$unqualified$by$negation)$and$unity$(inasmuch$
as$it$is$therefore$internally$undifferentiated).$Yet$substance$is$also$thereby,$so$Hegel$
insists,$something$devoid$of$content,$and$so$is$the$complement$of$a$world$that,$in$
actuality,$has$no$worldly,reality.$Hegel,$apparently$following$Salomon$Maimon,5$calls$
such$a$view$acosmism,6$inasmuch$as$“according$to$this$philosophy$there$is$actually$no$
world$at$all$in$the$sense$of$some$positive$being$(eines,positiv,Seienden).”$
$ This$account$of$individuation,$which$in$some$form$or$other$makes$its$appearance$
in$Porphyry,$Boethius,$Eriugena,$Odo$of$Tours,$Anselm,$Gilbert$of$Poitiers,$and$others,$
has$been$called$the$“standard$theory$of$individuality”$in$medieval$philosophy.7$The$basis$
for$this$account$is$the$proposition$that$what$makes$an$individual$substance$individual$is$
the$specific$set$of$properties$and$accidents$possessed$by$that$and$no$other$substance.$
The$view$that$Hegel,$in$effect,$attributes$to$Spinoza$is$that$the$relationship$between$
these$accidents$and$the$substance$they$individuate$is$that$of$negation.$His$complaint$is$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$4$See$his$remarks$in$the$Lectures,on,the,History,of,Philosophy:,The,Lectures,of,182591826,$Volume,III,$ed.$
Robert$F.$Brown$(Berkeley:$University$of$California$Press,$1990),$154.$
$
5(The$opposition$between$atheism$and$acosmism$can$apparently$be$traced$back$to$Salomon$Maimon’s$
discussion$in$his$autobiography.$See$Salomon,Maimons$Lebensgeschichte,$edited$by$Zwi$Batscha$
(Frankfurt$am$Main:$Insel,$1984).(
$$
6$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§50.$
$
7$This$designation$and$an$extensive$discussion$of$the$principal$claims$of$such$a$theory$are$to$be$found$in$J.$
J.$E.$Gracia’s$Introduction,to,the,Problem,of,Individuation,in,the,Early,Middle,Ages$(Philosophia$Verlag,$
1984).$See$also$Peter$King’s$“The$Problem$of$Individuation$in$the$Middle$Ages,”$Theoria$66$(2000):$159O
184.$
$$
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that$because$the$relation,$and$so$the$attributes$themselves,$are$external$to$the$
substance$in$question,$they$fail$to$determine$it$at$all,$and$simply$define$a$nonO
substance.$At$the$heart$of$this$complaint$lies$an$objection$of$the$sort$familiar$from$
contemporary$critiques$of$what$is$typically$called$the$bundle,theory$of$individuation,8$
i.e.,$that$individuals$are$defined$by$the$unique$set$of$properties$they$possess,$although$
most$bundle$theorists$claim$not$that$the$relevantly$bundled$properties$are$negations$of$
the$substance$they$individuate,$but$rather$that$there$is$no$substance$apart$from$such$
bundles.$Another$way$of$putting$Hegel’s$objection,$then,$would$be$to$say$that$Spinoza’s$
view$of$the$relationship$between$properties$and$substance$implies$a$conception$of$
individuation$that$leaves$the$relevant$substance$untouched$by$the$properties$that$
would$determine$it,$or$leaves$a$world$of$property$clusters$(bundles)$without$substance,$
and$therefore$without$being$(since$being,$in$this$instance,$is,$as$a$matter$of$stipulation$
external$to$the$properties$determined$in$relation$to$it).$
While$spelling$out$and$assessing$Spinoza’s$position$are$not$our$direct$concern,$it$
is$nonetheless$helpful$in$trying$to$make$sense$of$Hegel’s$view$on$negative$determination$
to$see$what$he$finds$inadequate$in$Spinoza’s,$and,$if$he$does$misrepresent$Spinoza,$to$
understand$why$he$might$be$inclined$to$do$so.$Now$Spinoza$does$indeed$cite$a$
quantificationOfree$version$of$the$principle,$i.e.,$determinatio,est,negatio,$in$his$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
8$See,$for$example,$Michael$Loux’s$discussion$of$the$objection$in$Metaphysics:,A,Contemporary,
Introduction$(New$York:$Routledge,$1998),$93.$Loux$poses$the$objection$in$terms$of$a$difficulty$bundle$
theories$have$explaining$the$meaning$of$ordinary$subject$predicate$propositions$that$purport$to$attribute$
a$property$to$an$object$that$possesses$them.$
$$
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correspondence$with$a$certain$Jarig$Jelles9$in$defense$of$the$claim$that$"figura,negatio,
[est],"$where$figura$is$contrasted$with$integram,materiam$(matter$as$a$whole).$Since$
Spinoza$appears$to$take$the$position$that$substance$is$itself$an$undivided$whole$
(integra),this$claim$about$figura$might$well$be$thought,$on$analogy,$to$imply$that$its$
modes,$understood$as$determinations,$may$to$this$extent$be$regarded$as$negations$of$
that$substance.$
However,$in$the$context$of$Spinoza’s$response$to$Jelles,$determinatio$clearly$
carries$a$far$more$restricted$sense.$The$(roughly)$geometrical$relationship$between$
materia,and$figura$is$analogous$not$to$the$relationship$between$substance$and$mode,$
but$to$individual$things$or$modes$and$their$“extrinsic$denominations,$relations$or,$at$
best,$circumstances$(denominationes,extrinsecas,,relationes,,aut,ad,summum,
circumstantias).”10$Here’s$what$Spinoza$writes$to$Jelles:$
…figure$applies$only$to$finite$and$determinate$bodies.$For$he$who$says$that$he$
apprehends$a$figure,$thereby$means$to$indicate$simply$this,$that$he$apprehends$a$
determinate$thing$and$the$manner$of$its$determination.$This$determination$
therefore$does$not$pertain$to$the$thing$in$regard$to$its$being;$on$the$contrary,$it$is$its$
nonObeing.$So$since$figure$is$nothing$but$determination,$and$determination$is$
negation,$figure$can$be$nothing$other$than$negation.11$
$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$9$Epistola$L,$dated$June$2,$1674.$For$translations$of$this$and$other$letters,$see$The,Letters,$translated$by$S.$
Shirley;$introduction$and$notes$by$Jacob$Adler,$Steven$Barbone,$and$Lee$Rice$(Indianapolis:$Hackett,$
1995).$Jelles$was$a$Dutch$merchant$and$a$member$of$a$small$circle$of$intellectuals$with$whom$Spinoza$
regularly$met$and$corresponded.$
$
10$Spinoza,$Tractatus,De,Intellectus,Emendatione,$§101,$in$Spinoza,Opera,$ed.$Carl$Gebhardt$(Heidelberg:$
Carl$Winter,$1925).$For$the$English$translation$see$Spinoza:,Complete,Works,$trans.$Samuel$Shirley$
(Indianapolis:$Hackett$Publishing$Company,$2002).$
$
11$Epistola$L.$
$$
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While$he$cites$determinatio,est,negatio$as$a$general$principle,$the$notion$of$
determinatio$he$has$in$mind$here$is$that$of$finite$limit,$i.e.,$that$which$confers$the$
specific$shape,$boundary$or,$more$abstractly,$finitude$upon$what$is$finite,$and$so$has$
nothing$obvious$to$do$with$being$or$substance$as$such,$or$with$the$essence$of$the$
modes.$
If$negation$plays$a$role$in$particularization$or$individuation,$i.e.,$in$making$
something$the$contingent$particular$it$is,$as$it$seems$to,$it$is$certainly$not$by$way$of$
establishing$the$determinations$(or$actualizations)$of$being.$At$best,$negation$produces$a$
finite$reflection$of$the$absolute$attributes$or$modes$of$the$divine$substance.$12$This$still$
amounts$to$construing$negation$as$a$mechanism$of$particularization,$but$presumably$
without$acosmist$consequences.$On$this$account,$Spinoza$holds$that$the$entire$cosmos$
is$actually,$and$infinitely,$present$in$divine$substance,$but$is$also$finitely$reflected$in$the$
determinations$used$to$cognize$it.$Yet$since$such$reflective$determination$is$necessarily$
external$to$substance,$this$still$does$not$yield$an$actual$world,$even$if$it$presupposes$an$
actual,$ontologically$replete,$substance.$If$what$we$mean$by$the$world$is$what$we$think$
we$mean,$that$is,$something$we$finitely$inhabit,$cognize,$etc.,$then$it$will$have$only$as$
much$reality$as$our$reflected$determinations$can$muster,$which,$if$negation$functions$as$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
12This,$in$its$essentials,$is$the$interpretation$of$Spinoza’s$use$of$the$principle$of$negative$determination$
offered$by$Yitzak$Melamed$in$his$"$'Omnis,determinatio,est,negatio'$–$Determination,$Negation$and$SelfO
Negation$in$Spinoza,$Kant,$and$Hegel,"$in$Spinoza,and,German,Idealism,$ed.$E.$Förster$and$Y.$Melamed$
(Cambridge:$Cambridge$University$Press,$2012),$195.$More$specifically,$Melamed$argues$that$the$use$of$
negation$yields$a$“partial$negation”$of$the$absolute$attribute,$though$it$isn’t$quite$clear$what$the$partiality$
of$negation$amounts$to.$
$$
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this$construal$of$the$principle$says$it$does,$isn’t$quite$enough$to$make$it$something$
existent,$let$alone$something$sufficiently$unified$to$count$as$a$world$or$cosmos.$
To$treat$negation$as$an$instrument$of$particularization,$from$Hegel’s$perspective,$
is$thus$to$misidentify$the$locus$and$range$of$negation,$namely,$to$hold$that$it$has$no$
intrinsic$relation$to$substance,$which$substance,$in$turn,$admits$of$no$negation$or$
differentiation$within$it.$When$applied$to$substance$so$conceived$(as$pure$being),$
without$differentiated$content,$it$therefore$yields$simple$non9being,$if$it$yields$anything$
at$all.$And$thus$if$being$is$all$that$is,$then$however$rich$in$delimiting$determinations$(i.e.,$
particularizations)$the$world$constituted$in$relation$to$it$might$be,$it$strictly$speaking$
isn’t.$If$this$is$the$case,$then$negation$so$applied$is$a$determination$not$in$the$sense$of$
providing$or$realizing$the$content$of$substance,$but$in$the$sense$of$externally$delimiting$
what$is$already$substantially$determined$by$other$means.$
Alternatively,$if$negation$is$instead$taken$to$be$virtually$internal$to$substance,$
i.e.,$as$the$potential$medium$of$cognition,$then$substance$itself$might$instead$be$
conceived$as$possessing$a$kind$of$potential,$virtual$or$rational$(that$is,$discursively$
realizable)$plenitude$that$can$be$actualized$through$its$successive$determinations.$On$
such$a$view,$substance$is$already$a$Stimmung,$a$potentiality$for$all$the$determinations$
(Bistimmungen)$that$can$be$determinately$expressed$or$derived$from$it.$In$one$sense,$
then,$substance$here$is$already,$in,potentia,$all$the$determinations$that$can$be$drawn$
from$it.$On$the$other$hand,$it$would$not$be$determinately,$in,actu,$any$of$these$
determinations,$taken$individually$or$collectively.$Hegel$attributes$something$like$this$
$$
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position$to$Leibniz,$whom$he$thinks$presents$an$inevitable$counterpoint$to$Spinoza,$or$
more$pointedly,$whose$Monadology$he$thinks$remedies$“the$lack$of$immanent,
reflection$that$affects$both$the$Spinozist$exposition$of$the$absolute$and$the$doctrine$of$
emanation.”13$The$problem$with$Leibniz’s$view$is$that$while$granting$the$immanence$of$
determination$–$each$monad$is$“the$totality$of$the$content$of$the$world,”$but$is$only$“a$
negative$reflected$into$itself”14$–$determination$is$assigned$an$external,principle,$that$is,$
in$Hegel’s$terms,$it$is$in,itself,$but$not$for,itself,$the$requisite$plenitude$of$substance.$
For$Hegel,$by$contrast,$negation$is$immanent$both$to$substance$and$thought,$
and$is$thus$an$internal$principle$of$conceptual$and$ontological$realization$alike,$or$more$
precisely$it$is$the$internal$principle$of$the$latter$because,it$is$the$internal$principle$of$the$
former.$This$follows$from$the$fact$that$for$Hegel$the$logic$that$“coincides$with$
metaphysics”$is$finally$a$logic$of$the$concept.$For$its$part,$negation$is$not$merely$that$
which$“propels$the$concept$onward,”15$but$is$present$in$“reality$itself.”16$Negation$is$
thus$internal$to$the$concept$itself$and$corresponds,$as$Plato$first$made$apparent,$to$the$
internal$otherness$of$every$substance,$i.e.,$its$being$a$totality$of$determinations$that$are$
both$other$than$it$and$constitutive$of$its$totality.$Hegel,$unlike$Plato,$however,$will$insist$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
13$Science,of,Logic$II.378.$
$
14$Science,of,Logic$II.378.$
$
15$Science,of,Logic$21.39.$
$
16$Science,of,Logic$21.102.$
$$
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on$the$interior$contradiction$this$entails,$rather$than$taking$refuge$in$the$more$benign$
notion$of$affine$alterity.$
To$begin$with,$Hegel$links$negation$to$propositional$expression,$but$also$
develops$the$inherence$conception$of$the$proposition$he$inherits$from$the$scholastic$
tradition,$according$to$which$the$proposition$is$grounded$in,$and$is$an$expression$of$
what$inheres$in,$the$concept$(Begriff),$which$Hegel$identifies$as$the$“general$form”$of$
philosophical$or$speculative$thought.17$Hegel$describes$the$crucial$role$of$negation,$or$
more$specifically$determinate,negation,$as$follows:$
The$one$thing$needed$to$achieve$scientific$progress$–$and$it$is$essential$to$make$an$
effort$at$gaining$this$quite$simple$insight$into$it$–$is$the$recognition$of$the$logical$
principle$that$negation$is$equally,positive,$or$that$what$is$selfOcontradictory$does$not$
resolve$itself$into$a$nullity,$into$abstract$nothingness,$but$essentially$only$into$the$
negation$of$its$particular$content;$or$that$such$a$negation$is$not$just$negation,$but$is$
the$negation$of$the$determined$fact$which$is$resolved,$and$is$therefore$determinate$
(bestimmte)$negation;$that$in$the$result$there$is$therefore$contained$in$essence$that$
from$which$the$result$derives$–$a$tautology$indeed,$since$the$result$would$otherwise$
be$something$immediate$and$not$a$result.$Because$the$result,$the$negation,$is$a$
determinate$negation,$it$has$a$content.$It$is$a$new$concept$but$one$higher$and$richer$
than$the$preceding$–$richer$because$it$negates$or$opposes$the$preceding$and$
therefore$contains$it,$and$it$contains$even$more$than$that,$for$it$is$the$unity$of$itself$
and$its$opposite.$–$It$is$above$all$in$this$way$that$the$system$of$concepts$is$to$be$built$
(bilden)$–$and$it$has$to$come$to$completion$in$an$unstoppable$and$pure$progression$
(Gange)$that$admits$of$nothing$extraneous.18$
$
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17$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§9.$
$
18$Science,of,Logic,$21.38.$
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And$here,$in$brief,$is$the$full$logic$of$conceptual$form,19$cast$in$much$the$same$terms$as$
Plato$casts$the$hodos,diaireseōs,$the$method$of$division,$as$that$through$which$
“everything$that$has$been$discovered$pertaining$to$technē$has$come$to$transparency$
(phanera,gegone).”20$At$its$center$lies$the$differentiating$instrument$of$determinate,
(bestimmte)$negation,$which$is$positive$in$just$the$sense$that$it$brings$about,$and$so$in$
effect$posits,$a$new$content,$and$thus$a$new,$higher,and,richer$concept,$since$it$retains,$
while$superseding,$the$content$of$its$negated$precursor.$This$basic$mode$of$such$
negation,$the$process$through$which$it$builds$content,$is$what$Hegel$calls$sublation$
(Aufhebung),$and$in$its$establishing,$as$a$result,$an$ordered$system$of$concepts$it$is$no$
longer$a$mere$instrument$of$discovery$(heuresis).$Aufhebung,$then$is$negation$as$a$
formative$principle$of$differentiation.$However,$its$operation$and$the$conceptual$
“progression”$Hegel$speaks$of$here$will$turn$out$to$depend$fundamentally$on$the$
engagement$of$the$concept$in$the$proposition$(Satz),$what$amounts$to,$for$Hegel,$
judgment$(Urteil).$It$is$therefore$with$Hegel’s$treatment$of$judgment$that$we$must$
begin,$inasmuch$as$it$is$here$that$negation$exhibits$this$characteristic$mode$of$
operation.$
(
(
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19$The$reference$here,$it$should$be$clear,$is$to$the$logic$of$form$based$on$SpencerOBrown’s$Laws,of,Form,$
which$I$discuss$in$the$Introduction.$
$
20$Plato$Philebus$16c2O3.$
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Section(Two.(Infinite(Judgment(and(the(Immanence(of(Negation(
$ In$a$curious$section$of$the$Phenomenology,of,Spirit$entitled$Observing,Reason,$
Hegel$generates$one$of$the$more$curious$pronouncements$of$occidental$philosophy,$
what$would$appear$to$be$a$moment$of$surpassing$philosophical$bathos:$"The$Spirit$is$a$
bone."21$Appearances$notwithstanding,$this$aphorism,$and$the$breadth$of$its$meaning$
earn$it$such$a$designation,$is$the$crystallization$and$critique$of$a$philosophical$tendency,$
depending$on$how$one$records$its$history,$that$begins$with$Anaxagoras,$as$Plato$alerts$
us$in$the$Phaedo,$and$continues$in$the$raft$of$contemporary$explorations$of$naturalism$
in$epistemology,$philosophy$of$mind$and$metaphysics.22$
So$construed,$it$expresses,$on$Hegel’s$first$gloss,$the$fact$that$"the$universality$
that$each$individual$as,such$attains$is$pure,being,,death."23$If$we$seek$an$empirical$
record$of$consciousness,$mind$or$Spirit$we$will$indeed$find$one$in$its$appearance,$acts$
and$effects,$but$in$none$of$these$will$one$find$the$vital$individuality$of$that$
consciousness$or$Spirit$itself.$The$phenomenon,$here$the$visible$materiality$of$an$
immaterial$substance,$in$its$dead$if$accessible$particularity,$is$in$the$first$place$the$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
21$The$original$form$of$the$proposition$is$"The$being$of$Spirit$is$a$bone,"$which$serves$to$highlight$its$
connection$to$the$Aristotelian$identification$of$individual$substance$as$the$subject$proper$of$predication.$
In$other$words,$insofar$as$"the$Spirit"$properly$serves$as$the$subject$of$predication$it$is$precisely$its$being,$
its$substance,$that$awaits$determination,$as$I$hope$will$be$brought$out$in$what$follows.$
$
22The$thoroughgoing$naturalism$contemporary$analytic$philosophers$such$as$Pinkard,$Pippin$and$Forster$
attribute$to$Hegel$seems$to$me$fundamentally$mistaken.$Yet$the$failure$of$the$kind$of$brute$empiricism$on$
display$in$Observing,Reason$does$not$on,its,own$discredit$these$readings,$and$there$is$much$of$great$
interest$and$value,$for$example,$in$Michael$N.$Forster’s$Hegel’s,Idea,of,a,Phenomenology,of,Spirit$
(Chicago:$The$University$of$Chicago$Press,$1998).$
$
23$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§452.$
$
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material$residue$of$conscious$life,$and$in$the$second$place,$evidence$of$a$departed,$
empty$transcendence,$its$mere,existence,$that$is,$its$lost$relation$to$the$category$of$
being,itself,$the$genus,generalissimum.$Yet$because,$as$Hegel$remarks$in$the$preceding$
section$on$Self9consciousness,$death$is$also$“the$natural,negation$of$consciousness,”24$
the$bone,$as$it$turns$out,$is$not$simply$the$residue$of$consciousness,$but$its$negation,$
which$is$why$this$judgment,$for$all$its$uncouth$irregularity,$is,$according$to$the$formal$
requirements$of$such$judgments,$infinite$(undendlich).$
Yet$Hegel$also$tells$us$that$as$an$instance$of$infinite$judgment$(unendliche,Urteil)$
our$proposition$"would$be$the$fulfillment$of$life$that$comprehends$itself,"25$that$is,$the$
fulfillment,$or,$more$precisely,$the$actualization,$of$the$promise$of$what$he$calls$
absolute,knowing.$It$thus$stands$as$a$kind$of$sphinx$at$the$crossroads,$or,$what$amounts$
to$the$same$thing,$as$a$riddle$whose$answer$leads$either$to$the$end$of$philosophical$
thought,$or$to$its$proper$beginning$in$the$restoration$of$logic$as$a$medium$of$veridical$
expression$and$so$as$an$instrument$of$speculative$metaphysics.$For$Hegel,$that$
restorative$logic,$elaborated$first$in$the$Science,of,Logic,$and$then$in$the$more$succinct$
Encyclopedia,Logic,$will$ultimately$reconceive$the$traditional$logical$relationship$
between$concept$and$proposition/judgment,$seeing$the$latter$as$the$necessary$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
24$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§188.$
$
25$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§346.$
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elaboration$of$the$former.$This$is$reflected$in$Hegel’s$insistence$that$“[j]udgment$is$the$
determinateness,of$the$concept$posited,(gesetzte)$in$the$concept,itself.”26$
In$the$preceding$chapters$I$argued$that$the$picture$of$the$concept$as$the$
stratified$ground$of$the$proposition$is$first$sketched$in$Plato’s$Sophist$and$subsequently$
transmitted$to$the$scholastic$tradition$in$its$more$developed$Aristotelian$form$by$
Boethius.$Hegel’s$logic$is$thus,$in$its$essentials,$a$recovery$of$a$semantic$model$that$is,$so$
to$speak,$buried$in$the$tradition.27$It$is$Hegel’s$achievement,$however,$to$have$applied$
this$model$outside$the$Aristotelian$and$Porphyrian$network$of$categories,$genera$and$
species,$and$as$against$Kant’s$reconfigured$table$of$a$priori$concepts.$What$will$emerge$
is$a$more$purely$conceptual$precursor$of$Frege’s$Begriffsschrift,,a$concept$logic$that,$like$
Frege’s,$grants$pride$of$place$to$semantic$engagement,$but$locates$such$engagement$in$
negation$rather$than$assertion.$
If$Hegel’s$conception$of$logic$looks$forward$to$Frege,$however,$it$also$points$
backwards$not$merely$to$Aristotle’s$syllogistic$but$to$Plato’s$diairetic$logic.$As$Hegel$puts$
things$in$the$Science,of,Logic:$
…because$it$is$absolute$negativity,$the$concept$divides$and$posits$itself$as$the$
negative$or$the$other$of$itself…in$this$division$the$unity$of$the$concept$is$still$only$an$
external$connection.$Thus,$as$the$connection$of$its$moments$posited$as$selfO
subsisting$and$indifferent,$the$concept$is$judgment.28$
$
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$
26$Science,of,Logic,$12.53.$
$
27$This$is$argued$for$in$Chapters$1$and$2.$
$
28$Science,of,Logic,$12.31.$
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Because$the$concept,$for$Hegel,$is$to$begin$with$unthought,$and$so$a$virtually$undivided$
unity,$judgment$(Urteil),$to$begin$with,$“is$the$originative,division,(Teilung)$of$an$
originative$unity.”29$On$the$other$hand,$the$division$that$brings$the$concept$to$
propositional$form$is$driven$by$the$concept$itself,$or$rather$by$the$thinking$initiated$by$
its$“absolute$negativity.”$$Parsing$the$lines$of$division$within$a$given$concept$amounts$to$
thinking$through$the$judgments$to$which$the$concept$gives$rise.$In$Hegel’s$version$of$
Platonic$diairetic,$therefore,$division$discloses$the$conceptual$and$inferential$relations$
that$are$immanent$to$the$specific$stage$of$philosophical$development$in$which$a$given$
concept$is$deployed,$rather$than$adumbrating$a$received$lineage$that$transcends$the$
contingencies$of$local$discourse.$The$form$of$infinite$judgment,$i.e.,$A$is$nonOB,$exhibits$
the$negative,$diairetic$dynamic$of$judgment$as$such,$and$therefore$the$divided$character$
of$the$concept$as$well.$To$show$that$this$is$the$case$for$Hegel$is$to$explain$the$riddle$of$
infinite$judgment,$which$will$be$the$task$of$the$first$section$of$this$chapter.$
While$negation$is$the$basic$mode$of$conceptual$determination$and$the$principal$
instrument$of$analytic$division$in$general,$the$gist$of$the$present$argument$is$that$the$
formal$progression$of$infinite$judgment$in$the$Phenomenology$illustrates$the$
immanence,of$negation$in$the$procession$of$conceptual$thought$and$so$thought$as$such.$
A$complete$picture$of$Hegel’s$adaptation$of$the$method$of$division$requires$seeing$both$
how$it$is$connected$to$the$process$of$sublation$(Aufhebung)$and$how$the$structures$of$
Aristotelian$syllogistic$facilitates$the$exposition$and$rationalization$of$the$concept,$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
29$Science,of,Logic,$12.55.$
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which,$though$touched$on$in$this$section,$will$not$be$spelled$out$until$the$last$section$of$
this$chapter.$$
Section(Three.(Infinite(Judgment(and(the((Dis)unity(of(the(Proposition(
In$order$to$uncover$the$logic$of$“The$Spirit$is$a$bone,”$it$is$necessary,$for$reasons$
I$hope$will$become$clear,$to$first$say$something$about$the$immediate$context$of$its$
derivation$and$about$the$broader$deductive$framework$to$which$that$derivation$
conforms.$With$regard$to$the$former,$it$is$the$evidentiary$force$of$properties$and$
expression$that$is$at$issue$in$this$section$of$the$Phenomenology.$The$central$question$
under$discussion$here$is$whether$material$appearance$is$the$manifestation$of$an$interior$
essence,$and$if$so,$whether$this$manifestation$expresses$that$essence$exhaustively$or$
inadequately,$or$displaces$it$entirely.$Since$in$phrenology,$the$exemplar$here$of$
empirical$science,$the$relevant$essence$is$that$of$the$soul,$mind$or$Spirit,$it$is$not$simply$
the$absurd$and$irrelevant$pseudoOscience$history$has$judged$it$to$be.$Its$concern,$on$the$
face$of$it,$is$identical$to$the$concern$of$the$Phenomenology$itself:$the$historical$
occurrence$of$consciousness,$subjectivity$and$spirit$in$the$material$world.$
$ As$a$summary$conclusion$of$that$discussion,$a$preliminary$construal$of$the$
proposition$would$make$it$a$claim$about$the$epistemic$and$metaphysical$primacy$of$
appearance,$understood$here$as$its$visible$materiality.$So$understood,$the$proposition$
would$constitute$an$inversion$of$the$traditional$hylomorphic$order,$metaphysically$and$
syntactically,$since$the$form$of$spirit$is$revealed$in$and$as$the$matter$of$the$bone,$and$
inferentially$as$well,$since$though$on$its$Aristotelian$conception$the$premises$of$a$
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syllogism$stand$to$its$conclusion$as$matter$to$form,$our$formula$would$instead$appear$to$
deliver$its$premises,$whatever$they$might$be,$to$the$indeterminate,$or$incalculable,$
materiality$of$its$conclusion.$On$this$construal,$the$force$of$the$predicate,$and$of$the$
logical$form$of$identity$in$general,$is$meant$to$furnish$for$its$indeterminate$subject$a$
determinate$immanence$in$experiential$or$experimental$encounter.$The$reconstructed$
syllogism$might$run$as$follows:$
$ $ The$matter$(i.e.,$material$form)$of$the$spirit$is$a$bone$(i.e.,$the$skull)$
The$Spirit$is$(just)$its$matter$
$ $ The$Spirit$is$a$bone$
$ $ $
However,$in$its$elevation$of$matter,$in$its$identification$of$instantiation$or$realization$
with$material$form,$the$proposition,$along$with$the$rule$of$empirical$science$that$
governs$it,$succumbs$to$incoherence.$Matter,$as$what$qua$matter$is$devoid$of$
determination,$is$in$the$end$evidence,$in$its$open$potentiality,$of$everything,$and$thus$
the$form$of$nothing,$unless$of$course$it$is$the$materiality$of$some$determinate$form,$in$
which$case$it$is$not$matter$at$all,$strictly$speaking.30$
$ Yet$the$overt$logical$incoherence$of$the$judgment$is$arguably$more$important$
than$its$metaphysical$inversion,$for$it$is$precisely$the$incongruence,$what$Hegel$
describes$as$the$“complete$inadequacy,”$between$subject$and$predicate$that$initially$
marks$an$infinite$judgment$as$infinite.$31$Aristotle,$who,$as$we$have$seen,$was$first$to$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
30$While$Aristotle$is$nowhere$mentioned$in$this$context,$his$presence$in$this$text$and$in$Hegel’s$thinking$is$
ubiquitous.$The$discussion$of$the$category$of$being$and$the$extensive$meditation$on$matter$in$this$section$
make$the$identification$of$matter$with$Aristotle’s$conception$irresistible.$
$
31$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§173.$
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classify$such$judgments,$did$so$in$terms$of$the$negative$terms$(of$the$form$non9x)$
comprising$them,$calling$them$indefinite,(aoristoi)$expressions.$He$applies$the$term$first$
to$names$(onomata)$and$verbs$(rhemata)$and$then$derivatively$to$propositions$
containing$such$expressions.32$When$Boethius$renders$the$Greek$term$in$Latin$by$
infinitus,33$the$ambiguity$between$indefinite$and$infinite$enters$into$the$treatment$of$
such$expressions,$and$it$is$in$part$this$ambiguity$that$Hegel$is$still$grappling$with$in$his$
unendliche,Urteil.$Such$judgments,$for$Hegel,$are$indeed$indefinite$or$indeterminate,$but$
they$are$also$infinite,$i.e.,$without$Ende,,oros,,finis,,terminus,$or$limit,$in$the$sense$that$
the$terminations$and$determinations$they$provide$their$subject$concepts$are$openO
ended,$inviting$further$determination,$ad,infinitum.$Indeed$for$Hegel,$this$feature$of$
infinite$judgment,$and$so$its$inadequacy,$is$implicit$in$all$judgments,$in$part$because,$as$
he$puts$it,$every$judgment,$in$retaining$its$traditional$categorical$structure,$expresses$
the$general$proposition$that,$or$as$we$might$put$it,$has$the$general$logical$form,$“The,
individual,is,the,universal.”34$On$the$face$of$it,$then,$infinite$judgment$is$simply$a$formal$
expression$of$the$logic$inherent$to$judgment$as$such.$
$ The$problem$with$the$categorical$proposition,$through$which$judgment$
proceeds,$lies$in$its$inadequate$negotiation$of$the$competing$demands$of$content,$which$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
32$See$Aristotle’s$De,Interpretatione,$16a31O16b15$and$19b5O19b18,$in$Aristotelis,Categoriae,et,Liber,De,
Interpretatione,$ed.$Lorenzo$MinioOPaluello$(Oxford:$Clarendon$Press,$1936).$
$
33$See$Boethius’$Commentarii,in,Librum,Aristotelis,Peri,Hermeneias,$ed.$C.$Meiser$(Leipzig:$Teubner,$1887,$
1880).$
$
34$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§166.$
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depends$on$a$difference$between$its$component$terms,$and$unity,$which$depends$on$
their$identity.$Frege$introduced$his$twoOtiered$semantics$of$sense$and$reference$in$
response$to$precisely$this$difficulty,$arguing$that$making$sense$of$the$informational$
content$of$sentences$such$as$“The$morning$star$is$the$evening$star”$requires$
differentiating$between$the$divergent$senses,(Sinne),and$common$reference$
(Bedeutung)$of$the$two$expressions$flanking$the$copula.35$The$problem,$however,$
persists$even$with$this$distinction$in$place,$because$once$identified$as$true,$such$
statements$resume$their$formal$status$as$tautologies,$as$truths$without$assertible$
content.$
$ Syntax$or$inflection$might$appear$to$settle$the$issue$grammatically,$but$grammar$
is$a$matter$of$convention$and$has$nothing$directly$to$tell$us$about$logic,$and$neither$
enables$one$to$discriminate$between$identity$and$attribution,$or,$for$example,$between$
substance$and$accident.$Much$the$same,$we$might$imagine,$goes$for$the$medieval$
distinction$between$categorematic$and$syncategorematic$terms,$and$for$the$original$
Aristotelian$one$between$rhemata$and$onomata.$The$trouble$in$each$case$is$that$the$
structures$of$the$categorical$proposition$ensure$identity$regardless$of$the$ontological$or$
epistemic$difference$intended$or$otherwise$signified,$and$despite$the$opacity$of$the$
unity$that$is$thereby$established.$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
35$See$Gottlob$Frege’s$“On$Sinn$and$Bedeutung”$in$The$Frege,Reader,$ed.$Michael$Beaney$(Oxford,$U.K.;$
Cambridge,$Mass.:$Blackwell$Publishers,$1997),$151O171.$,
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On$the$other$hand,$if$identification$somehow$miscarries,$if,$for$example,$the$
component$terms$are$fundamentally$incommensurable,$as$they$are$for$the$infinite$
judgment$under$discussion,$and$difference$prevails$over$the$logical$force$of$the$copula,$
then$it$is$the$unity$of$the$proposition$that$becomes$an$issue.$In$this$case,$once$again,$it$is$
not$enough$to$say$that$the$relevant$identity$statement$is$false,$for$in$some$sense$no$
statement$arises$at$all,$even$if$the$form$and$expression$of$the$proposition$persist$in$
suggesting$otherwise.$The$problem,of,the,unity,of,the,proposition$is$just$the$other$side$
of$the$problem$of$semantic$indifference.$
$ Hegel$observes$that$identity$and$difference$are$formally$undermined$in$the$
propositions$that$express$them,$and$in$particular$by$the$logical$laws,$or$laws$of$thinking$
(Denkgesetze)$as$he$calls$them,$of$identity$and$nonOcontradiction$that$apparently$govern$
all$such$propositions.$He$says$of$the$former,$in$particular,$that$"...it$is$nothing$but$the$
law$of$the$abstract,understanding"$that$"the$propositional,form,already$contradicts."36$
This$is$because,$
a$proposition$(Satz)$also$promises$a$difference$between$subject$and$predicate,$but$
this$proposition$does$not$accomplish$what$its$form$requires.$But$it$will$be$sublated$in$
particular$by$the$subsequent$soOcalled$laws$of$thinking$that$make$into$laws$the$
opposite$of$this$law.$–$If$one$maintains$that$this$proposition$cannot$be$proven$but$
that$each$consciousness$proceeds$in$accord$with$it$and$experientially$concurs$with$it$
as$soon$as$it$hears$it,$then$it$is$necessary$to$note,$in$opposition$to$this$alleged$
experience$of$the$school,$the$general$experience$that$no$consciousness$thinks,$has$
representations,$and$so$forth,$or$speaks$according$to$this$law,$that$no$concrete$
existence$of$any$sort$exists$according$to$this$law.37$
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36$Encyclopedia$Logic,$§115.$
$
37$Ibid.$
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The$"universal$experience"$Hegel$refers$to$here$is$that$of$the$vacuousness$of$identity$
statements,$which,$though$allegedly$governed$by$the$principle$of$identity,$Hegel$here$
tells$us$confirms$“the$contrary$of$this$law,”$the$principle$of$difference.$In$addressing$
different$but$related$concerns,$Wittgenstein$will$later$diagnose$a$philosophical$hazard$of$
the$same$kind$in$terms$of$the$tautologization$of$truth,$which$he$claims$is$an$inevitable$
outcome$of$logical$analysis.$Wittgenstein$puts$the$matter$starkly:$“The$identity$of$the$
meaning$of$two$expressions$cannot$be$asserted.”38$For$Hegel,$identity$can$indeed$be$
asserted,$but$in$being$so$asserted$initiates$an$interchange$between$identity$and$
difference$that$is$in$principle$interminable.$To$put$this$more$precisely,$while$judgment$
(Urteil)$can$and$indeed$must$assume$the$form$of$identity,$it$cannot$do$so$merely$
through$the$proposition$(Satz)$used$to$express$it.$
$ In$the$Phenomenology,$the$problem$takes$on$a$slightly$different$shape,$since$the$
logical$subject$of$relevance$here$is$that$of$Spirit,or$consciousness.$Nonetheless,$what$
remains$of$concern$is$still$the$structure$and$economy$of$judgment$itself,$and$thus$the$
relationship$between$judgment$and$the$propositional$form$it$assumes,$for$it$is$in$this$
form,$in$the$interval$between$subject$and$predicate$terms,$that$Hegel$locates$both$the$
condition$of$thought$and$the$source$of$its$immobility.$It$is$only$in$reconceiving$
propositional$form$in$terms$of$the$speculative$proposition$(der,spekulativ,Satz),$which$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
38$Ludwig$Wittgenstein’s$Tractatus,Logico9Philosophicus,$trans.$D.$F.$Pears$and$B.$F.$McGuinness$(London$
and$New$York:$Routledge$&$Kegan$Paul,$1974),$6.2322.$$$$
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properly$understood$is$simply$the$speculative$(begreifende)$apprehension$of$a$given$
proposition,$that$thinking,$as$selfOconscious$conceptualization,$can$be$realized:$
Usually,$the$Subject$is$first$made$the$basis,$as$the$objective$fixed$self;$thence$the$
necessary$movement$to$the$multiplicity$of$determinations$of$predicates$proceeds.$
Here,$that$Subject$is$replaced$by$the$knowing$'I'$itself,$which$links$the$Predicates$
with$the$Subject$holding$them.$But,$since$that$first$Subject$enters$into$the$
determinations$themselves$and$is$their$soul,$the$second$Subject,$viz,$the$knowing$'I',$
still$finds$in$the$Predicate$what$it$thought$it$had$finished$with$and$got$away$from,$
and$from$which$it$hoped$to$return$into$itself;$and,$instead$of$being$able$to$function$
as$the$determining$agent$in$the$movement$of$predication,$arguing$back$and$forth$
whether$to$attach$this$or$that$Predicate,$it$is$really$still$occupied$with$the$self$of$the$
content,$having$to$remain$associated$with$it,$instead$of$being$for$itself.39$
$
This$is$an$account,$in$outline,$of$the$dynamic$of$categorical$or$predicative$judgment$for$
Hegel,$albeit$not$the$formal$outline$given$in$the$Logic.$It$is$also,$more$specifically,$a$
breathtaking$synopsis$of$the$scattering$of$subjectivity$(both$metaphysically$and$
psychologically$conceived)$in$the$orderly$process$of$attribution,$of$which$Lacan's$analysis$
of$the$divided$self$and$its$fractured$entry$into$the$symbolic$is$an$obvious$descendent$
(though$not$so$obviously$an$heir,$as$Slavoj$Zizek$and$Mladen$Dolar$have$insisted40).$Its$
immediate$philosophical$predecessor$is,$and$quite$obviously$is,$the$Kantian$observation,$
with$its$accompanying$deduction,$that$judgment$is$"nothing$other$than$the$way$to$bring$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
39$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§60.$
$
40$This$is$not$entirely$fair$to$either$Zizek$or$Dolar,$who$both$have$much$to$say$about$the$connection$
between$Hegel$and$Lacan$that$is$subtle$and$interesting.$But$their$hagiographic$reading$of$Lacan$leads,$in$
my$view,$to$an$overly$psychological$reading$of$the$Phenomenology.$I'll$save$my$fairness$to$them$for$
another$occasion,$but$for$a$marvelous$account$of$the$philosophical$kinship$between$Hegel$and$Lacan$see$
M.$Dolar’s$“Hegel$as$the$other$side$of$psychoanalysis”$in$Jacques,Lacan,and,the,other,side,of,
Psychoanalysis.$Reflections,on,Seminar,XVII,$ed.$Justin$Clemens$and$Russell$Grigg$(Durham:$Duke$
University$Press,$2006).$For$Zizek’s$latest$discussion$of$Hegel’s$importance$for$Lacan$see$his$Less,than,
Nothing.$
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given$cognitions$to$the$objective$unity$of$apperception."41$For$Hegel,$on$the$contrary,$it$
is$the$concept$and$the$full$compass$of$its$philosophical$cognition$that$will$provide$the$
relevant$unity.$
$ What$Hegel$says$in$this$passage$does$more$than$simply$disband$the$unity$of$
apperception$Kant$had$thought$the$linchpin$of$judgment.$It$would$seem$to$make$of$the$
Kantian$account$of$cognition,$from$the$recruitment$of$categories$and$concepts,$through$
the$inventions$of$the$schematism,$to$the$intuitive$register$of$phenomena,$a$mechanics$
of$immobilization.$Of$course$it$is$not$specifically$or$merely$Kant$that$Hegel$alludes$to$
here.$Aristotelian$and$scholastic$logic$as$a$whole$are$equally$at$issue,$since$the$
indifference$problem$resides$in$the$structure$of$the$categorical$proposition$itself.$Still,$
there$is$little$question$that$Kant$is$profoundly$implicated.$Hegel's$further$elucidation$of$
the$passage$makes$this$still$more$clear:$$
Formally,,what,has,been,said,can,be,expressed,thus:,the,general,nature,of,the,
judgment,or,proposition,,which,involves,the,distinction,of,Subject,and,Predicate,,is,
destroyed,by,the,speculative,proposition,,and,the,proposition,of,identity,which,the,
former,becomes,contains,the,counter9thrust,against,that,subject9predicate,
relationship.42,
The$doubleOconcept$model$of$the$proposition,$which$both$Kant$and$Hegel$inherit$from$
the$scholastic$tradition,$formalizes$attribution$as$inclusion$or$union,$and$so$at$least$
formally$establishes$what$we$might$call$a$semantics,of,indifference,$the$propositional$
expansion$of$the$concept$“characterized$by$the$reciprocal,indifference,of$its$moments,”$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
41$Immanuel$Kant,$Critique,of,Pure,Reason,$eds.$Paul$Guyer$and$Allen$W.$$
Wood$(Cambridge:$Cambridge$University$Press,$1999),$B141.$
$
42$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§61.$
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as$Hegel$will$put$it.43$The$problem$is$that$nothing$in$either$of$the$two$concepts$
comprising$a$given$proposition$differentiates$them$logically,$i.e.$allows$one$to$see$or$
determine$either$the$logical$difference$between$"A$is$B"$and$"B$is$A,"$or$any$distinction$
between$statements$of$attribution,$identity$or$definition,$etc.$On$the$other$hand,$if$they$
were$to$be$so$differentiated,$the$copula$nonetheless$confounds$in$identity$whatever$
distinction$is$supposed$thereby$to$have$been$established.$
$ While$both$Hegel$and$Kant$recognize$the$need$to$redress$the$indifference$of$
logical$structure$to$metaphysical$or$epistemic$fact,$Kant$thinks,$along$Aristotelian$lines,44$
that$the$solution$lies$in$the$categorial$differentiation$and$subsumption$of$the$relevant$
terms,$and$ultimately$upon$the$apperceptive$grounding$of$the$categories.$In$particular,$
as$regards$the$subject$term,$he$says:$
Through$the$category$of$substance,$however,$if$I$bring$the$concept$of$a$body$under$
it,$it$is$determined$that$its$empirical$intuition$in$experience$must$always$be$
considered$as$subject,$never$as$mere$predicate;$and$likewise$with$all$the$other$
categories.45$
Categorical$assignments$determine$specific$roles$within$the$specific$forms$of$judgment$
with$which$they$are$correlated.$In$a$categorical$proposition$of$the$form$"A$is$B,"$though$
formally$indistinct,$either$A$or$B$cannot$be$anything$other$than$a$substance$(substantia)$
and$if$so$then$either$B$or$A,$respectively,$cannot$occur$as$anything$but$a$predicate,$given$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
43$Science,of,Logic,$12.31.$
$
44$I$am$referring$here,$of$course,$to$Aristotle's$metaphysical$differentiation$between$substance$and$
accident$in$terms$of$the$opposition$between$the$relations$of$"being$in"$and$"being$said$of."$
$
45$Critique,of,Pure,Reason,$B129.$
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its$subsumption,$for$example,$under$the$category$of$accident$(accidens).$Thus$if$"A$is$B"$
is$the$canonical$means$of$expressing$this,$then$the$converse$"B$is$A"$necessarily$
expresses$something$else,$and$moreover$something$necessarily$incoherent$because$
logically$illOformed.$For$Kant,$the$categorical$proposition$bridges$the$gap$between$
intuition$and$concept.$
$ However,$there$are$some$obvious$difficulties$with$such$a$solution.$First,$it$
remains$unclear$how$the$distinction$is$maintained$through$the$passage$of$attribution$or$
identity$the$copula$is$supposed$to$signify.$We$might$call$this$the$puzzle$of$logical$or$
discursive$opacity.$Second,$it$seems$to$replace$the$old$logical$quandary$with$a$new$
metaphysical$one,$which$we$might$accordingly$call$the$problem$of$metaphysical,
indifference:$the$puzzle$concerning$how$the$logical$distinction$between$subject$and$
predicate$is$expressively$maintained$is$simply$replaced$by$one$concerning$how$the$
copula$itself$or$its$linear$syntax$differentially$identifies$and$conjoins$substance$and$
accident.$More$to$the$point,$while$one$concept's$(e.g.,$that$of$a$body)$falling$under$
another$(e.g.,$the$category$of$substance)$might$readily$be$seen$as$lawOgoverned,$what$
regulates$subsumption$of$an$object$or$content$of$empirical$intuition$under$either$is$
more$difficult$to$make$out.$Finally,$it$isn’t$clear$how$the$content$of$an$empirical$intuition$
can$enter$into$the$proposition$or$judgment$in$the$first$place$without$taking$on$the$
minimal$conceptual$structure$required$of$names.$If$it$acquires$no$such$structure,$on$the$
other$hand,$then$bridging$the$gap$between$intuitive$content$and$conceptual$form$seems$
difficult$to$explain.$
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$ The$invocation$of$substance$and$accident$here,$and$their$inclusion$in$Kant's$table$
of$categories$itself,$underscores$the$abiding$influence$of$Aristotelian$metaphysics$in$
Kant$as$well,$and$more$specifically$in$this$case$Aristotle's$account$of$the$four$senses$of$
"substance"$in$Metaphysics,Z.3,$where$subject$is$identified$as$its$most$characteristic$
sense,$according$to$which$it$is$"that$of$which$the$other$things$are$said,$but$which$itself$is$
never$said$of$any$other$thing."$Its$being$exclusively$the$subject$of$predication$is$
furthermore$connected$to$its$being$a$singular$unity,$a$tode,ti.46$In$the$Categories$its$
preeminent$role$as$the$subject$of$predication$and$its$singularity$are$tied$to$primary,
substance,$which$expresses$as$well$the$metaphysical$sense$of$substance$as$essence.$But$
since$it$is$substance$and$accident$that$determine,patterns$of$logical$and$grammatical$
employment,$and$not$the$other$way$round,$what$we$need,$as$it$were,$are$the$
ordinances$of$substance,$which$the$copula$on$its$own$patently$fails$to$express,$and$
which$failure$of$expression$cannot$be$remedied$by$stipulation,$since$stipulation$is$
characteristically$arbitrary.$
$ Yet$while$the$copula$is$supposed$to$both$distinguish$and$unite$subject$and$
predicate$for$Kant,$what$it$does$most$importantly$is$to$express$the$fact$that$both$belong$
to$the$object$of$representation,$the$object$=$X.$It$does$this$by$expressing$the$fact$that$
judgment$is$a$judging$of$some$particular$consciousness,$of$a$single,$unitary$I.$As$he$puts$
it:$"For$this$word$["is"]$designates$the$relation$of$the$representations$to$the$original$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
46$The$complicated$sense$in$which$a$tode,ti,is$a$unity$at$all$raises$further$difficulties$for$the$burden$of$
propositional$organization$Kant$reserves$for$it.$I$discuss$the$composite$character$of$the$tode,ti,$as$both$
immediate$particular$(tode)$and$universal$kind$(ti)$in$Chapter$2.$
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apperception$and$its$necessary$unity."47$The$copula,$in$other$words,$is$an$expression$of$
apperceptive$engagement$that$Kant$thinks$objectively$differentiates$substance$from$
accident$through$the$asymmetric$relation$it$bears$towards$each,$and$presumably$in$
particular$through$the$epistemic$priority$it$assigns$the$former.$It$tells$us$where$the$
articulating$subject$begins,$i.e.,$necessarily$with$what$is$metaphysically$prior,$and$where$
it$ends,$i.e.,$with$what$is$metaphysically$posterior.$In$other$words,$it$establishes$the$
order$of$cognition$and,$ipso,facto,$the$direction$of$judgment$and$attribution.$
$ How$it$does$so,$however,$remains$obscure.$For$if$syntactic$primacy$reflects$
epistemic$primacy$which$in$turn$reflects,$or,$to$put$it$more$plainly,$represents,$
metaphysical$primacy,$then$the$ultimate$ground$of$logical$ranking$would$appear$to$be$
the$inaccessible$domain$of$things$in$themselves.$The$categories$are$indeed$supposed$to$
be$ordered$on$a,priori$grounds,$independently$of$their$application$to$the$objects$of$
experience,$but$the$point$is$that$their$employment$in$judgment$obscures$this$intrinsic$
ordinality.$This$is$of$no$small$consequence,$since$the$deduction$of$the$categories$needed$
to$ground$Kant's$critical$philosophy$proceeds$from$the$very$structure$and$operations$of$
judgment.$
$ As$regards$the$empirical$use$of$the$categories,$Kant$does$indeed$have$an$
account,$for$example,$of$how$certain$manifolds$of$intuition$are$cast$as$substances$and$
others$as$attributes$or$accidents,$etc.,$but$again$the$logical$form$of$judgments$
confounds$such$ontological$discriminations$and$so,$more$importantly,$points$to$their$
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47$Critique,of,Pure,Reason,$B142.$
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groundlessness.$If$phenomenological$criteria$such$as$continuity$and$persistence$are$
what$license$the$categorical$identification$of$substance,$for$example,$it$remains$unclear$
what$governs$the$determination$of$continuity$and$persistence.$To$put$it$plainly,$
continuity$and$persistence$are$paradigmatically$subject$to$the$kind$of$inductive$
indeterminacy$Nelson$Goodman$famously$defined$in$terms$of$projectability.48$The$
concept$or$name$applied$to$a$substance$having$property$p$intermittently,$i.e.,$
accidentally,$before$and$at$time$t$is$no$more$projectable$than$the$concept$or$name$
applied$to$that$same$substance$until$time$t$but$possessing$this$same$property$p$
persistently,$and$so$essentially,$after$time$t.$In$other$words,$no$finite$stretch$of$
persistence$or$continuity$is$inductively$sufficient$to$establish$the$unity,$essence$or$
substantiality$of$anything$to$which$a$substance$term$is$to$be$applied.$$
$ Yet$even$if$we$set$aside$the$puzzle$of$substanceOaccident$differentiation,$the$
problem$that$Kant$seems$to$ignore$and$that$Hegel$seems$attuned$to$remains,$that$is,$a$
problem$residing$in$the$very$form$of$judgment$itself.$Regardless$of$how$subject$and$
predicate$are$differentiated$to$begin$with,$within$the$predicative$framework$of$
judgment$that$is$the$hallmark$of$thinking,$or$at$least$of$discursivity,$logical$differences$of$
this$sort$are$dissolved.$For$as$already$observed,$on$the$traditional$model$the$logical$
form$of$every$such$judgment$is$that$of$identity.$From$Hegel's$perspective,$the$problem$is$
not$form$as$such,$but$form$conceived$as$empty,$contentless$structure,$something$he$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
48$See$Nelson$Goodman’s$Fact,,Fiction,and,Forecast$(Cambridge,$Mass.:$Harvard$University$Press,$1983).$
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detects$in$Kant$but$which$will$only$find$its$full$expression$in$the$mathematical$and$logical$
formalisms$explored$at$the$end$of$the$19th$century.$
$ Questions$of$form$are$paramount$for$Hegel$since$it$is$through$the$forms$they$
assume$that$concepts$are$realized,$and$not$in$the$weak$sense$of$merely$achieving$
materiality$or$visibility,$but$in$the$robust$Aristotelian$sense$of$becoming$the$actualized$
concepts$they$are$beforehand$merely$potentially.$Hegelian$phenomenology$is$thus$
directed$less$towards$the$visibility$of$truth$than$towards$its$actualization.$This$is$why,$for$
example,$Hegel$can$speak$so$naturally$of$propositions,$judgments$and$epistemic$states,$
along$with$political,$aesthetic$and$religious$movements$and$institutions,$as$shapes$or$
forms$of$consciousness,$or,$equivalently,$of$the$concept$or$truth.$Hegel’s$solution$to$the$
troubles$of$the$categorical$proposition$will$depend$upon$shifting$the$burden$of$semantic$
differentiation$from$the$logical$form$of$the$proposition$to$the$accumulated$shapes$of$
conceptual$determination.$This$is$what$lies$behind$Hegel’s$rejection$of$the$strict$
opposition$between$form$and$content,$and$his$insistence$that$“the$form$is$content$and,$
in$keeping$with$its$developed$determinacy,$it$is$the$law,of,appearance$(das,Gesetz,der,
Erscheinung).”49$$
Section(Four.(Judgment,(Cognition(and(the(Semantics(of(Difference(
$ The$passage$from$the$Phenomenology,cited$above$(PS$§61)$suggests$that$Hegel’s$
solution$to$the$indifference$problem,$and$implicitly$to$the$unity$problem$as$well,$is$to$be$
found$in$the$notion$of$the$speculative$proposition,$and$ultimately,$as$he$will$
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49$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§133.$
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subsequently$make$clear,$the$speculative,concept$(what$he$will$later$call$the$Idea)$from$
which$its$corresponding$proposition$expands.$Yet,$as$this$passage$also$indicates,$what$
Hegel$means$by$such$a$proposition$has$little$to$do$with$propositional$form$or$structure$
at$all,$since$no$such$structure$survives$its$speculative$recasting.$What$Hegel$is$gesturing$
at$here,$rather,$is$the$speculative$grasp$of$concept$and$proposition,$what$he$calls$
speculative$thought,(das,begreifende,Denken),$in$which,$as$he$informs$us,$“the$negative$
belongs$to$the$content$itself$[of$the$proposition]…both$as$the$immanent$movement$and$
determination$of$the$content,$and$as$the$whole$of$this$process.”50$Yet$inasmuch$as$such$
thinking$is$begreifende,,i.e.,$conceptual,$it$necessarily$unfolds$in$the$medium$of$the$
proposition.$
And$therein$lies$our$first$clue$concerning$the$philosophical$virtue$of$infinite,
judgment:$its$graphic$display$of$the$discursivity$and$plasticity$of$(speculative)$thought,$
i.e.,$of$its$elastic$and$simultaneous$accommodation$and$refusal$of$propositional$form.51$
It$manages$this$feat$of$presentation$by$recording$the$incongruity$of$terms$and$the$
operative$presence$of$negation$in$the$evolving$forms$of$the$categorical$proposition.$The$
claim,$in$short,$is$that$infinite,judgment,$in$its$distinctive$Hegelian$variant,$is$the$
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$
50$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§59.$
$
51$The$allusion$to$Catherine$Malabou’s$The,Future,of,Hegel:,Plasticity,,Temporality,,and,Dialectic,$trans.$L.$
During$(New$York:$Routledge,$2004)$reflects$a$philosophical$appreciation,$though$far$from$an$embrace,$of$
the$notion$of$plasticity$introduced$in$this$important$reading$of$Hegel.$Her$notion$of$plasticity$as$“the$
excess$of$the$future$over$the$future”$is$meant$as$an$interpretive$cipher$for$the$Hegelian$project$in$its$
totality.$I$apply$the$term$“plasticity”$far$more$specifically$to$the$sensitivity$of$a$logical$or$cognitive$system$
to$local,$historical$context.$It$is$then$just$the$logicoOepistemic$correlate$of$what$I$see$as$the$immanence$of$
truth,$negation$and$determination$in$Hegel.$
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exemplary$form$of$speculative$thought,$and$so$of$thinking$itself$as$the$unfolding$of$a$
subject$concept,$albeit$still$cast$in$the$formal$garb$of$the$categorical$proposition.$That$it$
can$be$both$true$and$incoherent,$depending$on$its$context$and$form,$is$an$indication$of$
the$double$role$it$plays$in$expressing$truth,$perhaps$the,truth,$within$an$historically$
specific$philosophical$setting$and$exhibiting$the$logicoOgrammatical$form$of$discursive$
expression$as$such.$
Its$ambiguous$status$is$further$revealed$in$the$dramatically$opposed$treatments$
Hegel$accords$it$within$a$single$text,$whether$it$be$the$Phenomenology$itself$or$either$of$
the$two$Logics.$In$the$Encyclopedia,Logic,$for$example,$under$Qualitative,Judgment,$
Hegel$compares$infinite$judgment$to$the$kind$of$transgression$involved$in$radical$evil,$
remarking$that$while$the$propositions$such$judgments$express$"are$indeed$the$truth$of$
the$immediate,$soOcalled$qualitative$judgment"$they$are$nonetheless$"not$really$
judgments$at$all."52$On$the$other$hand,$in$the$final$section$of$the$same$text$infinite$
judgment$is$identified$with$the$Idea$itself,$that$is,$with$the$determinate$realization$of$
the$concept:$
The$Idea$is$the$infinite$judgment,$of$which$the$sides$are$each$the$independent$
totality,$while$(precisely$because$it$completes$itself$in$this$way)$each$of$them$has$
also$passed$over$into$the$other.$None$of$the$concepts$that$are$determined$
otherwise$is$this$totality$that$is$completed$in$both$of$its$sides$–$both$as$the$Concept$
itself$and$as$objectivity.53$
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52$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§173.$
$
53$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§214.$
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What$this$identification$amounts$to,$however,$is$complicated$by$the$fact$that$the$Idea,$
unlike$the$judgment,$“is$essentially$a$process,”$and$thus$the$totality$of$the$latter$is$a$
mere$snapshot$of$the$incessant$movement$within$the$Idea$between$the$concept$it$
begins$with$and$the$instantiations$that$successively$determine$it.$
Nonetheless,$if$for$Aristotle$and$the$scholastic$tradition$there$are$two$basic$kinds$
(qualities)$of$categorical$proposition,$affirmative$(kataphasis,)$and$negative$(apophasis),$
corresponding$to$two$kinds$of$cognitive$operation,$composition$and$separation$or$
division,$for$Hegel$judgment$is$fundamentally,$that$is$to$say,$constitutionally,$negative,$
or$apophatic,$a$vivid$counterpoint$to$the$Fregean$(and$since$Frege$our$own)$intuition$
about$such$things,$mentioned$above,$that$all$judgments$are$assertoric.$This$does$not$yet$
amount$to$saying$that$all$judgments$are$infinite,$nor$even$that$all$are$formally$negative$
(as$opposed$to$affirmative)$in$quality,$but$only$that$judgment,$as$we$have$seen,$is$
fundamentally$driven$by$the$negation$of,$and$within,$the$concept$it$extrapolates.$It$
therefore$also$underpins$a$correlation$between$the$primacy$of$negation$in$the$
constitution$of$the$proposition$and$the$fundamental$place$of$the$method$of$division$in$
Hegelian$logic.$
As$I$have$argued$in$the$preceding$chapters,$negation$is$fundamental$to$the$
traditional$method$of$division,$since$it$is$negation$that$divides$genus$into$species$and$
thus,$through$its$iteration,$places$the$subject$of$a$judgment$within$the$conceptual$
lineage$that$successively$defines$it.$Judgment$so$understood$is$the$linear$abbreviation$of$
one$branch$or$another$of$the$extended$Porphyrian$tree$that$constitutes$the$totality$of$
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concepts$and$the$individuals$these$delineate.$Within$this$categorical$framework,$
judgment$follows$and$expresses$the$hierarchical$lines$of$subsumption.$Yet$if$Socrates$is$
subsumable$under$man,$and$thus$under$rational,$since$man$falls$under$the$latter,$this$
only$gives$us$part$of$the$picture,$indeed,$as$stated,$merely$the$bare$essentials,of$the$full$
picture$of$Socrates’$defining$features.$How$are$we$to$understand$division$and$
subsumption$outside$the$narrow$Porphyrian$framework?$In$part,$this$is$also$to$ask$how$
we$can$understand$how$the$formal$relations$of$subsumption$expressed$by$a$derived$
division$and$the$propositions$expressing$these$are$employed$in$judgment.$
$ For$the$tradition$I$have$been$tracing$(from$Plato,$through$Boethius,$to$the$
scholastics,$etc.),$there$is$no$clear$distinction$to$be$drawn$between$judgment,$statement$
and$proposition,$and$the$affirmative$or$negative$quality$of$a$proposition$just$expresses$
the$route$of$its$composition.$To$judge$that$x$is$y,$just$as$to$judge$that$x$is$not$y,$is,$as$we$
saw$Plato$putting$it$in$the$Sophist,$to$provide$the$boundary$(peras)$of$an$incomplete$
(apeiros)$expression,$to$delimit$it$(ti,perainei),$and$so$to$make$of$it$a$complete$
proposition,$a$logos.54$For$Boethius$and$the$scholastic$tradition,$as$we$have$seen,$
negation$separates$while$affirmation$unites$the$terms$that$make$up$the$proposition,$
and$both$are$thus$principally$acts$of$semantic$engagement,$and$only$secondarily$
lexically$expressed$features$of$the$spoken$or$inscribed$proposition.55$$The$combination$
or$separation$of$terms$is$always$also$an$act$of$subsumption$because$the$terms$
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54$Plato$Sophist$262d4.$
$
55$See$Chapter$3.$
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themselves$are$already$hierarchically$structured$(although$this$is$less$obvious$in$Plato,$
whose$new$horizontal$semantics$of$delimitation$in$the$Sophist,both$depends$upon$and$
departs$from$the$vertical$semantics$of$participation$he$is$partial$to$elsewhere).$
$ Though$Hegel$likewise$regularly$conflates$judgment$and$proposition,$often$using$
the$same$German$expression$(Satz)$for$both,$he$does$in$fact$distinguish$between$the$
two,$just$as$he$discriminates$between$content$and$form,$while$ultimately$claiming$that$
the$latter$is$just$the$realization$of$the$former.56$In$the$Science,of,Logic,$for$example,$he$
draws$a$vivid$distinction$between$judgment$and$proposition$that$highlights$this$very$
aspect$of$his$conception$of$logic,$namely$that$its$primary$concern$is$not$the$structure$of$
subsuming$instances$under$a$concept,$but$with$the$act$of$so$associating$them:$
…a$proposition,can$indeed$have$a$subject$and$predicate$in$a$grammatical$sense$
without$however$being$a$judgment$for$that.$The$latter$requires$that$the$predicate$
behave$with$respect$to$the$subject$in$a$relation$of$conceptual$determination,$hence$
as$a$universal$with$respect$to$a$particular$or$singular.$And$if$what$is$said$of$a$singular$
subject$is$itself$only$something$singular,$as$for$instance,$“Aristotle$died$at$the$age$of$
73$in$the$fourth$year$of$the$115th$Olympiad,”$then$this$is$a$mere$proposition,$not$a$
judgment.$There$would$be$in$it$an$element$of$judgment$only$if$one$of$the$
circumstances,$say,$the$date$of$death$or$the$age$of$the$philosopher,$came$into$doubt$
even$though$the$stated$figures$were$asserted$on$the$strength$of$some$ground$or$
other.$In$that$case,$the$figures$would$be$taken$as$something$universal,$as$a$time$
that,$even$without$the$determinate$content$of$Aristotle’s$death,$would$still$stand$on$
its$own$filled$with$some$other$content$or$simply$empty.57$
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56$It$is$a$standard$complaint$leveled$against$Hegel$(as$against$Kant),$that$he$failed$to$distinguish$the$
cognitive$act$of$judging$from$the$logical$content$of$such$an$act,$i.e.,$the$proposition$expressed.$The$basis$
for$this$claim$involves$ignoring$the$possibility$that$treating$the$proposition$as$the$residue$of$cognition$
represents$an$insight$rather$than$an$oversight.$
$
57$Science,of,Logic,$12.56.$
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What$would$advance$the$propositional$chronicle$of$Aristotle’s$death$to$the$status$of$
judgment$would,$for$example,$be$a$universalized$use$of$the$expression$“the$fourth$year$
of$the$115th$Olympiad”$as$a$determination$of$Aristotle’s$death,$and,$as$we$have$
repeatedly$seen,$such$determination$begins$in$difference,$with$the$hypothesized$
negation$of$the$determining$concept,$and$its$corresponding$division$from$the$subject$to$
be$determined,$in$this$case$Aristotle’s,death.$In$other$words,$what$would$be$required$is$
overcoming$the$presumed$negation$of$what$is$not$specifically$identical$with$that$death$
is$its$time,$place,$significance,$etc.,$although$these$are$precisely$the$coordinates$through$
which$Aristotle’s$death$must$be$delineated.$The$judgment$would,$in$effect,$express$the$
fact$that$Aristotle’s$death$is$a$fourth9year9of9the9115th9Olympiad$kind$of$thing,$or$that$it$
falls$under$the$universal$fourth9year9of9the9115th9Olympiad.$However,$it$would$do$so$not$
by$citing$the$established$subsumption$of$the$former$under$the$latter,$but$precisely$
through$successively$negating$itself$as$identical$to$its$time,$place,$significance,$etc.$
$ Yet$the$difference$between$the$immobile$proposition$and$the$determining$
judgment$is$surely$not$simply$a$matter$of$how$the$terms$of$the$proposition$are$formally$
construed.$The$“doubt”$Hegel$speaks$of$here,$like$the$interrogative$background$Frege$
points$to$in$bringing$out$the$distinctive$character$of$assertoric$engagement,58$reflects$a$
grounding$not$in$skeptical$unrest$but$in$semantic$indeterminacy.$Judgment$occurs$by$
way$of$restoring$or$specifying$the$indeterminate$content$and$truth$of$a$given$
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58$See$Frege’s$“Negation,”$in$The,Frege,Reader,$ed.$Michael$Beaney$(Oxford,$U.K.;$Cambridge,$Mass.:$
Blackwell$Publishers,$1997),$346O361,$discussed$below.$
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proposition,$or$rather$by$way$of$employing$a$proposition$to$establish$a$determinate$
content.$Whether$the$starting$point$is$epistemic$or$semantic$privation,$it$is$clear$that$
the$interest$and$vantage$of$the$speaking$subject$or$consciousness$is$pivotal.$It$is$also$
clear$that$how$we$formally$construe$the$elements$of$the$proposition$is$for$Hegel$a$
matter$of$their$conscious,$historical$recruitment.$
It$is$for$this$reason$that$Hegel,$although$he$initially$identifies$the$general$form$of$
the$proposition$as$“The,individual,is,the,universal,”$which$reflects$the$paradox$present$in$
the$basic$order$of$cognition,$insists$that$the$elements$of$the$judgment,$which$are$jointly$
involved$in$the$determination$of$the$concept,$are$logically$fluid.$Thus$initially$“the$
subject$is$indeed$an$existent$or$the$singular,$while$the$predicate$is$the$universal.$But$
because$the$judgment$connects$the$two,$and$the$subject$is$determined$as$universal$by$
the$predicate,$the$subject$is$then$the$universal.”59$Indeed,$as$we$learn$later$on,$through$
the$inferential$movement$of$the$syllogism,$subject$and$predicate$terms$are$each$capable$
of$assuming$any$of$the$three$possible$logical$quantities$–$singular,$particular$and$
universal.$What’s$more,$the$full$determination$of$the$concept$occurs$precisely$through$
the$exchange$of$quantity$that$marks$the$transition$from$one$syllogism$to$the$next.$The$
present$point,$however,$is$just$that$logical$form,$for$Hegel,$is$an$artifact$of$judgment.$It$
is$fundamentally$a$matter$of$cognitive,$conceptual$and$inferential$engagement,$which$is$
to$say$that$is$the$product$of$both$understanding$and$reason,$in$Kantian$terms.$
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59$Science,of,Logic,$§12.62.$
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$ This$way$of$distinguishing$judgment$from$proposition$is$crucial$to$understanding$
both$the$form$and$the$mobility$of$Hegel’s$aphorism,$the$synoptic$truth$of$Observing,
Reason.$In$particular,$as$regards$its$propositional$form$there$is$an$apparent$irregularity$
worth$examining,$namely,$the$clear$absence$of$the$formal$signature$of$infinite,
judgment,$the$sign$of$negation.$The$standard$form$of$such$propositions$is$thus:$X,is,non9
Y.$Yet$all$of$Hegel’s$examples$of$infinite$judgment$in$the$two$Logics$as$well,$e.g.,$“the$
elephant$is$not$a$rose,”$emphasize$the$incommensurability$of$subject$and$predicate,$
rather$than$the$negative$form$of$the$predicate$itself.$What$is$infinite$in$this$instance,$for$
example,$“rose,”$is$so$by$virtue$of$its$relation$to$the$subject,$not$by$virtue$of$its$logical$
form.$This$is$demonstrably$not,$however,$because$Hegel$is$inattentive$to$the$traditional$
form$of$such$judgments.$Rather,$it$is$because$he$thinks$the$defining$element$of$negation$
in$a$judgment$consists$in$the$constitution$of$the$predicate$as$a$determination,,whether$
or$not$that$element$is$an$inscriptional$feature$of$the$term$or$not.$From$this$perspective,$
the$negative$form$of$the$infinite$predicate$is$just$the$lexical$record$of$its$cognitive$
constitution.$
Thus$although$"The$spirit$is$a$bone"$(like$“The$elephant$is$not$a$rose”)$lacks$the$
standard$form$of$an$infinite$judgment,$it$is$nonetheless$logically$infinite,$and$its$
canonical$rendering$is$attested$in$Hegel's$subsequent$remarks$on$this$judgment$towards$
the$end$of$the$Phenomenology:$
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And$we$saw$Observing$Reason$at$its$peak$express$its$specific$character$in$the$infinite$
judgment$that$the$being$of$the$'I'$is$a$Thing...That$judgment,$taken$as$it$stands$is$
nonOspiritual$or$rather$is$the$nonOspiritual$itself.60$
$
The$logical$form$of$“The$Spirit$is$a$bone”$is$thus$made$explicit$in$“The$Spirit$is$a$nonO
Spirit,”$which$exhibits$the$recognizable$shape$of$the$infinite$judgment:$X,is,non9X.$It$
nonetheless$remains$a$question$in$what$sense$the$predicate$“bone”$itself$is$to$be$
regarded$as$infinite,$and$in$particular$as$the$infinite$predicate$“nonOSpirit.”$
In$the$hyperOempirical$context$of$Observing,Reason$in$which$this$proposition$is$
produced,$a$Spirit$or$consciousness$is$a$non9spirit$in$the$precise$sense$that$it$is$reducible$
to$the$material$evidence$available$to$direct$observation,$and$so$is$not$in$fact$a$spiritual$
substance$at$all,$but$rather$a$thing,$albeit$a$thing$determinately$realized$as$the$skull$that$
serves$as$evidence$for$the$spiritual$substance$it$contains.$That$negation$produces$this$
specific$content$is$thus$a$consequence$of$the$broader$discursive$environment$in$which$it$
operates,$and$from$which$it$proceeds,$in$this$case$the$preceding$discourse$of$Self9
consciousness,$and$the$narrow$predicative$structure$to$which$it$must$conform.$In$other$
words,$“bone”$is$the$infima$species$of$thing$arrived$at$within$the$discourse$of$empirical$
reason,$and$as$such$is$the$determinate,$defining$content,$within$this$discourse,$of$spirit.$
But$as$that$determinate$content,$it$is$precisely$what$the$negation$of$spirit,$what$non9
spirit$amounts$to$in$this$discursive$environment.$
As$I$have$argued$in$the$earlier$chapters$of$this$dissertation,$the$contextual$
character$of$negation,$in$its$original,$determinative$guise,$is$fundamental$to$its$
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60$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§790.$
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operation.$In$the$categorical$hierarchy$of$Porphyrian$predicables$(i.e.,$that$of$genera$and$
species)$that$Boethius$bequeaths$to$scholastic$philosophy,61$negation$is$an$ordering$
principle,$determining$the$taxonomy$of$genera$and$species,$descending$from$being$to$
infima,species,$and,$to$the$extent$that$these$are$conceptually$localizable,$to$individuals$
as$well.$Within$the$scholastic$schema$of$the$Porphyrian$tree,$man,$for$example,$is$
successively$identifiable$with,$and$differentiated$from,$animal,,rational,$and$mortal.$We$
might$say,$albeit$in$a$decidedly$Hegelian$idiom,$that$man$is$in$turn$the$non9man$that$is$
identified$with$each$of$the$successive$determinations$of$its$definition$or$essence.$
In$Hegel’s$Phenomenology,$as$in$the$two$Logics,$the$context$of$determination$is$
no$longer$the$regimented$array$of$eternal$categories$and$predicables$(just$as$it$is$not,yet$
such$a$thing$for$Plato).$Here$negation$operates$from$within$the$discourse$that$is$
contingently$in$play,$and$the$results$of$its$application$are$thus$immanent62$to$that$
discourse.63$As$Hegel$puts$this,$applauding$Heraclitus$for$recognizing$so$important$a$
truth,$“the$moment$of$negativity$is$immanent,$and$that$is$what$the$concept$of$
philosophy$as$such$is$concerned$with.”64$It$is$this$immanence$of$negation$and$concept$
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61$See$in$particular$Boethius’$De,Divisione,$ed.$John$Magee,$and$Porphyre$Isagoge,$ed.$Alain$de$Libera.$
$
62$The$immanence$of$negation$is$of$course$related$to$the$broader$immanence$of$determination$and$thus$
dialectic$itself.$A$useful$discussion$of$the$latter$is$to$be$found$in$Karin$De$Boer’s$On,Hegel:,The,Sway,of,the,
Negative$(Basingstoke;$New$York:$Palgrave$Macmillan,$2010).$
$
63$In$effect,$negation$runs$through,$and$is$governed$by,$the$deductive$machinery$of$syllogistic$logic$itself,$
removed$from$the$unproven$structures$of$categories$and$predicables.$This$part$of$the$story$is$filled$out$in$
the$next$section$of$the$present$chapter.$
$
64$G.$W.$F.$Hegel,$Lectures,on,the,History,of,Philosophy,,Volume,1,$trans.$E.$S.$Haldane$(Lincoln$and$
London:$University$of$Nebraska$Press,$1995),$284.$$$
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alike$that$explains$not$only$why$“The$Spirit$is$a$bone”$is$itself$infinite,$but$why$it$recurs$
under$several$guises$before$it$finally$emerges,$at$the$end$of$the$Phenomenology,$in$an$
absolute$form,$the$accomplished$selfOidentity$of$concept$and$consciousness$in$the$Idea,$
as$“’I’$=$‘I’.”$What$remains$difficult$to$understand,$and$what$I$will$attempt$to$explain$
briefly$below,$is$that$for$Hegel$the$incoherent$proposition$with$which$we$began$and$the$
seeming$tautology$with$which$the$Phenomenology,ends$are$not$merely$alternative$
engagements$with$the$same$infinite,proposition,$but$that$in$some$sense$they$are$the$
same,infinite,judgment,$expressing$the$same,$albeit$diversely$determined,$truth!$
An$initial$explanation$is$to$be$found$in$the$observation$that$the$“progress$of$
judgment$into$a$diversity$of$judgments,”$that$is,$the$movement$of$the$Phenomenlogy$as$
a$whole,$is$just$the$“progressive$determination$of$the$concept”65$from$which$the$original$
judgment$flows.$The$seeming$tautology$at$the$close$of$the$Phenomenology,$in$other$
words,$is$the$truth$of$the$seeming$barbarism$in$Observing,Reason,$owing$to$the$
conceptual$limitations$that$define$each$stage$of$philosophical$and$cultural$development$
through$which$Spirit$is$gradually$determined,$though$it$can$only$be$recognized$as$such$
from$the$standpoint$of$absolute,knowing$to$which$the$Phenomenology$finally$accedes.$
Indeed,$the$Calvary$(Schädelstätte),$literally$the,place,of,skulls$(or$bones),$of$absolute$
Spirit,$with$which$the$Phenomenology$ends$suggests$not$that$the$“Spirit$is$a$bone”$has$
been$superseded,$but$that,$in$the$context$of$Science$(Wissenschaft),$i.e.,$philosophy$
properly$conceived,$it$is$retained$but$elevated$to$the$form$of$the$pure,$epistemically$
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65$Science,of,Logic,$12.53.$
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realized$selfOidentity$of$Spirit$or$Consciousness.$It$remains$true,$in$other$words,$that$the,
Spirit,is,a,bone,$but$here$in$the$context$of$Hegelian$Science,$the$infinite$predicate$bone,$
as$nonOSpirit,$is$the$repository$of$the$totality$of$determinations$with$which$Spirit$is$
individually$nonOidentical,$but$collectively$united.$
The$three$forms$of$the$“The$Spirit$is$a$Bone”$are$reformulated$in$the$final$pages$
of$the$Phenomenology,as$"The$'I'$is$a$thing,"$"The$thing$is$an$'I',"$and$"'I'$=$'I',"66$and$the$
passage$from$the$first$to$the$last$demonstrates$precisely$the$economy$of$negative$
predication$as$conceptual$realization$in$Hegel.$The$identity$of$subject$and$thing$in$the$
first$judgment$yields$an$‘I’$as$a$thing$in$the$second,$which$in$turn,$in$the$philosophical$
transition$from$The,Ethical,Order$to$Morality$negates$itself$as$mere$instrumentality.$The$
negation$of$the$subject$as$thing$is$therefore,$within$the$discourse$of$Morality,$the$
reestablishment$of$the$‘I’$or$subject$as$“moral$selfOconsciousness,”67$as$expressed$in$the$
judgment$“The$thing$is$an$‘I.’”$This$morally$selfOconscious$subject$will$in$turn$be$negated,$
but$in$the$context$of$philosophy$proper,$that$is,$in$the$context$of$Hegel’s$own$
Wissenschaft,$negation$will$yield$the$consummate$philosophical$subject,$the$Self$as$
accomplished$epistemic$agent,$or$as$Hegel$puts$it$quite$simply,$the$subject$qua$Absolute,
Knowing.68$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
66$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§791.$
$
67$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§792.$
$
68$This$is$obviously$a$drastically$abbreviated$account$of$the$course$of$infinite$judgment$in$the$
Phenomenology.$A$more$complete$account,$presented$in$part$in$the$next$section,$depends$upon$making$
clear$the$deductive$structure$traversed,$which$Hegel$thinks$has$to$be$understood$in$syllogistic$terms.$
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The$emptying$out$or$externalization$(Entäußerung),and$reconstitution$of$the$
subject$(both$as$consciousness$and$as$determinable$concept)$in$its$infinite$predicate,$
exhibited$in$this$epitome$of$Hegelian$dialectic,$demonstrates$at$once$the$philosophical$
role$of$infinite$judgment$and$the$nature$of$the$predicative$act$as$such$for$Hegel.$The$
emptying$and$replenishment$of$the$concept$in$its$propositional$expansion$is$the$very$
essence$of$discursivity$for$Hegel,$in$that$every$philosophically$relevant$phenomenon,$
shape$or$form$is$precisely$a$static$impression$or$representation$of$thought$itself,$
realized$within$the$interval$between$kenosis$and$plenitude.$But$then$this$is$to$say$that$
semantic$engagement,$or,$as$we$might$put$it$more$simply,$the$thinking$of$Spirit$or$
consciousness,$is$both$the$"restless$process$of$superseding$itself,$or$negativity,"69$the$
continuous$provision$of$determinations,$and$the$cessation$of$philosophical$thought$in$
the$proposition$through$which$thinking$finds$its$moments$of$dead$repose.$Philosophical$
thinking$is$thus,$strictly$speaking,$the$exchange$between$concept$and$proposition,$and$
as$such,$it$is$both$Spirit$and$Bone.$
The$immanence$of$conceptual$determination$and$of$truth$has$regularly$been$
remarked$upon$by$recent$commentators$on$Hegel,$and$is$variously$conceived$in$terms$
of$communal$consensus$(Forster70),$discursive$coherence$(Longuenesse71),$or$pragmatic$
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$
69$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§805.$
$
70$See$M.$Forster,$The,Idea,of,Hegel’s,Phenomenology.$
$
71$See$B.$Longuenesse,$Hegel’s,Critique,of,Metaphysics,$translated$by$Nicole$J.$Simek$(Cambridge:$
Cambridge$University$Press,$2007).$
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attunement$(Brandom72).$What$I$would$point$out,$however,$is$that$the$fact$of$
communal$dependence,$discursive$immanence,$etc.,$entails$neither$the$pragmatism$
insisted$on$by$Brandom$nor$the$varieties$of$naturalism$promoted$by$Forster,$Pinkard,$
Pippin,$et,al.$If$the$resources$and$contours$of$a$given$concept$are$given$by$the$discourse$
in$which$it$occurs,$or$its$negative$determination$is$arrived$at$through$a$community$in$
which$that$discourse$is$articulated,$this$only$shows$how$the$truth$of$the$concept$is$
reached,$not$that$its$truth$amounts$to$or$is$fundamentally$grounded$in$the$path$it$takes$
to$reach$it.$Analogously,$that$a$proof$is$required$to$make$sense$of$a$mathematical$
proposition,$or$to$demonstrate$its$truth,$does$not$thereby$show$that$the$truth$or$
meaning$of$that$proposition$consists$in$its$demonstration$(though$of$course$intuitionists$
and$constructivists$will$insist$otherwise).$
I$have$thus$far$tried$to$show$that$for$Hegel$negation$operates$within$the$
contingent$array$of$concepts$that$defines$the$philosophical$discourse$of$a$given$
historical$moment.$Negation$is$in$this$sense$historically$immanent,$and$so$generates$
conceptual$and$propositional$determinations$and$truths$that$are$similarly$immanent.$
However,$the$fact$that$negation$is$not$applied$against$the$backdrop$of$an$established$
conceptual$firmament,$whether$this$be$the$Aristotelian$Decalogue,73$a$Porphyrian$tree$
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72$See$R.$Brandom,$Tales,of,the,Mighty,Dead:,Historical,Essays,in,the,Metaphysics,of,Intentionality$
(Cambridge,$Mass.:$Harvard$University$Press,$2002).,
$
73$I$introduce$the$expression$“logical$Decalogue”$for$Aristotle’s$categories$in$discussing$their$legislative$
character$in$Chapter$2.$$
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or$the$Kantian$table$of$categories,$should$not$be$taken$to$indicate$that$truth$itself$is$
contingent$or$relative.$$
The$progress$of$infinite$judgment$exhibits$an$internal$necessity$that$I$have$tried$
to$make$out$in$the$present$section,$and$in$the$more$universal$progress$of$logic$Hegel$is$
at$pains$to$demonstrate$in$his$Logic,$and$which$will$occupy$us$in$the$following$sections$
of$this$chapter.$In$my$view,$and$as$I$hope$the$overall$thrust$of$this$dissertation$serves$to$
establish,$this$necessity$suggests$a$semantic$and$epistemic$Platonism$that$is$quite$at$
odds$with$most$contemporary$views$of$Hegel$and$perhaps$with$Hegel’s$own$avowed$
philosophical$disposition.$However,$it$is$only$in$the$light$of$the$remarkable$reconceiving$
of$Aristotelian$syllogistic$undertaken$in$his$Logic$that$this$Platonism$can$properly$be$
made$out,$and$that$Hegel’s$achievement,$in$freeing$logic$and$metaphysics$from$the$
constraints$of$its$traditional$categorical$setting,$can$be$adequately$assessed.$
Section(Five.(Hegel(versus(Frege(on(Noetic(and(Semantic(Engagement(
However,$before$turning$to$the$syllogistic$reconstitution$of$the$concept,$let$me$
try$to$say$something$more$about$the$relationship$of$negation$to$formalism$and$the$
invisible$ground$of$predication$and$truth,$by$way$of$a$comparison.$The$comparison$is$
illuminating$because$Frege$makes$the$issue$of$cognitive$engagement$the$centerpiece$of$
the$logical$enterprise,$where$this$remains$implicit$in$Hegel,$although$he$thinks$it$is$
assertion$rather$than$negation$through$which$such$engagement$is$undertaken.$Frege$is$
also$committed,$like$Hegel,$to$isolating$the$formal$and$logical$constraints$on$language$
without$abandoning$the$notion$that,$as$an$expressive,$not$a$productive,$instrument,$
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language,$whether$logically$pure$or$errant,$is$constrained$by$the$things$and$
circumstances$it$is$intended$to$be$about.$Unlike$the$unapologetic$formalists$he$
contended$with$Frege$thus$thinks$there$are$ontological$constraints$and$implications$
associated$with$both$formal$and$natural$languages.$In$his$Begriffsschrift$and$the$twoO
tiered$semantics$he$develops$to$support$it$we$see$what$a$more$or$less$purely$logical$
approach$to$negation$looks$like,$but$also$what$metaphysical$issues$nonetheless$seem$to$
remain,$even$when$these$are$formally$bracketed.$If$Frege$dismisses$negation$in$this$
context,$he$also$shows$us$the$importance$and$difficulties$involved$in$expressing$the$very$
function$Hegel$identifies$with$it.$
$ In$his$remarkable$essay$on$negation,$entitled$simply$"Negation,"$Frege$argues$
that$the$content$or$sense$(Sinn),$i.e.,$the$thought,$of$what$he$calls$a$"propositional"$
interrogative,$i.e.,$one$that$questions$the$truth$or$falsity$of$a$proposition$and$is$thus$
amenable$to$a$yes$or$no$answer,$can$be$either$true$or$false,$but$that$its$falsity$cannot$
consist$in$its$not$being,$in$its$not$in$particular$being,a,thought,$since$if$false$contents$had$
no$being,$no$questions$containing$false$claims$could$meaningfully$be$asked,$and$thus$no$
genuine$inquiry$could$be$undertaken,74$because$only$questions$with$known$affirmative$
answers,$i.e.,$those$with$true$senses,$would$be$considered$wellOformed,$and$thus$no$
question$would$ever$arise$once$a$thought$was$entertained;$the$same$would$apply,$and$
with$perhaps$more$severe$consequences$for$scientific$endeavor,$to$counterfactuals,$
which$presume$the$falsity$of$their$antecedents.$In$fact,$Frege$maintains$that$thoughts$
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74$"Negation,"$in$The,Frege,Reader,$347.$
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are$precisely$what$truth$and$falsity$properly$apply$to,$precisely$that$in$declarative$
speech$for$which$"the$question$of$truth$arises."75$
$ He$also$maintains$that$thoughts$are$objective$and$eternal,$and$that$their$truth$
values$are$equally$so.$It$follows,$according$to$Frege,$that$sentences$involving$indexicals$
such$as$"I,"$"now"$or$"here,"$etc.,$do$not$express$thoughts,$for$example,$because$of$the$
irreducibly$specific$and$ephemeral$access$each$speaker$has$to$himO$or$herself,$though$it$
is$puzzling$they$can$be$made$to$express$thoughts$by$replacing$the$indexical$element$
with$rigidly$referring$expressions$of$time,$place$and$person,$and$so$on.$This$view$finds$a$
curious$parallel$in$Hegel's$argument$in$the$Sense,Certainty$section$of$the$
Phenomenology$that$the$immediacy$of$cognition$we$anticipate$in$restricting$our$
epistemic$claims$to$indexical$ostension$in$fact$yields$nothing$of$the$sort.$
$ Yet$aside$from$telling$us$that$there$are$both$true$and$false$thoughts,$that$a$false$
thought$has$as$much$being$as$a$true$one,$and,$in$the$roughly$contemporary$essay$
“Thought,”$that$thoughts$are$not$ideas$or$bound$by$the$specific$indices$of$
demonstratives,$pronouns$and$adverbs,$that$is$by$the$subject,$time$and$place$of$
utterance,$Frege$tells$us$little$about$what$kind$of$being$it$is$that$they$do$have.$What$he$
is$interested$in$establishing$is$that$negation$presents$no$special$problem$for$his$account$
of$sentential$sense$or$his$account$of$assertion$and$judgment.$In$particular,$if$he$is$right$
that$negation,$in$its$most$common$sentential$use,$simply$switches$the$truth$value$of$a$
given$thought,$then$as$long$as$falsehood$is$not$a$problem,$neither$is$negation.$On$the$
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other$hand,$if$we$want$to$preserve$the$standard$truthOfunctional$operation$of$negation$
then$we$have$to$accept$the$unproblematic$existence$of$false,thoughts:$whether$they$are$
the$starting$points$or$termini$of$a$logical$operation$there$can$be$no$such$operation$
without$them.$
$ It$is$perhaps$surprising$in$the$first$place$to$find$Frege$concerned$with$what$would$
appear$to$be$metaphysical$issues,$but$he$follows$Leibniz$not$only$in$his$attempt$to$
develop$a$lingua,characterica,$a$universal$language$fashioned$for$scientific$discourse,$
but$in$embracing$the$metaphysical$implications$of$the$semantic$puzzles$he$is$committed$
to$solving$in$the$service$of$constructing$such$a$language.$There$must$be$senses$(Sinne),$
for$example,$because$the$contentful$character$of$identity$statements$requires$that$there$
be$more$to$the$terms$that$make$up$such$statements$than$their$reference.$In$this$
instance,$there$must$be$false$senses/thoughts$because$counterfactuals,$propositional$
questions$incorporating$false$propositions,$and$the$truthOfunctional$use$of$negation$are$
both$commonplace$and$intelligible,$and$ought$to$remain$so$in$any$logic$we$hope$to$put$
to$mathematical$or$scientific$use.$In$the$end,$however,$while$we$know$that$negation,$
truth$and$falsehood$both$belong$to$the$level$of$thought,$we$never$learn$from$Frege$
what$kind$of$being$thoughts$have$so$as$to$be$subject$to$such$modification.$Nonetheless$
we$do$see$how$the$senseOreference$distinction$helps$him$out:$falsehood$exists$at$the$
level$of$the$thought,$which$is$to$say$it$exists$at$the$level$sense,$not$reference.$So$we$
seem$to$have$a$way$of$avoiding$the$thorny$problem$of$nonObeing$by$embracing$an$
ontology$of$thoughts$or$intensions.$A$falsehood$doesn't$represent$anything$that$is$not$
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the$case;$it$is$simply$a$thought$that$isn't$true.$But$rather$than$being$a$shortcoming$of$
falsehood,$this$is$just$an$indication$of$the$inadequacy$of$representation,as$a$semantic$
relation.$A$truth$doesn't$represent$anything$that$is$the$case$either;$it$is$simply$a$thought$
that$is$true.$
$ A$few$things$are$significant$about$Frege's$account.$First,$it$divorces$questions$of$
truth$from$questions$of$existence.$Second,$it$places$negation$outside$the$domains$of$
both$judgment$and$being.$Negation,$here,$as$for$much$of$the$scholastic$tradition,$is$a$
creature$of$intension$or$thought,$an$ens,rationis.$Finally,$though$this$is$only$discussed$in$
the$companion$essay$"Thought,"$there$are$all$sorts$of$sentential$elements$that$have$no$
effect$on$the$identity$of$the$thought$expressed.$For$example,$Frege$tells$us,$"Alfred$has$
still$not$come"$expresses$the$same$thought$as$"Alfred$has$not$come,"$since$the$fact$that$
no$one$is$expecting$Alfred$would$not$render$the$former$false,$though$the$latter$"hints$
(deutet)"$at$this$expectation.$Though$I$shall$return$to$this$at$greater$length$below,$the$
notion$that$sentential$expressions$are$more$fine$grained$than$those$of$thought,$seems$
deeply$problematic.$In$particular,$one$might$argue$that$the$truth$conditions$and$thus$
the$implicative$range$of$"$Alfred$has$still$not$come$"$are$importantly$different$from$"$
Alfred$has$not$come,"$since$the$first$is$in$fact$equivalent$to$"Alfred$was$expected$to$have$
already$come$and$he$has$not$come"$and$the$second$isn’t$(though$context$might$make$it$
so).$To$say$that$expectation$is$not$part$of$the$truth$conditions$of$either$statement$is$to$
miss$the$thought$expressed$by$the$first,$or$at$any$rate$to$beg$the$question$whether$or$
not$words$like$"still"$affect$the$truth$value$of$a$proposition,$and$more$generally$the$
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question$as$to$what$grammatical,$syntactical$and$lexical$elements$do$and$do$not$have$
their$correlates$in$truth$conditions.That$we$are$so$accustomed$to$conceiving$of$logic$is$
not$inevitable$and$indeed$has$a$specific$historical$provenance:$Frege's$Begriffsschrift.$
But$what$I$hope$to$show$in$the$second$half$of$this$paper$is$that$the$model$of$logic$as$an$
instrument$of$formal$clarification$and$the$model$of$logic$Hegel$attempts$to$develop,$
though$radically$different,$derive$from$a$common,$if$differently$construed,$insight,$
namely,$that$thought$as$such$and$logic$as$its$more$or$less$formal$expression,$insofar$as$
they$are$concerned$with$truth,$are$necessarily$concerned$with$the$activity$of$attribution,$
i.e.,$with$a$species$of$cognitive$engagement$that$is$specific$to$holding,true.$Moreover,$if$
we$understand$why$this$insight$gives$rise$to$the$formalism$Frege$introduces$but$
nonetheless$resists$developing$to$its$final$conclusion,$we$can$better$understand$why$it$
also$gives$rise$to$the$more$thoroughgoing$conceptual$logic$Hegel$will$attempt$to$set$
forth.$Moreover,$Frege$gives$us$an$explicit$and$clear$justification$for$the$primacy$of$
assertion$that$is$nowhere$articulated,$though$it$is$often$implied,$in$Hegel.$
$ But,$as$hinted$at$earlier,$the$more$substantive$reason$for$turning$to$Frege$is$this:$
While$the$puzzles$of$metaphysical,$ethical$and$semantic$access$that$take$center$stage$in$
Kantian$transcendentalism$lie$clearly$in$the$background$of$much$of$Hegel's$critical$
recapitulation$of$philosophy,$the$formalist$consequences$of$the$transcendental$program$
are$much$more$clearly$seen$in$Frege,$who$is$justifiably$viewed$as$the$culmination$of$
Kantian$formalism.$Because$Frege$is$focused$precisely$on$the$relationship$of$
propositional$form$to$truth,$he$sees$explicitly,$as$Hegel$does$implicitly,$that$the$
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categorical$form$of$the$proposition$and$judgment$has$to$be$overcome$although$it$
remains$the$fundamental$configuration$of$thought.$However,$Frege,$as$we$shall$
discover,$seems$ultimately$unable$to$dispense$with$the$predicative$model$of$judgment,$
even$as$he$declares$otherwise.$Hegel,$I$want$to$argue,$sees$that$the$more$profound$
problem$with$propositional$logic$is$that$it$treats$propositions$as$the$static$loci$of$truth,$
and$attempts$to$show$us$why$no$such$treatment$is$viable.$Frege's$masterwork$on$the$
logic$of$the$concept,$his$Begriffsschrift,$demonstrates$this$as$well,$although$it$is$of$
course$intended$to$demonstrate$quite$the$opposite.$In$other$words,$it$shows$us$what$a$
purely$formal$accommodation$of$truth9directedness$looks$like,$and$in$doing$so$it$shows$
why,$in$principle,$such$a$project$is$unworkable.$ $
$ In$the$paper$that$takes$its$title$from$the$formal$language$it$describes,$a$
Begriffsschrift,$literally$a$concept9script,$Frege$sets$out$the$rudiments$of$what$he$hoped$
would$function$as$a$lingua,characterica,$a$language$free$from$the$logical$and$lexical$
ambiguities$of$ordinary$language,$and$sufficiently$rich$to$express$any$proposition$of$the$
mathematics$of$numbers$(arithmetic$and$analysis,$to$begin$with)$and$provide$for$the$
transparent$deduction$of$its$theorems.$Like$Hegel,$Frege$thinks$one$of$the$principal$
failings$of$traditional$categorical$logic$lies$in$its$treatment$of$the$proposition$as$a$
concatenation,$and$thus$first$the$decomposition,$of$subject$and$predicate$terms,$which$
leaves$unexpressed$and$inexplicable$the$unity$of$the$truth,at$which$attributive$judgment$
aims.$
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$ To$address$this$shortcoming$he$recasts$the$proposition$as$the$combination$of$an$
unsaturated,concept$and$its$correlative$object,$an$object$that$saturates,the$gap$in$the$
concept$so$to$speak.$Frege$supposes$that$so$formulated$the$composite$surface$of$the$
proposition$exhibits$the$structural$unity$required$to$express$truth$(or$falsity).$Yet$in$
addition$to$the$concept/object$reformulation,$he$includes$amongst$the$logical$symbols$
of$his$concept9script,$along$with$those$for$quantification,$conjunction,$disjunction,$
concepts,$etc.,$a$right$turnstile$symbol$"⊢,"$$which$is$intended$to$express$the$assertoric$
use$of$the$proposition$to$which$it$is$affixed.$To$assert$P,$in$Frege's$view,$as$we$shall$see,$
is$to$employ$P$in$the$service$of$truth,$to$posit$it$as$a$name$of$the$True.$What$then$is$the$
relationship$between$these$two$distinct$means$of$exhibiting$semantic$readiness,$i.e.,$an$
aptness$for$expressing$truth?$
$ In$its$initial$presentation$this$assertion$sign$or$judgment$stroke$(Urteilstrich)$is$in$
fact$treated$syntactically$as$a$"combination$of$signs,"$the$horizontal$stroke$indicating$the$
propositional$unity$of$what$followed,$the$vertical$stroke$expressing$its$"affirmation$
(Bejahung)."$In$subsequent$discussions,$Frege$preferred$to$speak$of$the$horizontal$
stroke$as$a$kind$of$mapping$relation$from$propositions$to$truth$values.$However,$since$
the$unity$proper$to$the$expression$of$truth$was$what$the$concept/object$ligature$was$
supposed$to$exhibit$in$the$first$place,$anything$that$exhibits$such$a$unity$would$seem$to$
be$already$so$mapped,$in$the$sense$that$it$is$formally$oriented$towards$truth,$and$it$
seems$unlikely$any$more$robust$sense$of$mapping$can$be$thought$to$be$established$
formally.$Thus$whether$it$more$directly$confers$the$unity$required$for$the$expression$of$
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truth$or$points$an$already$suitably$unified$expression$in$the$appropriate$semantic$
direction$it$would$appear$that$this$part$of$the$assertion$sign,$at$least,$does$what$the$
propositional$notation$already$provides$for.$
$ As$for$the$affirmative$component$of$the$assertion$sign,$it$at$least$seems$to$
express$what$no$other$symbol$of$the$Begriffsschrift,expresses.$Yet$it$is$with$reference$to$
precisely$this$component$that$the$assertion$sign$as$such$is$regularly$dismissed$as$doing$
work$that$is$already$done$without$it,$or$doing$something$that$nothing$at$the$purely$
formal$level$is$capable$of$doing$at$all.$But$if$it$is$true$that$the$work$it$is$designed$to$do$is$
already$being$done$without$it,$then$it$must$be$true$that$there$is$some,extra$bit$of$work$
being$done,$whatever$it$amounts$to,$and$something$that$is$already$doing$it.$At$worst$
then,$such$a$sign$would$then$make$explicit$what$is$already$implicitly$under$way,$which$
would$at$worst$earn$it$the$charge$of$redundancy.$
$ Yet$there$are$difficulties$with$the$sign$under$any,$including$the$most$benign,$
construals$of$its$meaning.$Firstly,$although$it$is$part$of$the$logical$formula$used$to$
express$a$proposition$to$which$it$is$attached,$the$assertion$sign$is$not$considered$part$of$
that$or$any$other$proposition.$It$is$instead$a$formal$constituent$of$an$expression$that$
does$not$enter$into$its$meaning,$or,$in$terms$of$the$distinction$between$sense$(Sinn)$and$
reference$(Bedeutung)$Frege$is$yet$to$develop,$one$that$makes$no$contribution$to$the$
thought$or$truth,value,$respectively,$$of$the$proposition$it$introduces.$Presumably,$
concept$and$object$names,$when$properly$combined,$exhibit$the$contribution$each$
makes$to$the$unit$sense$of$the$proposition$they$together$constitute.$Though$meaning$
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(Bedeutung)$receives$no$explicit$discussion$in$the$Begriffsschrift,$Frege$seems$to$have$
thought$the$sense/reference$distinction$and$the$twoOtiered$semantics$it$defines$already$
latent$there,$as$he$makes$clear$in$a$passage$from$the$Grundgesetze,der,Arithmetik$in$
which$he$offers$a$summary$of$the$expressive$resources$of$his$concept9script:$
Thus$it$is$shown$that$our$eight$primitive$names$have$a$Bedeutung,$and$hence$that$
the$same$holds$too$for$all$names$legitimately$constructed$from$them.$However,$not$
only$a$Bedeutung,$but$also$a$sense$(Sinn)$belongs$to$all$names$legitimately$formed$
from$our$signs.$Every$such$name$of$a$truthOvalue$expresses$a$sense,$a$thought.$That$
is,$by$our$stipulations,$it$is$determined$under$what$conditions$the$name$refers$to$
[Bedeutet]$the$True.$The$sense$of$this$name,$the$thought,$is$the$thought$that$these$
conditions$are$fulfilled.76$
He$defines$"name"$a$little$earlier$in$§26$as$"a$sign$[Zeichen],$whether$simple$or$complex,$
that$is$intended$to$refer$to$[bedeuten]$an$object,$but$not$a$sign$that$merely$indicates$
[andeutet]$an$object;"$the$eight$names$he$has$in$mind$here$are$signs$of$firstO,$secondO$
and$thirdOorder$functions,$with$one$or$two$argument$places.$He$also$defines$a$separate$
class$of$signs,$namely$"Marken"$which$seem$to$be$names$in$which$constituent$object$
and$function$names$have$been$replaced$with$appropriate$variables.$In$this$same$section$
he$remarks$that$the$judgment$stroke$(assertion$sign)$is$neither$a$name$nor$a$Marke,$but$
a$"sign$of$its$own$special$kind."$
$ In$other$words,$the$judgment$stroke/assertion$sign$is$a$significant,$i.e.,$signifying,$
symbol$that$seems$to$say$something$without$meaning$anything,$for$if$it$did$mean$
something$it$would$either$be$a$constituent$of$a$secondOorder$proposition$or$of$a$
complex$of$symbols$that$fell$short$of$amounting$to$such$a$thing,$in$which$case$it$would$
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76$Gottlob$Frege,$Grundgesetze,der,Arithmetik,$Band,I,$(Hildesheim;$Zurich;$New$York:$Georg$Olms$Verlag,$
1998),$§32.$
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serve$to$obstruct$rather$than$facilitate$judgment$and$so$cease$to$function$as$an$
assertion$sign.$In$either$case,$it$would$seem$to$work$against$the$unification$of$the$
proposition$Frege's$notation$is$supposed$to$exhibit,$if$not$establish.$
$ The$types$of$functions$Frege$is$specifically$interested$in$are$concepts,$which$he$
defines$as$functions$whose$values$are$truth$values.$Though$Frege$is$not$consistent$in$his$
use$of$the$term$Satz,$which$is$usually$translated$proposition,$but$is$also$the$term$used$
for$sentence,$if$we$understand$by$a$sentence$or$proposition$a$saturated$concept,$i.e.,$a$
concept$whose$argument$place$has$been$filled$by$an$appropriate$object$name,$then$a$
sentence/proposition$is$just$the$name$of$a$truth$value,$either$the$True$or$the$False,$
depending$on$whether$or$not$the$object$referred$to$by$the$argument$or$object$name$
falls,under$the$concept.$Frege$also$occasionally$talks$of$a$proposition$as$what$is$
expressed,$although$more$typically$it$is$a$thought$that$is$expressed$by$a$proposition.$
Then$again,$in$the$Grundgesetze$a$proposition$seems$to$be$the$result$of$adding$an$
assertion$sign$(here$"judgment$stroke")$to$a$possible$content$of$judgment:$"A$sign$that$
consists$of$a$judgment$stroke$and$a$name$of$a$truthOvalue$prefixed$by$a$horizontal$I$call$
a$Begriffsschrift,proposition$(Satz)$or,$where$there$is$no$danger$of$confusion,$a$
proposition."$All$the$same,$in$whatever$way$we$designate$it,$in$addition$to$the$
expression$to$which$the$assertion$sign$is$prefixed,$there$is$also$the$expression$that$
consists$of$this$unasserted$expression$preceded$by$the$assertion$sign,$and$just$what$kind$
of$sign$that$entire$formula,$i.e.,$⊢p,$is$supposed$to$be,$is$not$entirely$clear.$
$ Here,$as$elsewhere,$Frege$is$at$pains$to$save$logic,$and$semantics$in$particular,$
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from$the$ills$of$psychologism,$and$so$he$insists$on$the$purely$logical$character$of$the$
assertion$sign,$on$the$fact$that$it$is$indeed$a$symbol$of$his$formal,notation.$As$he$tells$us:$
It$is$rather$the$task$...$to$purify$logic$of$all$that$is$alien$and$hence$of$all$that$is$
psychological...Logic$is$concerned$with$the$laws$of$truth,$not$with$the$laws$of$holding$
something$to$be$true,$nor$with$the$question$of$how$people$think,$but$with$the$
question$of$how$they$must$think$if$they$are$not$to$miss$the$truth.77$
The$obvious$problem,$however,$is$that$it$is$difficult$to$see$how$what$such$a$symbol$is$
designed$to$convey,$precisely$that$the$proposition$that$follows$is$in$fact$held,true,$can$be$
intelligibly$construed$as$logical$in$character$on$Frege's$own$view$of$logic,$let$alone$on$
the$standard$more$formal$conception$from$which$we$might$distinguish$Frege's$view.$We$
can$perhaps$mute$the$appearance$of$flatOout$contradiction$by$pointing$out$that$though$
logic$is$not$concerned$with$the$laws$governing$holding$something$true,$it$is$nonetheless$
essentially$concerned$with$things$that$are$or$might$be$held$true,$namely$propositions,$
and$only$insofar$as$they$are$held$true.$
$ This$does$in$fact$point$to$a$way$out$for$Frege$and$I$will$return$to$it$below.$
Nonetheless,$it$still$seems$that$the$sign$in$question,$which$is$all$the$same$a$sign$that$
belongs$to$the$symbolic$notation$of$the$Begriffsschrift,$does$indeed$stand$for$something$
very$much$like$a$psychological$or$propositional$attitude,$and$is$thus$subject$to$the$
substitutivity$constraints$characteristic$of$other$such$attitudes,$i.e.,$knowing,$believing,$
wishing,$etc.$Just$as$in$the$case$of$knows,that,p$or$believes,that,p,$,from$the$truth$value$
of$p$it$is$impossible$to$determine$the$truth$value$of$⊢p$for$any$p,$and$any$given$
author/scribe,$without$first$establishing$whether$or$not$p$is$in$fact$held,true$by$its$
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77$See$Frege’s$“Logic,(1897),”$in$The,Frege,Reader,$250.$
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author/scribe.$But$surely,$and$herein$lies$the$crux$of$the$issue,$that,is$a$matter$of$
empirical,$psychological$evaluation,$not$logical$calculation:$one$cannot$tell$from$the$
mere$occurrence$of$the$turnstile$sign$that$its$author$means$it,$or$to$put$it$another$way,$
that$it$properly$represents$his/her$semantic$commitment.$
$ In$addition$to$providing$for$what$we$might$think$of$as$the$primary$level$of$
semantic$engagement,$i.e.,$truthOholding,$Frege$thinks$it$is$only$when$preceded$by$the$
assertion$sign$that$propositions$can$enter$into$inferential$relations$with$one$another,$
since$it$is$only$then$that$a$judgment$is$expressed$and$inferential$relations$hold$
exclusively$between$propositions$held,true,$i.e.,$judgments,$not$mere$propositions,$
which$are$after$all$mere$signs,$in$isolation:$
An$inference$simply$does$not$belong$to$the$realm$of$signs;$rather,$it$is$the$
pronouncement$of$a$judgement$made$in$accordance$with$logical$laws$on$the$
basis$of$previously$passed$judgments.$Each$of$the$premises$is$a$determinate$
Thought$recognized$as$true;$and$in$the$conclusion$too,$a$determinate$Thought$
is$recognized$as$true.78$
$
It$would$seem$that$if$the$sign$expressing$such$recognition$is$thereby$psychological$in$
nature,$then$inference$itself$is$derivatively$psychological.$$Yet$it$is$generally$held$to$be$of$
the$essence$of$inference$rules$that$they$apply$to$propositions$regardless$of$whether$or$
not$those$propositions$are$held$true,$or$even$held$under$consideration,$by$anyone.$
Modus,ponens,$for$example,$the$single$inference$rule$Frege$introduces$in$the$
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78$See$Frege’s$“On$the$Foundations$of$Geometry:$Second$Series,"$in$Gottlob$Frege,$Collected,Papers,on,
Mathematics,,Logic,,and,Philosophy,$ed.$Brian$McGuinness$and$trans.$Max$Black$et,al$(Oxford,$UK;$New$
York:$Basil$Blackwell,$1984),$318.$I$owe$this$reference,$but$as$far$as$I$am$aware$nothing$else,$to$an$article$
by$Nicholas$J.$J.$Smith$entitled$"Frege’s$Judgement$Stroke$and$the$Conception$of$Logic$as$the$Study$of$
Inference$not$Consequence,"$Philosophy,Compass,4/4,(2009).$
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Begriffsschrift,$would$seem$to$apply$on$the$basis$of$the$logical,$i.e.,$truthOfunctional,$
properties$of$the$conditional,$and$independently$of$the$content$of$the$propositions$to$
which$it$is$applied,$let$alone$of$the$actual$or$potential$author$of$those$propositions.$In$
this$regard,$it$is$also$instructive$to$note$that$Frege$does$not$think$arguments$with$false$
premises$valid,$that,$in$other$words,$he$seems$to$conflate$validity$with$soundness,$or$to$
put$it$more$charitably,$that$he$regards$soundness$alone$as$the$relevant$evaluative$
measure$of$proofs.$Yet$it$is$likely,$and$not$merely$charitably$granted,$that$Frege$takes$
such$a$position$because$he$does$not$think$it$possible$to$logically,acknowledge$as$true$
what$is$not.$
Given$all$of$this,$one$might$be$inclined$to$conclude$instead$that$⊢p$ought$not$to$
be$subject$to$semantic$evaluation$in$the$first$place,$because$"⊢"$is$not$merely$
semantically$vacuous,$but$not$in$any$important$sense$a$part$of$the$statement$under$
evaluation$at$all.$Indeed,$beginning$with$Wittgenstein,$who$may$be$taken$as$the$
spokesman$for$the$traditional$position$on$the$matter,$it$has$generally$been$maintained$
that$Frege's$symbol,$or$anything$like$it,$has$no$legitimate$role$to$play$in$logic,$nor$in$the$
languages$logic$is$designed$to$replace$in$contexts$requiring$more$rigorous$standards$of$
expression$and$inference.$As$Wittgenstein$brashly$puts$it,$"Frege's$assertion$sign$'⊢'$is$
logically$altogether$meaningless;$in$Frege$(and$Russell)$it$only$shows$that$these$authors$
hold$as$true$the$propositions$(Sätze)$marked$in$this$way."$(Tractatus,Logico9
Philosophicus,$4.442).$This$is$more$emphatically$the$attitude$of$those$who$nonetheless$
acknowledge$the$substantial$advance$beyond$Aristotelian$categorical$logic$the$
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quantificational$features$of$Frege's$propositional$Begriffsschrift$amount$to.$From$this$
perspective,$the$assertion$sign$represents$a$lamentable$but$negligible$lapse$in$the$
logician's$otherwise$considerable$logical$acumen.$A$result,$it$might$be$further$
conjectured,$of$his$adherence$to$the$old$Kantian$conception$of$judgment$and$thus$to$a$
vestige$of$epistemological$psychologism$he$is$not$disposed$to$recognize.$
$ However,$that$his$commitment$to$the$assertion$sign$does$not$represent$a$lapse$
of$any$kind$is$made$clear$from$the$frequency$with$which$he$confirms$its$necessity,$and$
from$the$central$role$he$seems$to$assign$assertion,$or$assertoric$force,$in$the$logical$
enterprise.$Frege's$conceptOscript$is$first$described$in$his$paper$of$1879,$but$in$a$paper$
dating$from$1915,$entitled$"My$Basic$Logical$insights,"$in$which$he$reflects$back$on$the$
significance$of$his$script$and$its$use,$Frege$writes,$$
the$word$'true'$has$a$sense$that$contributes$nothing$to$the$sense$of$the$whole$
sentence$in$which$it$occurs$as$a$predicate...$But$it$is$precisely$for$this$reason$that$this$
word$seems$fitted$to$indicate$the$essence$of$logic...So$the$word$'true'$seems$to$
make$the$impossible$possible:$it$allows$what$corresponds$to$the$assertoric$force$to$
assume$the$form$of$a$contribution$to$the$thought.$And$although$this$attempt$
miscarries,$or$rather$through$the$very$fact$that$it$miscarries,$it$indicates$what$is$
characteristic$of$logic...For$there$is$no$doubt$that$the$word$'beautiful'$actually$does$
indicate$the$essence$of$aesthetics,$as$does$'good'$that$of$ethics,$whereas$'true'$only$
makes$an$abortive$attempt$to$indicate$the$essence$of$logic,$since$what$logic$is$really$
concerned$with$is$not$contained$in$the$word$'true'$at$all$but$in$the$assertoric$force$
with$which$a$sentence$is$uttered...but$no$word$or$part$of$a$sentence$corresponds$to$
this.79$
$
This$is$not$to$say$that$truth$is$not$the$proper$object$of$logic;$just$that$the$behavior$of$the$
predicate$"true"$cannot$tell$us$much$about$it.$Whatever$it$can$tell$us,$however,$Frege$
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79See$Frege’s$“My$Basic$Logical$Insights”$in$Gottlob$Frege,$Posthumous,Writings,$translated$by$P.$Long$and$
R.$M.$White$(Oxford:$WileyOBlackwell,$1991),$252.$
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thinks$the$formal$language$set$out$in$his$Begriffsschrift$provides$a$notation$for$
expressing.$To$be$more$exact,$what$shows$us$in$the$concept9script$that$which$"no$word"$
can$linguistically$express$is$what$I$have$persisted$in$calling$the$assertion$sign,$for$reasons$
I$hope$have$been$made$clear,$but$which$Frege$here$refers$to$as$the$turnstile,sign:$
A$judgment$is$always$to$be$expressed$by$means$of$the$turnstile$sign.$This$stands$to$
the$left$of$the$sign$or$complex$of$signs$in$which$the$content$of$the$judgment$is$given.$
If$we$omit$the$little$vertical$stroke$at$the$left$end$of$the$horizontal$stroke,$the$
judgment$is$to$be$transformed$into$a$mere$complex$of$ideas;$the$author$is$not$
expressing$his$recognition$or$nonOrecognition$of$the$truth$of$this.80$
$
The$recognition$or$acknowledgement$of$the$truth$of$a$proposition$simply$is$what$
judgment$consists$in$for$Frege.$To$the$extent$that$this$is$true,$the$assertion$sign$would$
constitute$the$only$strictly$predicative$element$left$in$his$notation,$the$traditional$
subjectOpredicate$structures$having$been$replaced$by$functions$and$arguments,$or,$more$
specifically,$concepts$and$objects.$Though$again$since$it$does$not$actually$occur$as$a$
predicate$but$merely$stands$in$for$one,$it$persists$only$as$a$formal$remnant$of$
predicative$function.$The$assertion$sign,$then,$is$the$logical$representation$of$a$formally$
inexpressible$predicate,$one$that$were$it$capable$of$doing$so$would$directly$express$the$
speaker's/author's$commitment$to$the$truth$of$the$relevant$proposition.$Indeed,$in$his$
introductory$remarks$to$the$Begriffsschrift,$Frege$explicitly$suggests$a$predicative$
construal$along$these$lines:$
We$can$imagine$a$language$in$which$the$proposition$"Archimedes$perished$at$the$
capture$of$Syracuse"$would$be$expressed$thus:$"The$violent$death$of$Archimedes$at$
the$capture$of$Syracuse$is$a$fact."$To$be$sure$one$can$distinguish$between$subject$
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80$“My$Basic$Logical$Insights,”$in$Posthumous,Writings,$252.$
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and$predicate$here,$too,$if$one$wishes$to$do$so$but$the$subject$contains$the$whole$
content,$and$the$predicate$serves$only$to$turn$the$content$into$a$judgment.$$Such$a$
language$would$have$only$a$single$predicate$for$all$judgments,$namely,$'is$a$
fact'...Our$ideography$is$a$language$of$this$sort,$and$in$it,$the$sign$⊢$$is$the$common$
predicate$for$all$judgments.81$
$ $
$ We$see$here$an$attempt$to$grapple$with$the$same$issue$of$inexpressibility$faced$
in$dealing$with$the$predicate$"is$true."$Having$recognized$the$redundancy$of$"is$true"$
Frege$here$suggests$"is$a$fact"$as$an$approximation$of$the$expressive$force$of$the$
assertion$sign.$But$again,$if$the$sign$does$in$fact$function$as$a$kind$of$predicate,$and$a$
predicate$with$this$specific$content,$it$necessarily$fails$to$do$the$work$it$is$designed$to$
do,$i.e.,$to$establish$the$fact$that$the$proposition$is$held$true$by$its$author.$Once$again,$
we$would$need$to$know$that$the$predicate$itself$is$asserted$rather$than$simply$
entertained.$To$see$this$we$need$only$construct$an$opaque$context$for$the$formula$"P$is$
a$fact."$For$example:$It$is$understood$that$P$is$a$fact$(where$"P"$has$been$recast$as$a$
nominal$phrase$designating$the$content$of$the$original$sentential$expression).$
$ What$goes$for$explicit$truth$attributions$would$seem$to$apply$to$any$device$that$
operates$in$their$stead.$As$Frege$himself$recognizes,$saying$"P$is$true",$adds$nothing$to,$
and$has$the$same$truth$conditions$as,$just$saying$"P."$On$the$other$hand,$saying$either$is$
consistent$with$asserting$neither,$which$argues$more$for$the$vacuousness$than$the$
redundancy$of$"is$true,"$and$this$is$precisely$why$Frege$thinks$the$word$"true"$fails$to$
capture$the$"essence"$of$logic.$We$might$make$out$a$difference$by$observing$that$the$
truth$conditions$of$"I$assert$P"$and$"P"$do$indeed$diverge,$since$the$former$would$be$
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81$Frege,$Begriffschrift,,§3,$in$The,Frege,Reader,$52.$
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true$regardless$of$the$truth$value$of$P,$provided$it$is$asserted$by$the$indexically$relevant$
"I."$But$this$would$be$to$express$a$different$proposition,$say$Q,$which$simply$contains$P$
as$an$object,$which$is$not,how$the$assertion$sign$is$supposed$to$operate:$the$assertion$
sign$is$not$part$of$any$propositional$content$at$all;$it$is$just$a$formal$indication$of$the$
assertoric$force$with$which$that$content$is$uttered$or$written.$
$ But$then$what$about$"is$a$fact"?$Once$again,$if$I$can$write$"P"$without$asserting$
it,$then$I$can$write$"R"$without$asserting$it,$where$"R"$stands$for$"P$is$a$fact."$$The$
trouble$with$the$assertion$sign$is$that$prima,facie,it$does$no$better$at$establishing$
semantic$commitment$unless$it$is$already$itself$established$as$semantically$engaged.$So$
again,$if$I$can$utter$P$without$asserting$it,$if$I$can$refrain$from$meaning$what$I$say$(to$put$
things$in$Cavellian$terms,$though$of$course$to$a$venture$a$rather$unOCavellian$thesis),$
then$I$can$do$the$same$with$turnstileOP,$I$can$refrain$from$meaning$what$I$say$even$in$
saying$that$I$mean$what$I$say.$On$the$assumption$that$propositional$inscription$is$
formally$uncoupled$from$assertion,$nothing$at$the$level$of$the$former$can$adequately$
vouchsafe$the$latter.$And$the$symbolization$of$assertoric$commitment$itself$now$
appears$to$be$the$culprit,$since$it$makes$of$assertion$a$secondOorder$or$metasentential$
syntagm,$which$while$intended$to$accomplish$what$no$firstOorder$(truth)$predicate$can,$
entrusts$assertoric$success$to$another$mute$notational$signature,$about$which$the$same$
question$of$assertion$can$be$asked.$Paradoxically$then,$the$assertion$sign,$to$the$extent$
that$it$is$predicatively$parsed,$would$seem$to$be$as$much$an$obstacle$to$as$an$
instrument$of$semantic$engagement.$
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$ The$introduction$of$the$assertion$sign$is$supposed$to$be$motivated$by$an$
observation$concerning$truth$and$true,$namely$that$the$latter$is$not$a$predicate,$the$
former$not$a$property.$What$Frege$does$not$quite$say,$though$he$comes$close$to$doing$
so,$but$what$his$and$the$analytic$tradition's$grappling$with$its$appropriate$designation$
and$status$also$demonstrates,$is$that$this$sign,$the$turnstile,$cannot$be$a$logical$symbol$
in$the$formal$sense$because$only$semantically$engaged$entities,$not$engagement$itself,$
are$so$formalizable.$More$specifically$it$cannot$be$formalized$as$a$predicate,$since$it$
does$not$say$anything$at$all$in$the$discursive$language$it$is$supposed$to$be$part$of.$In$fact$
the$point$may$be$put$more$strongly:$It$does$not$say$anything$at$all$in$any$language,$but$
rather$expresses$the$saying$of$anything$that$is$said.$To$this$extent,$and$more$visibly$and$
obviously$than$Hegel's$infinite$judgment,$it$is$written$both$inside$and$outside$the$
network$of$signs$and$symbols$it$allegedly$belongs$to$(i.e.,$in$this$case,$the$conceptO
script).$Moreover,$it$is$necessarily$so$written.$$
$ This$need$not$amount$to$admitting,$however,$that$the$assertion$sign$has$no$role$
to$play,$nor$in$particular$the$role$Frege$intended$it$to$play,$for$it$is$the$visible$inscription$
of$what$the$attribution$of$truth$cannot$express,$namely$the$semantic$engagement$of$the$
inscription$that$follows.$Its$designation$and$pictographic$form$O$a$horizontal$content$line$
bisecting$a$vertical$line$O$transparently$identify$it$as$a$gateway$to$inscription$and$
utterance.$Yet,$while$it$is$what$distinguishes$judgments$and$propositions$from$mere$
arrays$of$marks$or$signs,$it$is$more$pictogram$than$grapheme,$and$so$an$incongruous$
hieroglyph$in$the$otherwise$orderly$array$of$logical$insigniae.$
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$ But$to$say$it$is$a$hieroglyph$is$still$to$identify$it$as$an$expressive$mark$of$some$
sort,$though$it$is$indeed$very$difficult$to$say$precisely$what$kind$of$mark$it$is,$and$
therefore$what$kind$of$symbol$it$makes$of$any$expression$it$is$attached$to.$I$mean$by$
this$to$capture,$in$part,$the$sense$in$which$it$can$now$be$said$that$the$assertion$sign$is$
indeed$nonOsymbolic$or$extraOsymbolic,$that$it$shows$how$and$where$truth$enters$into$
the$deployment$of$signs,$without$itself$being$deployed$as$one.$The$further$argument$to$
be$made$is$that$such$a$sign$can$never$be$so$deployed,$cannot$be$understood$as$
operating$at$the$same$symbolic$level$as$the$formulae$it$mobilizes.$The$reason$for$this,$as$
mentioned$above,$is$that$it$says$something$that$cannot$be$meant,$and$to$this$extent$
exhibits$something$about$the$very$character$of$formal$inscription,$namely,$that$it$cannot$
on$its$own$ever$tell$us$that$it$is$to$be$treated,$understood,$responded$to,$etc.,$in$any$
particular$way.82$More$generally$and$to$the$point,$that$any$given$form,$logical$or$
otherwise,$is$semantically$engaged,$rather$than$depleted$or$dead,$cannot$be$established$
by$the$form$itself,$even$by$a$symbol$formally$introduced$to$establish$just$that.$To$return$
to$our$original$focus$on$the$proposition,$nothing$at$the$propositional$level$makes$it$
possible$to$distinguish$propositions$from$judgments.$
$ But$perhaps$there$is$still$a$way$of$avoiding$the$charge$of$redundancy$or$
emptiness.$Consider$the$word$"Exit"$on$an$exit$sign$on$the$wall$of$a$theater,$for$
example.$We$might$ask$what$it$is$about$how$it$occurs$that$tells$us$it$is$pointing$beyond$
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82$This$is$a$point$that$Wittgenstein$makes$repeatedly$in$the$Philosophical,Investigations,$and$it$is$also$a$
point$that$Hegel$makes$in$distinguishing$between$propositions$and$judgments:$a$judgment,$in$essence,$is$
simply$a$meant$proposition.$
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itself,$indicating$a$direction$of$egress,$rather$than$functioning$imperatively,$or$merely$
decoratively.$Presumably$we$rule$out$an$imperatival$construal$because$its$so$operating$
would$seem$inconsistent$with$the$expectation$of$remaining$in$place$for$a$while$that$is$
an$intrinsic$part$of$the$enterprise$of$attending$a$theater$in$the$first$place,$or$because$no$
one$attending$theaters$tends,$of$his/her$own$accord$or$prompted$by$others,$to$
immediately$exit$upon$seeing$the$word$"Exit."$But$though$the$sign$itself$is$of$course$
incapable$of$telling$us$anything$of$the$sort$about$the$word$that$appears$on$it,$we$would$
still$be$inclined$to$say$that$that$word's$having$the$significance$it$has$is$at$least$in$part$a$
function$of$the$fact$that$it$occurs,$as$a$matter$of$convention,$in$illuminated$letters$on$a$
sign,$in$a$theater,$etc.$
$ The$sign$itself,$and$the$architectural$and$cultural$environments$in$which$it$
appears,$are$not$themselves$without$significance.$Indeed$though$there$is$not$one,$
particular$expression$for$the$relevant$context,$one$might$argue$that$several$features$of$
that$context$together$indicate$that$the$word$"Exit,"$in$this$case,$signifies$a$direction$of$
egress.$Similarly,$one$might$then$say$that$the$turnstile$sign$has$this$kind$of$significance:$
it$tells$us$that$the$context$of$inscription$is$that$of$a$deductive$system,$i.e.,$one$governed$
by$the$demands$of$truth$and$validity.$
$ To$treat$the$assertion$sign$in$this$way,$to$take$up$a$point$argued$for$by$Peter$
Geach,83$is$to$admit$that$Frege's$concept9script,$unlike$the$formal$languages$derived$
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83$See$his$"Saying$and$Showing$in$Frege$and$Wittgenstein,"$in$Essays,on,Wittgenstein,in,Honour,of,G.,H.,
Von,Wright$(Amsterdam:$North$Holland$Publishing,$1976),,54O70.$
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from$it,$incorporates$a$distinction$between$saying$and$showing,$although$it$seems$to$me$
that$the$character$of$the$assertion$sign$as$a$logical$sign$would$suggest$that$saying$and$
showing,$from$Frege’s$perspective,$both$lie$on$the$formal$side$of$things.$The$claim$that$
Frege's$logic$is$not$formal$in$the$sense$that$it$is$purely$syntactically$defined,$
independently$of$semantic$interpretation,$is$not$a$new$one,$and$has$perhaps$been$most$
succinctly$made$by$Von$Heijenoort$in$terms$of$a$distinction$he$is$famous$for$drawing$
between$logic$as$calculus$and$logic$as$language.$But$it$is$not$enough,$or$is$perhaps$too$
much,$I$think,$to$place$Frege$in$the$logicOasOlanguage$camp.$Given$the$rather$restricted$
domain$of$Frege's$concerns,$one$might$argue$that$he$is$not$concerned$with$natural$
language$or$ordinary$communicative$acts,$philosophical$or$otherwise,$and$that$thus$the$
seeming$artificiality$of$his$treatment$of$assertion,$for$example,$is$just$the$result$of$our$
being$unaccustomed$to$attending$to$logical$structure$insofar$as$this$relates$to$so$limited$
a$field$of$expression.84$
$ But$Frege$does$think$his$Begriffsschrift,$as$a$whole,$shows$what$ordinary$
language$cannot,$that$is,$it$shows$how$truth$finds$its$constituent$expression$in$the$parts$
of$the$proposition$that$is$its$proper$domain,$and$he$does$not$think$there$is$more$than$
one$kind$or$domain$of$truth.$He$thought$that$his$concept9script$showed$in$a$graphic$
manner$the$contours$of$inference$and$concepts$which$ordinary$spoken$language,$or$its$
alphabetic$expression,$obscures:$
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84$Cora$Diamond$has$something$like$this$to$say$in$her$"What$does$a$ConceptOScript$do?"$in$The,Realistic,
Spirit:,Wittengenstein,,Philosophy,,and,the,Mind$(Cambridge,$Mass.:$MIT$Press,$1995),$115O144.$
$$
258$
Speech$often$only$indicates$by$inessential$marks$or$by$imagery$what$a$conceptOscript$$
should$spell$out$in$full.$At$a$more$external$level,$the$latter$is$distinguished$from$
verbal$language$in$being$laid$out$for$the$eye,$rather$than$for$the$ear.85$
This$is$something$he$believed$continuous$with$the$Leibnizean$project$of$developing$a$
lingua,characterica,$which$Leibniz$apparently$thought$should$"peindre,non,pas,les,
paroles,,mais,les,pensées."$Yet$what$this$script$is$ultimately$designed$to$make$visible$and$
representable,$to$show,$is$how$truth$is$obliquely$expressed$in$truth$claims$in$the$face$of$
its$own$inexpressibility.$Frege's$concept9script$is$thus$conceived$as$the$kind$of$
demonstrative$notation$Wittgenstein$thought$impossible,$i.e.,$one$that$both$says$and$
shows$how$what$is$said$is$to$be$understood.86$
$ Frege$is$thought$to$have$introduced,$along$with$Peano$and$Russell,$a$more$or$
less$purely$formal$treatment$of$logic,$and$in$so$doing$to$have$made$possible,$at$least$in$
principle,$a$universal$deductive$instrument,$i.e.,$a$symbolic$language$into$which$every$
relevant$proposition$and$method$of$inference$for$a$given$science$might$be$readily$
translated.$Yet$it$is$also$known$from$Frege's$essays$and$correspondence$that$he$
vehemently$rejected$the$pure,$or$what$might$more$usefully$be$called$the$arbitrary$or$
arbirtrarian$formalism$of$Hilbert$et,al,(what$in$discussing$Hegel$I$earlier$identified$as$
abstract$formalism).$In$an$article$on$Boole's$logical$calculus$he$says$as$much:$
In$contrast$we$may$now$set$out$the$aim$of$my$conceptOscript.$Right$from$the$start$I$
had$in$mind$the$expression$of$a$content.$What$I$am$striving$after$is$...$not$a$calculus$
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85$Gottlob$Frege,$“Boole's$logical$Calculus$and$the$ConceptOscript,"$Posthumous,Writings,,13.$
$
86$In$the$Tractatus,$Wittgenstein$directs$this$line$of$critique$to$the$assertion$sign,$or$“judgment$stroke,”$as$
he$refers$to$is,$claiming$that$it$is$“logically$meaningless”$(4.442).$
$$
259$
restricted$to$pure$logic.$But$the$content$is$to$be$rendered$more$exactly$than$is$done$
by$verbal$language.87$
More$to$the$point,$it$is$not$merely$the$emphasis$placed$on$the$role$of$assertion,$but$the$
use$of$alternative$sign$sets$for$bound$and$unbound$variables,$a$pictorial$representation$
of$syntactic$and$inferential$relations,$etc.,88$all$suggest$a$conception$of$logic$as$formal$
primarily$in$the$sense$that$it$exhibits$in$its$very$form$those$and$only$those$features$of$a$
statement$or$thought$that$are$relevant$to$its$truth$and$its$inferential$employment$in$
deductive$proof.$Such$a$conception$is,$for$Frege,$not$merely$consistent$with$but$indeed$
directly$motivates$his$denying$the$arbitrariness$of$form.$If$we$give$up$the$conception$of$
Frege's$concept9script$as$a$formal$calculus,$we$can$begin$to$make$sense$of$the$assertion$
sign,$along$with$other$features$of$his$notation.$
$ On$the$face$of$it,$his$inclusion$of$the$assertion$sign$as$a$constituent$of$his$formal$
language$represents$an$insistence$on$the$determinative$role$assertion$or$semantic$
engagement$as$the$foundation$of$logical$form.$We$should$recall$that$Frege$characterizes$
part$of$the$function$of$the$assertion$sign$initially$in$terms$of$its$establishing$the$unity,$
that$is$to$say$the$propositionality,$of$a$following$formula,$and$then$as$directing$such$
unified$formulae$towards$(mapping$them$with)$truth.$Object$and$concept$terms,$
sentences$and$propositions$all$hang$together$in$terms$of$the$extensional$contribution$
they$make$towards$determining$a$truth$value.$For$Frege,$all$such$expressions$are$
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87$Tractatus,$12.$
$
88$On$this$point$see$Danielle$Macbeth's$Frege's,Logic,(Cambridge,$MA.:$Harvard$University$Press,$2005).$
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semantically$of$a$piece,$in$that$they$all$function$as$names,$and$in$particular$sentences$or$
propositions$are$complex$names$of$truth$values,$namely$the$True$or$the$False.$
$ We$can$thus$begin$to$see$the$motivation$for$the$assertion$sign,$especially$as$he$
introduces$it$as$a$way$of$making$sense$of$its$absence$in$quotation,$and$in$opaque$
contexts$more$generally.$The$sign$enables$us$to$tell$by$simply$looking$at$a$formula$of$the$
Begriffsschrift$whether$or$not$it$is$being$used$truth$functionally,$i.e.,$to$express$a$truth,$
which$in$turn$enables$us$to$determine$its$inferential$value.$Or,$from$the$perspective$I$
think$more$properly$Frege's,$and$which$would$certainly$be$Hegel's,$it$is$intended$to$
make$visible$the$fact$that$what$follows$is$directed$towards$truth,$and$thus$instructs$us$to$
evaluate$each$constituent$concept,$object$and$logical$term$as$an$elucidation$of$the$True.$
The$insistence$that$such$a$sign$be$formal$is$just$the$insistence$that$it$be$graphically$
transparent.,
$ As$Frege$more$or$less$tells$us,$the$significance$of$such$a$sign$can$best$be$seen$in$
the$effect$produced$by$its$omission,$just$as$the$keystone$of$an$arch$might$reveal$its$
function$in$the$structural$collapse$that$follows$its$removal.$We$can$presumably$see$by$
looking$at$"⊢$(A$believes$that$P)"$that$whatever$proposition$P$names$it$is$inferentially$
inert,$and$would$consider$"⊢(A$believes$that$⊢P)"$illOformed.$The$unasserted$inscription$
of$a$proposition$is$semantically$opaque$in$the$sense$that$it$makes$no$claim$to$truth$(or$
falsity,$for$that$matter),$though$knowing$what$truth$it$would$lay$claim$to$remains$
essential$to$determining$its$meaning.$The$claim$would$be$that$even$if$P$implies$Q,$this$
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does$not$license$us$to$attribute$belief$in$Q$to$A,$even$though,$on$a$Brandomian$view,$Q$
furnishes$us$with$important$information$about$what$A$believes.$
$ It$is$in$principle$impossible$to$determine$from$the$isolated$fact$of$someone's$
uttering$or$writing$out$a$sequence$of$names$(in$the$fully$general$sense$of$referring$
expressions)$whether$he$is$simply$listing$the$objects$or$persons$named,$calling$upon$
them,$practicing$a$particular$language,$inventing$a$new$one,$trying$to$memorize$or$savor$
the$sound$or$shape$of$a$set$of$propositions,$etc.$But$if$what$is$missing$from$the$
environment$of$utterance$is$an$assertion$sign$or$its$equivalent,$then$because$its$
contribution$to$the$truthOvalue$of$an$utterance$is$what$the$ultimate$meaning,$i.e.,$
reference,$of$any$meaningful$expression$amounts$to,$it$is$impossible$in$principle$to$fully$
determine$what,$if$anything,$any$such$linguistic$display$ultimately$means.$
$ In$discussing$this$issue,$in$a$commentary$on$Frege$that$may$be$considered$
canonical,$Michael$Dummett$likens$the$use$of$language,$let$us$say$the$language$of$the$
Begriffsschrift,$to$the$game$of$chess.$He$raises$the$question$how$anyone$might$
understand$what$one$is$doing$in$playing$the$game$if$all$he$has$at$his$disposal$is$a$"formal$
description$of$chess...describing$the$initial$position$of$the$pieces,$and$giving$rules$for$
what$constituted$a$legitimate$move$from$any$given$position."89$He$maintains$that$from$
such$a$description$it$would$be$"impossible$to$tell$what,$in$playing$chess,$a$player$is$trying$
to$do,"$namely$to$win.$An$analogue$of$the$assertion$sign$for$chess,$on$Dummett's$view,$
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89$Michael$Dummett,$Frege:,Philosophy,of,Language$(New$York:$Harper$&$Row,$1973),$296.$
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would$be$something$that$addressed$such$a$deficit,$something$that$told$us$that$winning,
was,$so$to$speak,$the$name$of$the$game.$
$ Dummett's$analogy$and$the$analysis$that$follows$help$to$make$clear$why$Frege's$
extralogical$sign$simply$extends$the$problem$of$expressiveness$from$the$level$of$logical$
to$that$of$metalogical$or$metalinguistic$form.$While$it$might$be$true$that$no$one$who$did$
not$know$what$the$players$were$trying$to$accomplish$could$know$what$precisely$they$
were$doing$in$playing$chess,$the$addition$of$a$gesture$or$extra$chess$piece$designed$to$
make$clear$that$purpose$could$hardly$succeed$unless$the$use$of$that$gesture$or$extra$
pieces$were$understood$to$have$been$truthfully,$honestly$or$gameOspecifically$
employed.$One$might$easily$imagine$a$form$of$the$game$in$which$expressing$one's$intent$
in$playing$the$rest$of$the$game$was$considered$part$of$the$game,$and$thus$a$game$in$
which$one$might$express$one's$intent$to$play$to$win,$while$in$fact$playing$to$draw$or$
achieve$a$desired$disposition$of$chess$pieces.$For$someone$who$did$not$already$have$the$
appropriate$concept$of$what$the$point$of$game$playing$is,$the$intention$piece,$as$we$
might$call$it,$would$again$offer$no$clarity$of$intent.$But$even$for$someone$who$did$have$
the$notion$of$winning$as$a$starting$point,$it$would$be$impossible$for$him$to$tell$that$that$
is$what$a$particular$player$was$trying$to$do$in$playing$a$particular$game$of$chess.$
$ This$still$need$not$mean,$however,$that$the$assertion$sign$is$either$hopeless$or$
redundant.$Indeed$it$can$still$be$maintained$that$if$nothing$like$the$force$of$an$assertion$
sign$can$be$detected,$then$no$sense$can$be$made$of$any$string$of$symbols$that$follow$or$
are$otherwise$framed$by$such$a$sign.$To$put$it$this$way$is$to$come$close$to$saying$that$
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such$a$sign$functions$more$or$less$as$a$kind$of$diacritic$expressing$something$like$a$
principle$of$charity$of$the$sort$Donald$Davidson$argues$for.$Just$as$for$Davidson$we$
cannot$get$off$the$ground$in$determining$the$meaning$of$another's$speech$if$we$do$not$
assume$that$the$commitment$to$uttering$truths$holds$for$the$most$part,$so$without$the$
assumption$that$a$name$of$a$truth$value$is$being$asserted$it$is$impossible$to$tell$what$
one$is$doing$in$writing$or$pronouncing$that$name$or$its$component$parts.$Frege$thus$
thought$it$necessary$to$make$this$presumption$manifest,$though,$as$we$seem$to$be$
compelled$to$admit,$the$task$of$doing$so$appears$beyond$the$notational$device$
introduced$to$accomplish$it.$
$ Frege$had$sought$to$deliver$logic$from$very$the$riddle$of$predication$I$claimed$
Hegel's$infinite$judgment$seems$to$embody,$from$its$vacillation$between$tautology$and$
contradiction,$but$succeeds$only$in$concentrating$that$riddle$in$a$single,$covert$predicate$
that$when$applied$identifies$every$proposition$with$its$truth$value,$and$thus$depletes$
each$of$its$specific$content.$What$is$revealed$by$this,$strangely$enough,$is$that$the$
content,of$any$proposition$is$in$some$sense$unrepresentable$in$any$formal$language,$
even$an$interpreted$one,$since$if$it$were$representable,$it$would$immediately$identify$
itself$as$true$(or$false),$without$having$to$be$directed$to$do$so$by$a$sign$that$by$definition$
can$add$nothing$to$its$meaning$or$sense$(Sinn).90$
$
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90$This$problem$of$extensional$descent$lies$at$the$heart$of$Russell's$critique$of$Frege's$distinction$between$
sense$and$reference$in$"On$Denoting"$in$Mind$14$(1905):$479O493.$
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Section(Six.(Frege(and(Hegel(on(Logical(Form(
$ The$philosophical$upshot$of$Frege's$Begriffschrift$is$thus$that$semantic,
engagement,$understood$as$affirmation$and$ultimately$the$intended$meaning,$if$not$
quite$the$extension,$of$the$assertion$sign,$is$the$one$intentional$relation$we$can$properly$
bear$towards$truth.$The$Hegelian$amendment$to$this$would$be$that$semantic$
engagement$must$instead$be$understood$in$terms$of$negation,$and$that$though$it$is$in$
and$through$such$engagement$that$the$concepts$we$use$are$determined,$it$is$not$as$
they$are$in,truth,$but$as$they$are$provisionally,$or$mediately,$as$finite,$if$rational,$
impressions$of$an$infinite$truth,$which,$as$Hegel$will$put$it,$are$capable$of$being$correct,$
but$never$true.$Properly$understood,$that$is$from$the$philosophical$standpoint$of$
absolute,knowing,$our$determinations,$in$other$words,$would$at$the$same$time$be$
acknowledgments$that$the$Truth$eludes$our$truths.$It$is$some$such$amendment$that$$
infinite$judgment$allows$us$to$comprehend$even$as$we$submit$to$the$passing$
verisimilitudes$of$the$Phenomenology.(Here$is$one$of$several$ways$in$which$Hegel$puts$
the$matter:$
It$is$one$of$the$most$fundamental$logical$prejudices$that$qualitative$judgments$such$
as:$"The$rose$is$red,"$or:$"is$not$red,"$can$contain$truth.$Correct$they$may$be,$but$
only$in$the$restricted$confines$of$perception,$finite$representation,$and$thinking;$this$
depends$on$the$content$which$is$just$as$finite,$and$untrue$on$its$own$account.$But$
the$truth$rests$only$on$the$form,$i.e.,$on$the$posited$Concept$and$the$reality$that$
corresponds$to$it;$truth$of$this$kind$is$not$present$in$the$qualitative$judgment,$
however.91$
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91$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§172.$
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Hegel$will$later$identify$the$"deeper"$variety$of$truth$that$is$the$proper$concern$of$
philosophy,$namely,$that$exemplified$in$the$coincidence$of$objectivity$and$concept.$
What$Hegel$seems$to$be$getting$at$here$is$the$roughly$Anselmian$conception$of$truth$as$
ontological$rectitude:$something$is$true$just$in$case$it$conforms$to$what$it$is$to$be$the$
sort$of$thing$that$it$is.92$Such$truth$corresponds$to$the$concept$or$essence$of$things$and$
is$thus$removed$from$the$finitude$and$contingency$of$the$objects$of$experience.$This$
represents$one$sense$in$which$truth,$or$rather$Truth,$is$infinite,$that$is$to$say,$beyond$
determination.$
$ Let$me$try$to$make$this$a$little$more$clear$before$concluding.$The$undisclosed$
philosophical$backdrop$of$both$Hegel's$and$Frege's$work$remains,$I$want$to$claim,$the$
medieval$one,$which$is$to$say$the$Augustinian$one,$of$a$more$or$less$impassable$
boundary$between$the$verbum,mentis$and$the$verbum,carnis,$between$the$unicity$of$
the$nondiscursive,$i.e.,$the$pure,$intelligible$word$of$Truth,$and$the$multiplicity$of$the$
discursive,$diffracted$word$of$human$language,$of$what$Augustine$calls$the$mos,
locutionis,humanae.$Within$this$framework,$Frege's$avenue$of$approach$is$also$roughly$
Hegel's$in$the$Phenomenology,$i.e.,$the$systematic$elucidation$and$refinement$of$the$
verbum,carnis,$the$language$of$finitude$and$contingency,$so$as$to$make$it$suitable$for$
the$expression$of$what$is$both$true$and$necessary:$"The$true$shape$in$which$truth$exists$
can$only$be$the$scientific$system$of$such$truth.$To$help$bring$philosophy$closer$to$the$
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92$Hegel$puts$things$as$follows:$"It$is$this$deeper$sense$of$truth$which$as$at$issue$when$we$speak,$for$
instance,$of$a$'true'$State,$or$a$'true'$work$of$art.$These$objects$are$'true$when$they$are$what$they$ought$to$
be,$i.e.,$when$their$reality$corresponds$to$their$concept."$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§213$Addition.$
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form$of$science...that$is$what$I$have$set$myself$to$do."93$For$both,$the$traditional$vehicle$
of$discursive$expression,$inference$and$thought,$the$predicate,$is$also$the$principal$locus$
of$logical$and$metaphysical$error,$and$thus$it$is$only$a$language$or$notation$that$
dispenses$with$predicates$in$the$strict$sense$that$can$lay$any$claim$to$the$universality,$
transparency$and$veridicality$of$a$language$like$Leibniz's$lingua,characterica.$
$ Frege,$however,$believed$that$a$language$that$showed$the$proper$inferential$
relationship$between$singular$terms,$logical$connectives$and$propositions$would$enable$
us$to$separate$out$the$truthOfunctional$dimensions$of$a$given$proposition$and$thus$
ultimately$to$forge$an$evaluable$link$between$truths$and$the$Truth.$He$also$believed$that$
his$concept9script$was$just$such$a$language.$We$have$seen,$however,$that$in$the$end$
what$ultimately$forges$that$link$in$Frege's$concept9script$is$a$diacritical$sign$at$odds$with$
this$very$script,$in$part$because$it$captures$something$at$the$heart$of$predication$that$
persists$despite$the$eradication$of$the$predicate$as$a$formal$structure:$an$invisible$agent$
of$reason$and$assertion.$And$thus$the$concept9script$itself,$intended$as$the$inscriptional$
notation$of$the$True,$for$all$its$hieroglyphic$charm$and$expressiveness,$constitutes$a$kind$
of$visible$geometry$not$of$Truth$but$of$inferential$relations,$however$numerous,$that$at$
best$picture$validity.$As$such$it$is$a$system$of$dead,$if$potentially$infinite,$circuitry,$a$
transparent$labyrinth$in$the$classical$sense$of$an$open$prison,$whose$captive$resident,$in$
this$case,$is,$as$it$were,$this$invisible$agent,$or$what$in$the$end$amounts$to$the$same$
thing$for$Hegel,$self9conscious,$or$absolute,Spirit.$
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93$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§5.$
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$ And$here$lies$the$key$to$understanding$Hegel's$discovery.$Hegel,$in$essence,$
shows$that$anything$that$occurs$as$a$finite$determination,$whether$it$be$a$predicate$in$
the$narrow,$logical$sense,$or$a$shape$in$the$broader$sense$of$philosophical,$aesthetic,$
political$or$religious$formation,$bears$the$discursive$trace$of$disseverance,$not$simply$
because$it$is$accomplished$in$the$idiom$of$negation$proper$to$the$rational$activity$of$
consciousness,$but$because$it$is$removed$from$the$infinite$by$the$finitude$of$every$such$
act$of$determination.$Hegel's$phenomenological$logic$demonstrates$the$irreducible$
negativity,$diversity$and$finitude$of$the$meant$proposition,$of$the$proposition$held$true,$
i.e.,$of$judgment.$The$crucial$implication$here$is$that$no$truth$survives$its$utterance$or$
assertion,$and$it$is$only$cumulatively$that$the$True$is$approximated,$but$not$in$the$
imaginary$totality$of$truths,$inferentially$consolidated,$as$Frege$would$have$it,$that$is,$
through$the$serial,$or$let$us$call$it$the$discursive$infinity$of$inferential$association,$an$
instance$of$what$Hegel$calls$the$bad,$or$"finitized",infinity.94$For$Hegel,$the$resumption$
of$the$historical$and$necessarily$finite$record$of$judgment,$of$holding,true,$simply$makes$
visible$the$infinite$source$of$knowledge$and$its$correlative$Truth$that$nonetheless$
exceeds$the$resources$of$such$judgment.$
$ What$then$of$the$infinite$of$infinite$judgment?$While$the$Phenomenology$
presents$no$clear$discussion$of$the$distinction$between$"spurious"$and$true$infinity,$the$
latter$seems$clearly$identifiable$with$the$absolute,$which$in$turn$is$identifiable$with$selfO
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94$See,$for$example,$Science,of,Logic,$21.124.$
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reflexive$identity,$with,$for$example$the$"'I'='I'"$of$Absolute,Knowing.$A$more$or$less$
clear$statement$of$what$this$amounts$to$is$be$found$in$the$Encyclopedia,Logic:$
In$its$relationship$to$an$other,$something$is$already$an$other$itself$visOaOvis$the$latter;$
and$therefore,$since$what$it$passes$into$is$entirely$the$same$as$what$passes$into$it$–$
neither$having$any$further$determination$than$this$identical$one$of$being$an$other$–$
in$its$passing$into$another,$something$only$comes$together$with$itself;$and$this$
relation$to$itself$in$the$passing$and$in$the$other$is$genuine,Infinity.95$
To$understand$this,$it$is$helpful$to$recall$our$earlier$discussion$of$Boethius'$Latin$oratio,
infinita,$his$translation$of$Aristotle's$aoristos,logos$as$it$is$presented$in$De,
Interpretatione,$and$almost$certainly$the$source$of$the$expression$in$Kant$and$Hegel.$
What$is$infinitus,$in$this$context,$is$in9definite$or$in9determinate,$and$more$specifically$
indeterminate$as$to$truth$or$falsity.$But$since$the$Latin$"in"$expresses$either$privation$or$
negation,$what$is$indeterminate$may$be$thought$of$either$as$what$is$lacking$in$truth$
value$or$what$is$not$determined,$i.e.,$bounded,$by$such$valuation,$which$might$roughly$
be$identified$as$bad$and$good$infinities,$respectively.$While$an$adequate$account$of$the$
two$will$have$to$be$postponed$for$another$occasion,$it$is$sufficient$here$to$point$out$that$
infinite$judgment$would$seem$to$be$infinite$according$to$both$senses$of$indeterminacy,$
though$not$simultaneously,$i.e.,$as$what$is$firstly$the$simple$negation$of$finitude,$and$
thus$neither$true$nor$false,$and$finally$as$what$lies$beyond$determinacy,$or$rather$
beyond$determination,$and$thus$the$True$as$such.$
$ In$Observing,Reason,$it$is$the$infinite$form$of$finite$judgment$that$prevents$it$
from$formally,expressing$any$truth$and$thus$anything$True$in$the$proper$sense,$i.e.,$
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95$Encyclopedia,Logic,$§95.$
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infinitely,$and$precisely$because$as$long$as$it$retains$its$categorical$form,$the$
incommensurability$of$the$predicate$with$its$subject$persists.$And$yet,$when$it$
reappears,$finally,$in$Absolute,Knowing,$still$more$concretely$than$Frege's$hapless$
diacritic,$it$does$indeed$tell$us$that$and$how$the$True$is$aimed$at,$but$only,$I$would$
suggest,$by$somehow$disavowing$the$categorical$or$propositional$form$in$which$it$
nonetheless$continues$to$appear.,
, Indeed$if$we$look$more$closely$at$the$original$instance$of$the$infinite$judgment,$it$
seems$to$disavow$its$form$from$the$outset.$"The$spirit$is$a$bone"$is$anything$but$formal,$
in$the$abstract$sense,$and,$absent$the$predicative$negation$that$logically$identifies$such$
judgments,$hardly$seems$an$infinite$judgment$at$all.$A$more$characteristic$formulation$
can,$however,$be$extrapolated$from$Hegel's$later$gloss$on$the$original$instance:$"And$we$
saw$Observing$Reason$at$its$peak$express$its$specific$character$in$the$infinite$judgment$
that$the$being,of,the,'I',is,a,Thing...That$judgment,$taken$as$it$stands$is$nonOspiritual$or$
rather$is$the$nonOspiritual$itself"$(§790).$The$judgment$is$nonOspiritual$inasmuch$as$the$
bone,$a$thing$is$a$nonOSpirit,$which$suggests$"The$(being$of)$Spirit$is$a$nonOspirit"$as$a$
canonical$reformulation.,
$ Still,$even$if$translatable$into$canonical$form,$this$is$merely$to$say$that$it$is$an$
instance$of$that$form,$not$the$form$itself.$It$is$hardly$possible$in$the$present$context$to$
detail$the$richness$of$content$Hegel$finds$in$this$first$instance$of$the$infinite$judgment,$
as$well$as$in$its$second$and$third$moments,$glossed$as$"The$thing$is$an$'I'"$and$finally$"'I'$
=$'I',"$respectively,$since$it$is$fairly$clear$that$concentrated$in$this$confounding$
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proposition$is$more$or$less$the$full$passage$to$selfOconsciousness$the$Phenomenology,as$
a$whole$undertakes$to$chronicle.$Yet$what$is$perhaps$more$difficult$to$see$is$that$the$
conceptual$plenitude,$the$replete$selfOidentity$of$the$concept,$to$which$the$original$form$
of$the$proposition$eventually$gives$way$(in$absolute,knowing)$is$in$fact$formal,$according$
to$the$only$conception$of$form$that$Hegel$can$countenance,$i.e.,$the$Aristotelian$one$of$
actualization.$For$as$remarked$earlier,$Hegel$thinks$the$notion$of$abstract$form$
unintelligible.$He$writes:$"form$is$so$far$from$being$indifferent$with$respect$to$content,$
however,$that,$on$the$contrary,$it$is$the$content$itself”$(Encyclopedia,Logic,$202O3).$
$ One$might,$on$the$other$hand,$think$that$the$three$distinct$propositions$Hegel's$
infinite$judgment$comes$to$express$(as$the$three$critical$moments$of$the$
Phenomenology)$reveal$a$syntactically$formal$character.$Yet$if$it$admits$of$diverse$
interpretations$this$is$as$much$a$function$of$semantic$indeterminacy$as$the$irresistible$
drive$of$rational$determination$of$which$such$indeterminacy$is$the$paradoxical$
consequence.$The$"The$'I'$is$a$thing"$gives$way$to$"The$thing$is$an$'I',"$(PS$§791)$and$
eventually$to$"'I'$=$'I',"$precisely$through$the$"emptying$out"$(Entäußerung),and$
reconstitution$of$the$subject$(both$as$consciousness$and$as$determinable$concept)$in$its$
infinite$predicate,$and$it$is$the$determinative$activity$of$spirit$or$consciousness$that$
performs$these$operations.$
$ The$language$of$emptying$returns$us$to$Hegel's$description$of$the$speculative$
proposition,$and,$by$contrast,$to$Frege's$talk$of$the$saturated$and$unsaturated$elements$
of$the$logical$proposition,$i.e.,$concept$and$object,$nonOpredicatively$conceived.$As$we$
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saw$earlier,$what$is$a$structural$gap$in$the$Fregean$concept$is$a$more$thoroughgoing$
feature$of$the$speculative$proposition,$which$is$marked$by$a$corresponding$lacuna$in$the$
subject$position$as$well,$rather$than$a$space$or$occasion$for$potential$supplement:$"Thus$
no$content$occurs$which$functions$as$an$underlying$subject,$nor$receives$its$meaning$as$
a$predicate;$the$predicate$as$it$stands$is$merely$an$empty$form."96$For$Frege,$as$long$as$
the$concept$remains$unsaturated,$it$can$play$no$semantic$role$in$either$a$proposition$or$
a$judgment,$and$so$can$bear$no$determinate$relation$to$truth.$On$the$other$hand,$once$
that$gap$is$appropriately$filled,$a$proposition$materializes,$as$does$progress$towards$
truth.$For$Hegel,$on$the$other$hand,$such$saturation$is$what$brings$about$the$dead$
proposition.$If$there$is$any,unity$to$be$found$in$the$proposition$it$lies$in$the$achievement$
of$selfOconsciousness$and$will$thus$depend$upon$the$overcoming$of$predicative$
structure.$
$ But$Hegel's$proposal$is$not$a$Parmenidean$philosophy$of$silence,$nor$one$of$
monistic$or$monastic$incantation.$The$rich$historicism$of$the$Phenomenology$represents$
as$well$its$profound$commitment$to$expression$in$the$fullest$sense:$$
It$is$thus$that$consciousness,$as$the$middle$term$between$universal$Spirit$and$its$
individuality$or$senseOconsciousness,$has$for$[its?]$middle$term$the$system$of$
structured$shapes$assumed$by$consciousness$as$a$selfOsystematizing$whole$of$the$life$
of$Spirit$O$the$system$that$we$are$considering$here,$and$which$has$its$objective$
existence$as$worldOhistory.97$
$
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96$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§66.$
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97$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§295.$
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The$"shapes"$(Gestaltungen)$alluded$to$here$are$the$institutions$and$regimens$of$
philosophical,$cultural$and$political$life$which$comprise$the$topics$of$each$successive$
section$of$the$Phenomenology.$Where$a$pronouncement,$philosophical,$ethical,$
aesthetic$or$otherwise,$comes$up$for$consideration,$it$is$always$within$the$context$of$
these$broader$environments$that$they$are$analyzed.$As$I$hope$to$have$made$clear,$the$
relevant$unit$of$analysis,$in$other$words,$is$not$ultimately$the$individual$proposition$or$
judgment,$but$the$patterns$and$habits$of$naming$and$judgment,$along$with$the$practices$
such$judgments$entail,$within$those$framing$environments,$which$Hegel$broadly$
identifies$as$syllogistically$deployed.$
$ Yet$if$what$is$expressed,$the$"content",$is$always$beyond$the$specific$judgment,$
the$act$of$assertion,$or$rather$negation,$of$articulation$itself,$is$always$utterly$specific.$
When$Antigone$speaks$and$acts$on$behalf$of$a$divine$law,$of$Gods$"that$are$not$of$
yesterday$or$today,$but$everlasting"$her$utterance,$though$an$expression$of$something$
else,$a$traditional$ethicoOreligious$configuration,$that$speaks$beyond$her,$is$singularly$
hers.$It$is$precisely$Hegel's$point$that$this$"beyond,"$in$its$temporal$and$semantic$
priority,$in$its$vital$historicity,$nonetheless$becomes$a$lifeless$edifice,$and$one$through$
which,$therefore,$anything$determinately$meant$succumbs$to$evanescence,$and$
ultimately$to$petrification.$This$point$is$made$repeatedly$and$perhaps$most$graphically$
in$the$section$on$Revealed,Religion,$where$Hegel$speaks$of$the$historical$depletion$of$
the$religion$of$art:$
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The$statues$are$now$only$stones$from$which$belief$has$gone.$The$tables$of$the$gods$
provide$no$spiritual$food$and$drink,$and$in$his$games$and$festivals$man$no$longer$
recovers$the$joyful$consciousness$of$his$unity$with$the$divine.98$
$$
One$task$of$the$Phenomenology$is$to$recover$for$Spirit$and$consciousness$the$meaning$
and$truth$discarded$in$their$development.$$
$ I$spoke$earlier$of$a$dead$repose$to$mark$a$contrast$with$the$"pure"$repose$of$the$
True,$of$the$"Bacchanalian$revel"$Hegel$identifies$with$Truth$in$the$Preface$to$the$
Phenomenology.$The$former$is$the$stillness$of$finitude$exhausted$by$the$discursive$
infinitude$of$"restless"$consciousness.$The$latter$is$the$immutable$tranquility$of$the$
"genuine"$infinite,$the$repose$of$eternal$Truth,$the$truth$of$the$verbum,mentis,$if$not$the$
verbum,dei,$to$which$consciousness$aspires.$If$Hegel's$infinite$judgment,$and$the$
phenomenological$logic$it$represents,$miscarries$in$its$attempt$to$coordinate$truths$with$
the$True,$it$does$so$by$foregrounding,$by$making$visible$the$incongruous$demands$of$
thought$and$Truth$that$structure$the$proposition,$and$paves$the$way$for$a$substantive$
logic$of$the$concept$without$predicative$remainder,$of$Truth$without$truths,$though$
perhaps$not$without$incongruity.$For$Frege,$whose$semantic$Platonism$is$as$strong$as$
Hegel's,99$but$who$ultimately$resists$giving$up$the$propositional$structures$his$Platonism$
requires$him$to,$logic$remains$an$instrument$of$formal$representation,$whether$what$is$
so$represented$are$the$finite$lines$of$attribution$or$the$finitized$relations$of$inference.$
$
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98$Phenomenology,of,Spirit,$§753.$
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99$This$point,$of$course,$has$been$the$subject$of$some$debate,$one$I’ll$have$to$join$on$another$occasion.$
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Section(Seven.(Conclusion:(Syllogistic,(Division(and(the(Economy(of(Determination(
For$Hegel,$logic$is$properly$speaking$an$instrument$of$determination,$not$
representation.$It$is$how$things$are$discursively$thought,$not$the$residue$of$what$has$
been$thought,$and$so$cannot$be$captured$in$the$static$formulae$of$a$logical$notation.$
What’s$more$Hegel$is$quite$explicit$about$this,$acknowledging$the$possibility$of$a$purely$
formal$language,$such$as$that$developed$by$Gottfried$Ploucquet,$and$says$of$it$that$“it$
makes$of$the$syllogistic$inference$a$totally$empty$and$tautological$construal$of$
propositions.”100$It$is$also$irreducibly$conceptual,$although$it$is$via$the$inferential$
movement$mapped$by$the$syllogism$that$the$concept$logically$enters$and$exits$the$
discursive$fray,$so$to$speak.$To$this$extent$the$syllogism,$which$Hegel$somewhat$
cryptically$identifies$here$with$"the$reasonable,"$is$the$abstract$form$of$understanding,$
identified$in$the$Phenomenology,with$"reasonableness"$(Preface,§55).$Inasmuch$as$the$
syllogism$is$the$movement$of$the$concept,$or$determination,$it$is$also$properly$speaking$
an$instrument$of$negation,$as$a$brief$examination$of$Hegel’s$discussion$in$the$last$
section$of$his$Logic$makes$clear.$
$ There$is$much$overlap$between$the$two$logics,$but$I$quote$here$from$the$Greater,
Logic,$which$contains$the$more$expansive$discussion.$It$begins,$with$characteristic$
paradox,$as$follows:$
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100$In$an$article$that$is$otherwise$full$of$useful$observations,$“The$Role$of$Logic$“commonly$soOcalled”$in$
Hegel’s$Science,of,Logic,”$British,Journal,for,the,History,of,Philosophy$22$(2014):$281O301,$Paul$Redding$
argues$that$despite$the$evident$horror$with$which$Hegel$regards$the$mechanization$of$logic$as$calculus,$it$
is$important$for$Hegel$that$logic$pass$through$such$a$phase,$which$he$compares$to$the$ossification$of$spirit$
expressed$by$our$aphorism$from$Observing,Reason.$
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The$syllogism,is$the$result$of$the$restoration$(Wiederherstellung),of$the$concept,in,
the,judgment,$and$consequently$the$unity$and$the$truth$of$the$two.$The$concept$as$
such$holds$its$moments$sublated$(aufgehoben)$in$this$unity;$in$judgment,$the$unity$is$
an$internal$or,$what$amounts$to$the$same,$an$external$one,$and$although$the$
moments$are$connected,$they$are$posited$as$self9subsisting,extremes.$In$the$
syllogism,$the$determinations$of$the$concept$are$like$the$extremes$of$the$judgment,$
and$at$the$same$time$their$determinate$unity,is$posited.$Thus$the$syllogism$is$the$
completely$posited$concept;$it$is,$therefore,$the$rational.101$
In$identifying$the$syllogism$as$the$rationalization$of$the$concept,$Hegel$identifies$it$as$a$
conceptual$logic$whose$propositional$formulae$represent$the$constituents$of$inference,$
no$longer$as$its$structural$elements$but$as$transitional$moments$in$the$inferential$
differentiation$and$unification$of$the$concept.$The$syllogism$so$formulated$is$the$formal$
discursus$of$the$concept,$its$actualization,$though$not$quite$yet$its$actuality;$judgment$is$
identified$both$with$its$categorical$structure,$and$with$the$rational$mobility$it$affords$the$
concept,$as$a$conduit$between$its$indeterminate$and$determinate$"extremes,"$the$
terminal$poles$of$its$categorical$representation.$The$seemingly$paradoxical$equivalence$
of$its$internal$and$external$unity$in$judgment$expresses$this$double$status$of$the$
judgment$as$the$expressive$instrument$of$both$identity$and$attribution,$of$concentration$
and$diffraction,$and$of$mobility$and$immobility.$It$expresses$as$well$the$dual$character$of$
the$concept$as$exemplar$and$as$the$embodiment,$or$rather$the$actuality,$of$thought.$
The$syllogism$thus$has$the$paradoxical$role$of$expressing$the$movement$of$the$concept$
by$parsing$it$into$the$signal$moments$of$its$logical$(as$distinct$from$its$historical)$
constitution.$
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$ So$understood,$the$syllogistic$represents$at$once$the$exterior$or$explicit,logic$of$
discursive$rationality$and$the$interior$or$implicit$logic$of$the$concept,$though$not$
simultaneously.$For$it$is$only$in$passing$from$the$qualitative,$immediate,syllogism$to$the$
syllogism,of,necessity$that$exterior$and$interior$rationality$converge,$or,$from$the$
perspective$of$absolute,knowing,$it$is$only$in$overcoming$the$contingency$of$attribution$
that$the$concept$eventually$realizes$its$absolute,$universal$(or$infinite)$extension$via$the$
circuit$of$discursive$engagement.$Hegel$summarizes$the$conclusion$of$this$circuit$as$
follows:$
Thus$it$[i.e.,$the$concept]$is$still$the$internality$of$this$its$externality;$and$so$in$the$
course$of$the$syllogism$this$externality$is$equalized$with$the$internal$unity.$The$
various$determinations$return$into$this$unity$through$the$mediation$which,$while$it$
unites$them,$is$still$a$third$term...But$that$determination$of$the$Concept$which$had$
been$considered$as$reality$is,$conversely,$equally$a$positedness.$For$in$this$result$the$
truth$of$the$Concept$has$turned$out$to$be$the$identity$of$its$internality$and$
externality;$and$not$only$this:$already$the$moments$of$the$Concept,$in$the$Judgment,$
remain,$in$their$indifference$to$each$other,$determinations$which$have$their$
significance$only$in$their$relation.$The$Syllogism$is$mediation$O$the$complete$Concept$
in$its$positedness.$Its$movement$is$the$transcendence$of$this$mediation.102$
In$passing$beyond$mere$qualitative$or$categorical$attribution$to$(potentially)$exhaustive$
disjunction,$the$final$form$of$the$syllogism,of,necessity,$the$concept$that$fuels$the$
syllogism$overcomes$mediation$as$such,$along$with$the$breach$between$rational$form$
and$content,$and$achieves$an$(approximate)$totality$of$determinations$proper$to$a$given$
concept.$But$if$mediation$is$overcome,$if$only$approximately,$so$is$the$propositional$
structure$that$permitted$its$expression.$
$ What$does$this$amount$to?$The$mediation$expressed$through$judgment,$and$in$
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102$Science,of,Logic,$12.126.$
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the$form$of$a$proposition,$i.e.,$its$presentation$of$a$subject$through$its$predicate,$is$here$
found$to$have$unfolded$through$the$mechanism$of$the$syllogism.$This$happens$through$
the$mediation$of$the$middle$term$that$forges$and$maintains$the$predicative$relation$
between$the$extremes,$i.e.,$the$major$and$minor$terms,$of$the$conclusion.$The$middle$
term,$however,$is$lost,$technically$sublated,$in$that$conclusion,$even$though$it$“as$the$
totality$of$the$concept$itself$contains$the$two$extremes$in$their$complete$
determinateness.”103$It$is$through$the$syllogism$that,$for$example,$the$singularity$of$the$
subject$term$and$the$universality$of$the$predicate$term$are$connected$through$the$
particularity,of$the$middle,term.$Put$more$generally,$since$in$the$dynamics$of$categorical$
identity$each$term$successively$assumes$each$quantity,$the$quantities$of$the$extremes$
are$each$exchanged$and$mediated$through$the$quantity$of$the$middle$term.$The$
syllogism,$to$this$extent,$as$the$very$embodiment$of$rationality,$is$also$thus$the$formal$
expression$of$Aufhebung,(sublation)$itself,$of$the$process$through$which$the$concept$is$
elevated$through$the$negated$middle$term$through$which$each$of$the$subject/predicate$
terms$acquires$its$determination.$Every$judgment,$it$then$turns$out,$is$a$judgment$
insofar$as$it$concludes$a$syllogism,$just$as$every$concept$is$a$concept$just$insofar$as$it$is$
discursively$extrapolated$and$determined$through$the$divided$unity$of$the$proposition.$
$ However,$upon$deriving$the$apodictic,form$of$judgment$in$which$subject$and$
predicate$terms$are$mutually$and$fully$determined,$according$to$the$limits$of$judgment,$
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i.e.,$through$the$“repletion$of$the$copula,”104$judgment$is$made$analytic,$and$therefore$
tautological,$just$as$happens$inferentially$in$the$case$of$the$apodictic,syllogism,$with$the$
“repletion”$of$the$middle$term.$In$both$instances,$the$formal$instruments$of$predicative$
and$inferential$determination,$respectively,$are$dissolved.$In$the$former$case,$this$is$
because$“subject$and$predicate$are$in$themselves$the$same$content.”105$In$the$latter$
case,$it$is$because$“the$syllogism,$which$consisted$in$the$difference$of$the$middle$term$
as$against$its$extremes,$has$thereby$sublated$itself.”106$
$ Once$arrived$at,$judgment$is$immediately$transformed$into$mere$proposition,$
just$as$the$syllogism$itself$succumbs,$at$each$of$its$stages,$to$its$merely$formal$adequacy.$
Similarly,$just$as$judgment,$in$reaching$the$limits$of$expression,$gives$way$to$the$
syllogism,$so$the$propositional$logic$of$the$syllogism,$in$reaching$its$own$limits$of$
determination,$gives$way$to$the$logic$of$division.$However,$it$is$not$merely$that$division$
emerges$out$of$the$exhausted$formalism$of$the$syllogistic,$but$that$the$syllogistic$has$
indeed$repleted$the$terms$relevant$to$division,$i.e.,$the$relevant$genus,$or$universal,$its$
differentiae,$and$the$genera,$species$and$individuals$subordinate$to$and$defined$by$
these.$The$syllogistic,$in$other$words,$is$what$supplies,$through$its$inferential$sorting$of$
contingent$and$essential$or$necessary$determinations,$the$plenitude$and$structure$of$
the$genus$and$its$lineage,$even$if$it$is$then$through$division$that$this$lineage$must$be$
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thought$through.$It$is$thus$that$the$threatening$arbitrariness$of$diairetic$taxonomy,$
whether$we$think$of$this$in$the$limited$terms$of$a$Porphyrian$tree,$or$a$less$hierarchical$
table$of$categories,$or$ultimate$concepts,$achieves$its$rational,$yet$immanent,$
justification$in$the$context$of$a$specific$historical$moment$of$philosophical$or$historical$
discourse.$
$ The$economy$of$determination,$whether$expressed$in$the$interplay$between$
judgment$and$proposition,$between$syllogism$and$judgment,$or$finally$between$the$
concept$and$the$idea,$is$thus$a$movement$from$the$vital,$plastic$operations$of$
determining$to$the$moribund$artifacts$of$the$instruments$of$determination.$Yet$if$one$is$
inclined$to$attribute$the$moments$of$petrification$to$negation,$e.g.,$the$aphorism$from$
the$discussion$of$observing,reason$in$the$Phenomenology,of,Spirit$with$which$we$began,$
or$the$Calvary$of$absolute$knowing$with$which$the$Phenomenology,ends,$etc.,$it$should$
be$clear$by$now$that$it$is$in$the$belated$affirmation$of$the$work$of$negation$that$thought$
is$brought$to$the$standstill$of$its$formal$expression.$It$should$be$noted,$by$way$of$
conclusion,$that$the$immobilization$of$thought$Hegel$documents$throughout$his$work$is$
only$part,$albeit$half,$of$the$picture.$Hegel’s$Logic,$therefore,$demonstrates$not,$as$Paul$
Redding$has$put$it,$that$one$must$pass$through$“the$‘ossification’$of$thought$as$it$
reduces$the$life$of$thought$to$the$operations$of$a$dead$mechanism,”$i.e.,$formal$logic,$in$
order$to$redeem$the$vitality$of$the$concept.107$Rather,$Hegel’s$Logic$is$an$expression$of$
the$inevitable$oscillation,$within$the$logical$apprehension$of$Being$and$beings,$between$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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the$vitality$of$thought$in$its$ceaseless$renunciation,$i.e.,$negation,$of$form$and$the$
instruments$of$expression$summoned$to$exhibit$it.$
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CONCLUSION!
NEGATION,!PHILOSOPHY!AND!THE!LIMITS!OF!EXPERIENCE!
Within!the!tradition!I!have!been!trying!to!trace,!unity,"since!there!is!no!such!
thing!without!multiplicity,!is!accomplished!on!the!basis!of!a!succession!of!divisions,!of!
rational!interruptions,!so!to!speak,!for!the!reason!in!question!is!discursive,!its!primary!
mode!that!of!negation.!What!reason!uncovers!for!both!Plato!and!Hegel,!
paradigmatically,!are!the!contiguous!boundaries!that!hierarchically!articulate!and!
separate!the!kinds!of!things!there!are,!and!the!individuals!that!instantiate!those!kinds.!
The!unity!of!a!given!concept!or!corresponding!object!will!derive!from!the!system!of!
concepts!or!universals!under!which!it!is!subsumed,!and!ultimately!from!the!
philosophical!articulation!of!that!system.!
The!rational!character!of!such!concepts!therefore!depends!on!their!being!
thought!through!the!hierarchy!of!divisions!they!derive!from.!For!Hegel,!for!example,!the!
nonTidentity!of!subject!and!predicate!is!primary,!and!not!merely!as!a!first!moment!of!
differentiation!to!be!overwritten!in!the!succeeding!selfTidentity!of!the!Absolute:!nonT
identity!is!the!fundamental!form!of!predication,!thought!and!ontological!specification,!
which!is!why!infinite"judgment!plays!so!crucial!a!role!in!Hegel’s!Phenomenology"and!
Logic.!Negation!governs!not!just!the!drive!of!predication,!but!its!eventual!completion!
through!the!syllogism,!which!returns!a!given!predicative!series!to!its!originating!concept,!
!!
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and!thus,!consecutively,!to!the!logic!of!division!and!finally!to!the!Idea.!In!this!return!
through!syllogistic!inference!to!the!concept!Hegel!also!reveals!the!false!dichotomy!
between!reason!and!understanding,!between!thinking!through!the!implications!and!
obligations!of!a!given!judgment!and!applying!a!concept!to!a!given!object!or!
phenomenon:!“just!as!little!as!the!concept!is!to!be!regarded!merely!as!a!determination!
of!the!understanding,!so,!too,!the!syllogism!is!to!be!regarded!without!further!ado!as!
rational.”1!
The!intrinsic!connection!between!negation!and!conceptual!determination!finds!
expression!in!a!great!variety!of!philosophical!theories!of!meaning,!knowledge,!mind,!
etc.,!that!lie!outside!the!limited!focus!of!genealogy!undertaken!in!this!dissertation.!The!
discourse!of!negation!continues,!for!example,!in!medieval!accounts!of!individuation,!
from!the!more!obvious!cases!that!directly!invoke!negation,!such!as!Henry!of!Ghent’s!use!
of!double"negation!as!a!principle!of!individuation,!to!those!that!explain!individuation!in!
terms!of!matter!(Aquinas!et"al)!or!accidental!properties!(Avicenna!et"al),!in!the!negative!
epistemologies!and!metaphysics!of,!for!example,!Eriugena,!Bonaventura,!Maimonides!
and!Meister!Eckhart,!in!Saussurian!structuralism,!and!in!the!diverse!postTstructuralist!
philosophies!of!Heidegger,!Sartre,!Adorno,!Levinas!and!Derrida.!It!also!lies!at!the!heart!
of!Robert!Brandom’s!new!Hegelian!synthesis!of!Fregean!and!pragmatist!semantics.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!Encyclopedia"Logic,!§182!
!
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On!the!other!hand,!Hegel’s!recognition!of!the!discursive!rationality!of!the!
concept!is!most!obviously!anticipated!by!Leibniz.!Two!of!the!general!theses!that!define!
the!discourse!of!negation,!i.e.,!(9)!and!(10)!in!my!Introduction,!are!easily!recognizable!as!
two!of!Leibniz’!fundamental!axioms,!axioms!that,!amongst!other!things,!provide!the!
grounds!for!his!principium"rationis!(the!principle!of!reason,!or!more!familiarly,!the!
principle!of!sufficient!reason),!a!principle!he!states!in!two!forms:!(1)!nihil"est"sine"ratione!
(there!is!nothing!without!reason)!and!(2)!nullum"effectum"est"absque"causa!(there!is!no!
effect!apart!from!a!cause).!The!two!formulations!converge!because,!for!Leibniz,!the!
rational!character!(ratio)!of!a!thing!is!just!its!having!a!reason!for!existing,!which!reason!is!
its!intelligible!cause!(causa).!Things!exist!and!are!rational!to!the!extent!that!they!express!
truth,!and!they!are!capable!of!expressing!truth!only!to!the!extent!that!they!are!logically!
representable!as!identity!statements!(or!propositions).!
Leibniz!is!relevant!here!because!his!axioms!(as!I!have!designated!them)"capture!
the!internal!relation!between!conceptual!and!propositional!expression,!or!between!the!
rationality!of!concepts!and!their!propositional!or!discursive!deployment.!While!this!
conception!of!the!proposition,!as!Leibniz!acknowledges,!is!already!present!in!Aristotle,!it!
is!a!centerpiece!of!Leibnizean!metaphysics!and!is!more!clearly!elaborated!here!than!in!
any!other!previous!or!subsequent!philosophical!system.!According!to!the!first!axiom,!
“the!predicate!or!consequent!is!always!in!the!subject!or!antecedent,!and!the!nature!of!
truth,!or!the!connection!between!the!terms!of!the!statement!(enuntiationis)!consists!in!
this!very!thing,!as!Aristotle!also!observed.”!The!second!axiom!states!that!the!“inclusion!
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of!the!predicate!in!the!subject”!is!true!not!only!for!formal!identity!statements!but!for!
“every!affirmative!truth,!universal!or!particular,!necessary!or!contingent.”!The!third!
axiom,!perhaps!the!best!known!and!most!notorious!of!them,!states!that!“Every!
individual!substance!contains!(involvit)!in!its!complete!notion!(in"perfecte"notione"sua)!
the!entire!universe.”2!
The!picture!of!individual!substances!(monads)!and!their!concepts!these!axioms!
define!is!admittedly!rather!different!from!what!we!find!in!the!tradition!I!have!been!
looking!at.!Yet!Leibniz’s!axioms!make!transparent!the!consequences!of!an!appetitive!
conception!of!propositions,!namely!that!all!true!propositions!are!analytic,!even!those!
involving!contingent!facts/predicates,!and!because!they!point!to!conceptual!analysis!
(analysis"notionum)!as!a!central!focus!of!logic,!a!focus!we!see!both!in!Plato!and!again!in!
Hegel,!though!it!is!implicit!as!well!in!the!attention!scholastic!philosophers!pay!to!the!
method!of!division,!and!particularly!to!its!role!in!generating!definitions!and,!what!
amounts!to!the!same!thing,!in!parsing!the!essential!features!of!the!substances!to!which!
those!definitions!apply.!Still!more!important!for!our!purposes!are!the!points!of!
divergence!with!the!tradition!upon!which!I!have!been!focusing.!In!particular,!Leibniz’s!
axioms!account!for!the!unity!of!the!proposition!on!the!basis!of!the!plenitude!of!the!
concept!and!its!corresponding!substance!(monad),!and!do!so!in!terms!of!identity,!and!
the!intrinsic!cohesion!and!unity!of!the!predicates!of!a!given!individual!substance!or!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!Primae"Veritates,!in!Opuscules"Fragments"Inédits"de"Leibniz,!ed.!Louis!Couturat"(Paris,!1903),!518T19.!My!
translation!is!based!on!that!by!Roger!Ariew!and!Daniel!Garber:!“Primary!Truths”!in!Leibniz’s!Philosophical"
Essays!(Indianapolis,!IN:!Hackett!Publishing,!1989),!30T34.!
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concept,!provided!for!by!divine!reason.!Yet!Leibniz!pays!little!philosophical!attention!to!
negation,!and!this!primarily!because!there!is!no!real!discursivity!in!the!logic!of!a!
monadology,!just!as!there!are!no!real!relations!in!its!metaphysics,!for!all!determinations!
are!already!globally!and!instantaneously!determined!by!God.!The!unfolding!of!monadic!
life!is!thus!the!metaphysical!equivalent!of!the!purely!computational!logic!Leibniz!
envisioned,!i.e.,!one!in!which!inference!plays!no!vital!logical!role.!
While!for!Leibniz!all!this!is!taken!to!imply!what!is!systematically!captured!in!his!
Monadology,!namely,!that!things!(monads)!are!predicatively!predetermined,!for!Plato!
and!Hegel!the!relationship!between!things,!or!beings,!and!the!propositions!that!
represent!them!is!best!put!conversely:!propositions!and!ontological!relations!are!
categorically!predetermined.!This!way!of!putting!things!stands!at!odds!with!Heidegger’s!
claim!that!Leibniz’s!logic!represents!the!culmination!of!a!philosophical!tendency!
initiated!by!Plato.3!Plato,!according!to!Heidegger,!cedes!the!place!of!truth!to!
propositions!and!representation,!and!thus!loses!sight!of!its!original!ontological!ground,!
of!its!original!sense!as!revelation!or!unconcealment.!Though!this!is!hardly!the!place!to!
argue!the!point!at!length,!I!hope!to!have!provided!the!basis!for!arguing!that!both!the!
ontological!and!revelatory!character!of!truth!are!in!fact!preserved!in!the!model!Plato!
bequeaths!to!the!tradition.!That!both!conceptions!are!indeed!necessary!is!part!of!what!
is!expressed!in!Hegel’s!muchTcited!dictum!that!“everything!hangs!on!apprehending!and!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!Martin!Heidegger,!“On!the!Essence!of!the!Ground”!in!Pathmarks,!ed.!and!trans.!William!McNeil!
(Cambridge:!Cambridge!University!Press,!1998),!97T135.!
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expressing!the!truth!not!merely!as!substance!but!also!equally!as!subject.”!Amongst!
other!things,!we!should!discern!here!an!expression!of!the!fact!that!the!ontological!or!de"
re"truth!of!the!designatum!of!a!given!term!has!to!be!understood!in!terms!of!its!logical!
deployment!within!the!categorical!propositions!that!are!true!of!it,!that!the!ontological!
truth!of!substance!is!only!discoverable!through!the!propositional,!or!de"dicto,!truths!of!
the!subject!that!is!its!ground/essence,!even!if!those!propositions!and!their!logic!are,!in!
the!end,!to!be!suspended.!
However,!even!if!Heidegger!is!wrong!in!this!regard!about!Plato!and!Leibniz,!his!
own!philosophical!predilections!bring!him!remarkably!close!to!what!is!right,!or!at!least!
important!in!them,!in!my!view.!While!discussing!the!defining!relationship!between!
Dasein,!i.e.,!the!kind!of!being!that!is!specific!to!human!beings,!and!negativity"in!Being"
and"Time,!Heidegger!asks:!“Has!anyone!ever!made!a!problem!of!the!ontological!source!
of!notness,!or!prior!to!that,!even!sought!the!mere!conditions!on!the!basis!of!which!the!
problem!of!the!‘not’!and!its!notness!and!the!possibility!of!that!notness!can!be!raised?”4!
Though!Heidegger!does!not!attempt!to!fill!this!philosophical!lacuna!here,!he!does!tell!us!
something!about!how!such!a!project!ought!to!be!conceived,!namely,!that!it!lies!at!the!
heart!of!metaphysics,!or!rather!of!the!phenomenology!of!Dasein!he!thinks!must!replace!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4!Being"and"Time:"A"Translation"of"Sein"und"Zeit,!trans.!Joan!Stambaugh!(New!York:!State!University!of!
New!York!Press,!1996),!332.!
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traditional!ontology.!He!suggests,!in!particular,!that!the!analysis!of!notness!is!
inseparable!from!the!thematic!examination!of!“the!meaning!of!Being!in!general.”5!
Heidegger!will!argue!elsewhere6!that!the!experience!and!the!problem!of!
nothingness!are!prior!to!the!“problem!of!the!‘not’,”!the!problem,!that!is,!of!negation.!
This!is,!in!part,!because!his!critique!of!metaphysics,!which!nonetheless!remains!
profoundly!bound!to!the!questions!of!metaphysics,!is!in!the!first!place!concerned!with!
ontological"difference,!i.e.,!the!difference!between!Being!(Sein)!and!beings"(Seiendes).!
This!difference!consists!in!the!fact!that!Being"is!not"a!being,!although!beings!are!beings!
only!insofar!as!they!bear!some!relation!to!Being.!I!have!tried!to!motivate!a!broader!use!
of!the!expression!ontological"difference"to!indicate!the!difference!between!any!more!
general!kind!and!its!more!determinate!forms,!including!the!difference!between!a!genus!
and!its!species.!Briefly,!the!considerations!for!the!broader!use!are!that!the!expression!
would!seem!most!aptly!to!apply!to!any!difference!in!ontological!grade!or!status,!and,!on!
the!other!hand,!that!the!ground!or!Abgrund"of!such!differences!would!be!better!
portrayed!as!Plato!portrays!the!Good,!as!lying!outside!of!or!beyond!ontology,!rather!
than!a!difference!within!it.!Moreover,!even!if!the!gap!between!Being!and!beings!is!
granted!metaphysical!prominence,!and!is!not!simply!a!difference!amongst!other!
equivalent!differences,!one!way!of!explaining!its!prominence!is!to!think!of!it!as!spanning!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5!Being"and"Time,!9.!
!
6!Heidegger!directly!addresses!the!problem!of!the!“nothing”!in!a!number!of!texts,!but!most!concertedly!in!
Being"and"TIme,!“What!is!Metaphysics”!in!Pathmarks,!82T96,!“On!the!Essence!of!the!Ground”!in!
Pathmarks,!97T135,!and!Introduction"to"Metaphysics,!revised!and!expanded!translation!by!Gregory!Fried!
and!Richard!Polt!(New!Haven:!Yale!University!Press,!2014).!
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the!entire!ontological!spectrum,!where!other!ontological!differences!apply!merely!to!a!
single!segment!of!that!spectrum.!
But!to!return!to!Heidegger,!while!ontological"difference,!in!his!more!narrow!
sense,!is!the!primary!concern!of!metaphysics,!according!to!Heidegger!it!is!one!specific!
kind!of!being!that!is!of!particular!importance:!Dasein.!For!Dasein,!and!Dasein!alone,!its!
own!Being,!and!the!divide!between!that!Being!and!the!beings!over!which!it!exercises!
care!(Sorge),!i.e.,!the!ontological!difference,!are!abiding!and!defining!concerns.!It!is!the!
exclusive!capacity!of!Dasein!to!uncover!the!ontological"difference!as!an!essential!project!
of!its!specific!Being,!which!it!does!in!terms!of!its!own!possibilities!and!(more!
importantly)!temporal!limitation,!i.e.,!its!nothingness,!or!death.!Heidegger!maintains,!
very!roughly,!that!the!specific!meaning!of!our!being!is!indeed!death,!and!that!it!is!this!
that!grounds!the!meaning!of!negation.!As!he!puts!it,!“Dasein!means:!being!held!out!into!
the!nothing,”7!where!“the!nothing!is!the!‘not’!of!beings,!and!is!thus!being,!experienced!
from!the!perspective!of!beings.”8!The!experience!of!nothing!proper!to!Dasein!is!the!
experience!of!its!being!“towards,”!and!so!bounded!by,!death.!Importantly,!for!
Heidegger,!death!properly!speaking!only!occurs!for!Dasein!insofar!as!it!is!capable!of!
conceiving!of!it!as!such!a!limit,!as!its!own!negation.!For!those!incapable!of!conceiving!
their!own!death!as!a!kind!of!limit,!that!is,!as!a!form!of!negation,!death!is!merely!an!
occurrence!(ein"Vorkommnis),!not!a!possible!experience!(Erfahrung).!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7!“What!is!metaphysics?”!in!Pathmarks,!91.!
!
8!“On!the!essence!of!the!ground,”!in!Pathmarks,!97.!
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In!his!late!essay!“The!Thing,”!Heidegger!approaches!the!matter!according!to!the!
metaphysical!regulations!of!scholastic!taxonomy,!which!designates!mortality!the!final!
(infima)!differentia!of!man.!Though!it!may!strike!us!as!odd!that!mortality!occur!below,!
i.e.,!as!a!differentia!of,!rational!animal,!since!certainly!irrational!animals!are!finite!as!
well,!that!is,!all!are!subject!to!death!and!are!thus!mortal,!this!is!indeed!how!the!standard!
taxonomy!represents!matters.!Heidegger!gives!us!a!way!of!understanding!why.!Though!
he!makes!no!reference!to!its!provenance,!he!clearly!relies!on!the!scholastic!definition!of!
man.!On!his!view,!mortality!is!part!of!this!definition!because!being"mortal!is!
fundamental!and!exclusive!to!the!meaning!of!man’s!being:!“to!die!means:!to!be!capable!
of!death!as!death.!Only!man!dies!(stirbt).!The!animal!perishes!(verendet).!It!has!death!
neither!ahead!of!itself!nor!behind!it.”!(TT,!p.!176)!The!implication!is!that!the!death!of!
human"beings,!as!opposed!to!that!of!animals,!is!indeed!something!they!have!before!
them,!as!the!anticipated!limit!of!their!possibilities.!Again,!though!Heidegger!makes!no!
reference!to!Epicurus,!his!argument!surely!alludes!to!Epicurus’!equally!brief:!“whenever!
we!are!present,!death!is!not!present;!but!whenever!death!is!present!we!are"not!(hēmeis"
ouk"esmen).”9!
However,!though!the!argument!is!similar,!Heidegger’s!claim!appears!to!be!a!
direct!rebuttal!of!the!proposition!Epicurus!argues!for,!namely!the!metaphysicoT
therapeutic!principle!that!death"is"nothing"to"us!(ho"thanatos"ouden"pros"hēmās).!For!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9!Epicurus,!Epistula"Menoeceum,!125,!in!Epicurus:"The"Extant"Remains,!with!short!critical!apparatus,!
translation!and!notes!by!Cyril!Bailey!(Oxford:!Clarendon!Press,!1926),!85.!
!!
290!
Heidegger!the!principle!applies!merely!to!irrational"animals,!who!presumably,!and!
unfortunately,!cannot!make!use!of!it.!Yet!there!is!another!way!of!construing!the!
Epicurean!principle!that!aligns!it!directly!with!Heidegger’s!claim.!On!this!construal,!the!
principle!tells!us!not!that!death!isn’t!anything!to!us,!but!rather!that!it!is!precisely,!for"us,!
ouden,!nothing.!!
However,!I!want!to!suggest!an!alternative!argument,!one!stemming!from!the!
character!of!scholastic!taxonomy!itself,!and!one!that!perhaps!helps!make!sense!of!the!
distinction!between!sterben!and!verenden!Heidegger!relies!on.!The!verb!sterben!in!
German!is!cognate!with!to"starve!in!English,!and!thus!suggests!a!conception!of!death!as!
privation.!But!the!privation!of!what?!Animals!too!are!deprived!of!life!in!death,!and!so!if!
death!is!just!the!privation!of!life,!and!mortality!is!just!the!property!of!being!subject!to!
this!privation,!then!it!would!seem!that!the!differentia!ought!to!occur!higher!up!in!the!
genealogical!tree,!dividing!mortal!animals!from!immortal!ones.!But!this!is!not!how!the!
genealogy!goes,!and!this!is!because!the!relevant!contrariety!is!not!between!death!and!
life,!but!between!mortality!and!immortality.!While!mortals,!like!all!other!animals,!lose!
their!lives!in!death,!what!they!are!deprived!of,"as!a!matter!of!their!essential!
determination,!is!immortality,!not!life,!which!though!on!the!face!of!it!a!counterintuitive!
claim,!holds!precisely!according!to!the!logic!of!privation:!privation!(sterēsis),!in!its!strict!
Aristotelian!sense,!is!attributable!to!that!which!“though!it!would!naturally!have!the!
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[negated]!attribute…!has!it!not.”10!Relative!to!that!which!properly!possesses!the!
attribute!of!immortality,!mortality!is!therefore!a!privation,!and!as!such!it!secures!for!
man!his!essential!relation!to!immortality.!Whether!we!see!this!in!theological!terms!as!a!
relation!to!a!lost!paradisiac!past,!in!more!strictly!Christological!terms!as!the!possibility!of!
resurrection,!or!according!to!the!Platonic!doctrine!of!the!soul’s!immortality!as!against!
the!perishability!of!the!body,!mortality!is!thereby!established!both!as!a!fundamental!
constituent!and!of!the!taxonomy!and!definition!of!man!and!of!his!essential!privation.!
One!implication!of!the!present!dissertation!is!that!Heidegger!has!the!grounding!
relation!reversed,!that!the!experience!of!nothingness!has!its!basis!in!the!expression!of!
negation.!To!this!extent,!I!take!my!cue!from!Freud,!who!did!indeed,!before!Heidegger,!
broach!the!question!of!the!origins!of!negation!directly,!albeit!from!the!standpoint!of!
psychoanalysis!or!neurology!rather!than!philosophy.!While!death!and!finitude!might!
well!be!thought!the!limiting!and!defining!conditions!of!life,!and!the!apprehension!of!
these!a!condition!of!consciousness,!and!thus!of!negation!and!symbolic!life!more!
generally,!the!considerations!brought!forth!in!this!dissertation!suggest!the!converse!
proposition,!an!extrapolation!of!the!epigraph!from!Freud!with!which!the!Introduction!
begins,!that!it!is!negation!that!makes!possible!symbolic!life!and!with!this!the!
apprehension!of!death!and!finitude.!According!to!the!tradition!under!examination,!
negation!grounds!the!experience!of!being!human,!in!the!specific!sense!that!it!is!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10!Aristotle!Metaphysics"IV,!1022b27T30.!!
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fundamental!to!the!capacity!for!discursive!thought,!which!has!been!accounted!a!
distinctive!feature!of!human!beings!since!Plato!and!Aristotle.!
On!the!other!hand,!Heidegger’s!correlation!of!the!problem!of!the!“not”!with!that!
of!being!is!a!necessary!starting!point!for!the!philosophical!treatment!of!negation,!as!I!
have!tried!to!show,!and!it!is!this!correlation!and!the!threat!it!poses!that!explain!the!
philosophical!neglect!of!negation!Heidegger!points!to.!If!speech,!and!thus!true!speech,!is!
always!bound!to!the!here!and!now,!it!also!succeeds!as!speech!only!to!the!extent!that!it!
preemptively!revokes!or!negates!its!indexical!anchors.!And!this!is!not!merely!a!matter!of!
language:!the!tode"ti,!i.e.,!the!individual!or!primary!substance!(prōtē"ousia)!of!traditional!
Aristotelian!metaphysics,!cannot!be!identified!with!any!or!all!of!its!spatioTtemporal!
instances.!Rather,!it!is!precisely!not!any!of!these,!individually!or!in!their!totality.!So!much!
is!revealed!in!the!Greek!expression!itself,!which,!in!the!concatenation!of!a!
demonstrative!and!an!indefinite!pronoun,!draws!into!a!single!denomination!a!this"and!a!
something,!an!individual!limit,!that!is,!and!a!kind!to!which!that!individual!belongs.!
In!his!discussion!of!this!expression!in!Language"and"Death,!Giorgio!Agamben!
remarks!that!“primary!substance,!inasmuch!as!it!signifies!a!tode"ti!(that!is,!both!the!‘this’!
and!the!‘that’),!is!the!point!of!enactment!for!the!movement!from!indication!to!
signification,!from!showing!to!saying.”!(LD,!p.!17)!But!translating!the!two!elements!as!
“this”!and!“that”!diverts!us!from!the!true!gap!traversed!within!this!formula.!While!the!
indexical!tode!names!the!this"of!an!immediate!instance,!the!indefinite!ti!specifies!the!
universal!kind!that!makes!it!one.!A!tode"ti!is!thus!both!many!and!one!itself,!both!
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particular!and!universal,!indeed!it!is,!in!Agamben’s!useful!formulation,!“the!most!
concrete!and!immediate!thing”!and!simultaneously!“the!most!generic!and!universal.”!
However,!it!thereby!charts!the!movement!not!from!“showing!to!saying”!but!from!
naming"to!saying,!or!from!the!rudiments!of!the!name!to!the!divided!identity!of!the!
proposition,!for!it!gives!us!all!we!need!to!proceed!from!the!mere!this!(tode)!to!the!
proposition,!this"is"something!(tode"esti"ti).!What!resides!within!this!ligature,!then,!as!a!
condition!of!its!coherence,!is!the!ontological"difference!that!divides!and!connects!the!
tode!to!its!ti,"and!it!is!negation!that!marks!this!difference,!as!the!most!basic!form!of!
indication,!even!if!it!is!here!expressed!merely!internally!in!the!structure!of!the!ligature.!
Such!internal"negation!is!ultimately!what!we!I!have!tried!to!give!an!account!of.!
To!extrapolate!from!the!formal!structure!of!primary"substance!(prōtē"ousia)!we!
might!say!that!any!substance,!whether!individual!or!generic,!is!limited!by!the!kind!that!
defines!it,!the!kind!with!which!it!is!necessarily!nonTidentical.!If!this!is!ontological!
difference!in!the!primary!sense,!then!there!is!a!secondary!sense!as!well,!and!similarly!a!
second!level!of!negation!to!be!accounted!for!in!the!notion!of!substance.!This!secondary!
sense!consists!in!the!fact!that!substance!is!precisely!the!negation!of!each!of!its!
contingent!appearances,!since!if!it!were!simply!identifiable!with!any!of!its!instances!it!
would!be!nonTidentical!to!every!other!(or!a!different!substance!in!each!of!its!instances),!
and!so!nonTidentical!to!itself,!whereas!if!it!were!identifiable!with!the!totality!of!its!
contingent!appearances!it!would!be!constituted!according!to!accident!rather!than!
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essence.11!Yet!the!uniqueness!of!every!substance!is!also!given!by!the!series!of!its!
instances,!which!can!only!belong!to!it!–!nothing!else!could!be!nonTidentical!to!these!
instances!in!this!precise!respect.!However,!if!substance!is!defined!by!the!exclusion!or!
negation!of!its!immediate!time!and!place,!it!is!thereby!defined!by!what!is!not,!and,!as!
Plato!regularly!observed,!what!both!is!and!is!not!is!not!being!(to"on)!but!becoming!
(genesis),!the!proper!object!of!opinion!(doxa)!rather!than!scientia!(epistemē).!In!other!
words,!if!negation!and!substance!are!so!bound!to!one!another,!then!there!would!appear!
to!be!no!possibility!of!metaphysics,!that!is,!of!a!science!of!being!qua!being.!
It!is!hardly!surprising!then!that!it!is!with!the!paradox!of!the!indexical!that!Hegel!
begins!the!Phenomenology"of"Spirit,!for!it!is!here!that!the!interrelatedness!of!substance!
and!negation!is!most!immediately!encountered.!What!he!demonstrates!in!the!
Phenomenology"of"Spirit,"an!essential!contiguity!between!ostension!and!negation,!will!
be!presented!in!the!Logics,"to!begin!with,!as!an!identity!between!being"and!nonSbeing.!!
What!emerges!here!is!the!grounding!of!logic!and!metaphysics!in!the!divided!unity!of!
conceptual!form,!a!joining!of!contraries!T!assertion!and!negation,!being!and!nothingness,!
the!former!signaled!by!the!this!of!an!ontology!of!unmediated!particulars,!the!latter!by!
the!not!of!an!elusive!transcendence!(or!transcendent!ontology)!of!universals.!This!is!
also,!I!believe,!what!Hegel!is!getting!at!in!telling!us!that!“If!we!take!the!‘this’!in!the!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11!Admittedly!such!a!position!regarding!substance!has!been!defended!in!Buddhism,!for!example,!but!what!
the!doctrine!of!instantaneous!existence!(kshanika"bhava)!defends!is!not!an!account!of!substance!at!all.!
The!doctrine!is!instead!a!denial!that!there!is!anything!like!substance!to!serve!as!the!basis!of!any!positive!
metaphysics!or!epistemology.!!
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doubled!shape!(der"gedoppelten"Gestalt)!of!its!being,!as!‘now’!and!as!‘here,’!the!
dialectic!will!receive!a!form!as!intelligible!as!the!“This”!itself!is.”!This!dialectic,!in!turn,!
shows!us!that!this!‘“this”!is!a!nonTentity…!neither!this!nor!that,!a!notSthis,”"that!is,!a!
“universal!(Allgemeines).”12!The!generality!or!abstractness!of!language,!without!which!it!
makes!little!sense!to!speak!of!language!at!all,!bears!witness!to!the!originating!interplay!
of!negation!and!affirmation,!of!nonTbeing!and!being.!
It!is!this!interplay!that!Freud!will!return!to!precisely!in!relation!to!the!
development!of!the!capacity!for!judgment,!specifically!in!relation!to!biological!drives!
that!establish!the!possibility!of!psychological!life!while!standing!against!the!specific!
demands!of!thought.!Thought!is!possible!only!to!the!extent!that!the!barrage!of!sensory!
and!affective!input!is!moderated!and!thus!only!under!the!condition!of!exclusion.!Yet!
what!is!excluded!is,!for!all!that,!registered!as!an!exclusion,!which!is!precisely!how!to!
understand!the!logic!of!repression!and!its!instrument!or!field!of!expression,!the!
unconscious.!To!Freud’s!riveting!claim!that!the!unconscious!knows!no!negation!one!has!
to!add!the!observation!that!the!unconscious!itself!is!the!domain!of!the!negated!that!
makes!possible!the!logically!richer!language!of!consciousness.!We!might!further!point!
out!that!consciousness!bears!the!fundamental!structural!relationship!of!negation!to!the!
unconscious.!To!this!extent,!the!unconscious!is!the!infinite!apprehension!with!which!
consciousness!is!both!identical!and!nonTidentical.!When!Freud!assures!us!of!the!
analysand’s!confession,!“You!can!be!certain!it!is!not!my!mother,”!that!the!dream!figure!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12!Phenomenology"of"Spirit,!§95.!
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in!question!is!indeed!his!mother,!it!is!important!to!understand!both!the!contradiction!
involved!and!its!resolution.!I!want!to!suggest!that!if!we!read!this!not!in!terms!of!
pathogenic!organization!but!in!terms!of!the!structure!of!symbolic!assent/engagement!
what!we!have!here!is!a!local!picture!of!Hegelian!dialectic.!
If!Freud!offers!us!a!more!precise!elaboration!of,!and!a!contrast!with,!the!
Hegelian!picture!of!the!essential!negativity!of!consciousness,!it!is!Frege!who!brings!into!
similarly!precise!focus!the!irreducibly!inferential!setting!of!the!concept,!which!Hegel!so!
richly,!if!diffusely,!explores.!Although!in!some!sense!Hegel’s!Logic"is!a!more!
thoroughgoing!Begriffschrift"than!Frege’s,!he!shares!with!Frege!the!philosophical!
ambition!of!overcoming!the!illusion!of!the!autonomy!of!names,!predicates!and!the!
objects!and!properties!they!designate.!On!the!other!hand,!Hegel’s!is!more!a!logic!of!
Gedanke!than!Schrift,!and!so!aspires!to!a!formalism!of!rational!constitution!rather!than!
orthographic"clarity.13!Paradoxically,!Hegel’s!concept"logic!is!also!ultimately!more!
attuned!to!the!propositional!framework!of!thinking!and!saying!than!Frege’s!logic,!which!
in!the!end!returns!logic!to!its!archaic!ground,!i.e.,!to!the!Adamic!ground!of!naming,!
despite!Frege’s!valiant!effort!to!confer!upon!assertion!the!status!of!logical!form.!This!is!
so!because!sentences,!on!Frege’s!account,!turn!out!to!be!complex!names,!though!what!
they!name,!i.e.,!truth!values,!remains!a!little!obscure.!What!seems!quite!clear!is!that!in!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13!I!contrast!Frege’s!and!Hegel’s!conceptions!of!formalism!in!Chapter!3.!On!Frege’s!interest!in!the!
orthography!of!propositional!and!inferential!structure!see!Cora!Diamond’s!“What!does!a!ConceptTScript!
do?”!and!Daniele!Macbeth’s!Frege’s"Logic.!!
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this!aspect!of!his!semantics!Frege!is!as!much!a!Platonist!as!I!believe!I!have!shown!Hegel!
to!be.!
That!Platonism!and!one!or!another!form!of!nominalism!can!develop!side!by!side!
is!already!shown!by!Plato!himself,!but!it!is!perhaps!Boethius!who!provides!the!most!vivid!
example!of!their!compatibility,!precisely!insofar!as!he!looks!back!to!the!high!
metaphysics!of!Platonism!and!forward!to!the!high!logicism!of!late!medieval!philosophy.!
Logicism!in!this!context!is!to!be!understood!not!as!the!technical!program!of!reducing!
mathematics!to!logic,!but!as!the!programmatic!attempt!to!assimilate!metaphysics!to!
logic.!It!nonetheless!shares!with!Fregean!and!postTFregean!logicism!the!view!that!the!
formal!language!of!logic!grants!us!a!more!unobstructed!view!of!the!shape!and!function!
of!concepts!and!inference,!and!so!also!tells!us!something!about!the!character!of!objects!
over!which!such!concepts!can!range.!
The!possibility!of!logic!telling!us!something!about!particular!individuals!or!
instances!of!a!given!concept,!or!least!telling!us!something!of!philosophical!interest,!is!
hardly!obvious!and!takes!us!to!the!heart!of!the!matter!concerning!negation.!If!logic!tells!
us!nothing!about!the!character!of!particulars,!that!is,!if!it!is!indifferent!to!the!instances!
over!which!concepts!range,!and!thus!truths!about!those!instances,!then!it!is!pretty!
clearly!irrelevant!to!the!assessment!of!ordinary!speech!about!particulars!and!their!
eventualities.!This!raises!far!more!serious!questions!for!nominalists!than!for!realists,!but!
for!both!it!divides!philosophical!from!quotidian!discourse!in!principle.!Yet!it!raises!more!
serious!questions!about!how!we!determine!what!level!of!generality!or!universality!is!
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relevant,!as!a!matter!of!principle,!to!philosophical!discourse.!If!individual!men!are!of!no!
philosophical!consequence,!what!is!it!that!makes!the!species!man!of!interest,!given!the!
greater!generality!of!animal,!or!substance?!
If!it!is!claimed!that!only!what!can!be!defined!is!of!relevance!to!philosophy,!and!
only!what!is!essential!sub"species"aeternitatis!can!be!defined,!we!have!to!insist!that!
individuals!don’t!have!the!relevant!sorts!of!essences,!which!seems!to!beg!the!question,!
since!the!relevant!sort!of!essence!is!simply!one!that!is!possessed!universally!by!things!of!
a!given!kind.!Ultimately,!the!implication!is!that!we!cannot!know!anything!of!individuals!
because!nothing!said!of!them!qua!individuals!follows!from!their!identity!as!individuals,!
because!nothing!can!be!read!off!the!expression!designating!that!individual.!Otherwise!
put,!there!are!no!concepts!of!individuals.!But!why!not?!Leibniz!certainly!thought!there!
were,!and!if!concepts!are!the!determinate!results!of!deductions!that!proceed!through!
the!descending!exclusion,!i.e.,!the!determinate!negation,!of!features!of!higher!concepts,!
why!not!consider!the!ideas!of!individuals!derivable!through!an!extension!of!this!same!
procedure!(of!division)!concepts!as!well?!
In!a!much!remarked!upon!footnote!from!the!Philosophy"of"Nature,"Hegel!reports!
having!been!challenged!by!Herr!Krug!to!deduce!his!(Herr!Krug’s)!pen.!His!response!is!not!
that!the!challenge!is!itself!absurd,!but!that!there!are!likely!more!significant!matters!one!
might!attend!to!first.!In!a!wonderful!work!on!metaphysics,!Jose!Benardete!offers!the!
deduction!Hegel!had!deemed!too!inconsequential.!It!runs!roughly!as!follows:!For!all!x,!x!
is!identical!to!x,!therefore!Herr!Krug’s!pen!is!identical!to!Herr!Krug’s!pen!(by!universal!
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instantiation);!therefore,!there!is!something!with!which!Herr!Krug’s!pen!is!identical!(by!
existential!generalization).!The!sleight!of!hand!detectable!here,!a!hallmark!of!the!fallacy!
of!petitio"principii,!derives!from!drawing!out!the!existence!presupposition!of!the!identity!
statement,!but!it!is!for!this!reason!instructive.!!
At!the!level!of!identity!at!which!what!Hegel!calls!“general!diversity”!may!be!
asserted,!there!is!indeed!no!difference!between!identity!and!existence:!“A!is!A”!is!simply!
a!discursive!expansion!of!the!empty!enumerability!of!a!thing,!its!indeterminate!diversity!
that!is!the!correlate!of!its!indeterminate!identity.!So!what!Herr!Benardete!deduces!is!the!
mere!existence!of!Herr!Krug’s!pen,!which,!despite!its!descriptor,!remains,!perhaps,!a!
bare!particular.!What!is!required,!at!the!very!least,!is!the!deduction!of!the!actuality,!and!
beyond!that!the!individuality!of!Herr!Krug’s!pen,!and!that!would!require!the!complete!
resources!of!the!Logic.!Of!course!we!have!in!Hegel’s!Phenomenology"of"Spirit,!a!ready!
example!of!what!such!a!deduction!would!look!like,!in!this!case!the!deduction!of!Spirit!or!
consciousness,!and!with!this!the!constituent!deductions!of!the!individual!contingencies!
of!Greek!Tragedy,!Stoicism,!etc.!If,!in!short,!Herr!Krug’s!pen!is!to!be!properly!deduced,!it!
would!require,!at!the!very!least,!something!like!or!something!that!includes!a!
phenomenology!of!the!technology!of!writing!(Derrida?),!a!genealogy!of!Herr!Krug’s!
profession,!of!his!social!and!familial!circumstances,!etc.;!hence!Hegel’s!reticence.!All!this!
suggests!that!diverse!contingencies!and!individuals!are!indeed!deducible,!and!so!
conceptualizable,!even!if!they!are!also!necessarily!inexhaustible!in!number,!and!it!is!
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through!negation!that!the!otherwise!indeterminate!terrain!of!contingencies!is!
navigated.!
It!comes!as!no!surprise,!then,!that!in!the!recent!resumption!of!interest!in!Hegel,!
Robert!Brandom,!for!example,!explores!a!variety!of!Fregean!inferentialism!that!leads!
him!to!defend!a!version!of!determinate!negation!he!calls!“material!incompatibility,”14!
that!Jacques!Derrida’s!program!of!conceptual!deconstruction!depends!upon!recovering!
a!notion!of!difference,!what!he!calls!différance,!that!is!wedded!to!negation,!
determinatively!understood,!and!that!Deleuze’s!attempt!to!establish!an!alternative!
model!of!difference!freed!from!the!constraints!of!combination!and!any!symbolic!or!
representational!system!devotes!so!much!space!to!a!critique!of!this!same!conception!of!
negation.!Frege’s!context!principle!might!be!thought!a!counterexample!to!the!
connection!between!division!and!determinate!negation,!but!it!should!be!recalled!that!
the!context!of!Frege’s!context"principle!is!not!the!distribution!of!other!concepts!but!the!
propositional!setting!in!which!a!concept!is!deployed.!
Deleuze!in!his!magisterial!Difference"and"Repetition!challenges!the!determinative!
use!of!negation!precisely!on!the!grounds!that,!like!hypothetical!propositions,!it!has!no!
independent!expressive!power.!The!proper!rejoinder!to!this,!the!ultimate!message!of!
this!dissertation,!is!that!while!this!is!superficially!true!because!negation!itself!has!no!
autonomous,!nonTcontextual!content,!it!is!more!profoundly!true!because!negation!is!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14!Robert!Brandom,!Tales"of"the"Mighty"Dead:"Historical"Essays"in"the"Metaphysics"of"Intentionality!
(Cambridge:!Harvard!University!Press,!2002),!181.!
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party!to!the!determination!of!all"content,!inasmuch!as!it!is!the!very!instrument!of!the!
discursive!extrapolation!involved!in!demarcating!our!concepts.!In!this!sense,!negation!is!
semantically!inexpressible!in!much!the!way!that!Derrida’s!différance!is!phonetically!so,!
or!in!the!way!that!the!unconscious!is!cognitively!so.!In!other!words,!it!is!lexically!
inexpressible!because!its!proper!role!is!expressed!in!everything!that!is!expressible.!
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